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Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has implemented several policies aimed at promoting equity-based socioeconomic growth and correcting historical inequalities. This study explores the economic policies crafted and implemented since 1980 to address inequality in Zimbabwe. It delves into the transition from a focus on Growth with Equity to the adoption of the National Development Strategy 1 to confront and mitigate development disparities within the country. Embedded within these policies were clear objectives to redistribute land and wealth, create employment opportunities for the masses and improve the standards of living for everyone. While historical research on policy formulation and implementation in Zimbabwe emphasises local interest groups and politics in influencing the outcomes of the policies, this paper also highlights the intrusive nature of global forces in interfering with policy objectives of reducing inequality.  By exploring these broader dynamics, the study analyzes pauses and continuities in the forms, structure and degrees of inequality over the four and half decades of independent Zimbabwe. The paper highlights global forces like the Lancaster House Agreement, the Structural Adjustment Programmes and the USA’s Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, and how these impacted on effectiveness of these policies on redistribution of wealth.

Inequality refers to the disparity in the distribution of resources and opportunities among individuals or groups in a given society. It can manifest in various forms, such as income inequality, wealth inequality, and inequality of opportunity.[1] Inequalities evident in Zimbabwe have largely been ascribed to the country’s colonial history characterised by racial dominance of the white settlers in the colonial period (1890-1980).  Colonial development policies shaped the distribution of resources (particularly land and mineral rights), access to economic opportunities and social services (education, health and housing) in a manner that favoured the white minority over the black majority. From a Marxist perspective, the skewed distribution of land in favour of the whites historically remained central to racial, income and gender inequality discourse in the country after independence.[2]

Since 1980, technocrats in Zimbabwe developed seemingly aggressive economic and social policies and programmes to determinedly fight inequalities. The inherited colonial economy was troubled with entrenched inequalities including rural-urban disparities, educational and occupational disparities, regional inequality, income inequalities, gender inequality, land ownership disparities and racial inequality to mention a few. Influenced by the socialist ideology, the policy-making processes accentuated the state-centric nature of post-colonial development centred on land redistribution, agricultural development, health and education service delivery and social welfare programmes.[3] The government became the central channel through which redistributive programmes were carried out. How did the international scene play out to influence policy formulation and implementation in Zimbabwe? To what extent did the conceived economic policies achieve their objectives of ending inequality?

This paper presents a chronological analysis of the socio-economic policies adopted by Zimbabwe in each of the four and half decades of independence.

The First Decade (1981-1990): Growth with Equity, Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) and The First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP)

Independent Zimbabwe inherited a dual agrarian society and economy comprised of white large-scale farms and a stagnant impoverished communal sector.[4] During the colonial period, the government pursued a separate development policy that favoured the white minority over the black majority. For instance, in terms of access to education in 1976-77, the state expenditure per African pupil was R$43.2 compared to R$475.2 per European pupil, while previously in 1972-73 it was R$28.8 per African pupil against R$377.8 per European pupil.[5] The infant mortality rate among whites was only 17 per 1,000 against 120 to 220 per 1,000 among blacks.[6] In terms of land ownership, about 6,000 white farmers owned over 15.5 million hectares of land, while more than 8,500 small-scale black farmers had just 1.4 million hectares.[7]

During the first decade of independence, the new government prioritised majority-focused socio-economic policies and adopted state-led development strategies to address these colonial inequalities. As a result, the government promulgated and adopted the Growth with Equity policy in 1981 as the first post-independence economic policy blueprint. It aimed to “achieve a sustained high rate of economic growth and speedy development in order to raise incomes and standards of living of all our people and expand productive employment of rural peasants and urban workers, especially the former.”[8] Growth with Equity was characterised by high social welfarist rhetoric underpinned by a strong socialist ideology, although Zimbabwe never became a socialist country. The government aimed to enable the black majority to take control of the commanding heights of the economy and widen the masses’ access to social services.  From 1981, the government spearheaded land resettlement for the land-hungry blacks. Further, there was immense support in the form of subsidies for social services such as health and education.

The Growth with Equity policy made notable headway in improving the economic and social status of the black majority.  As Zhou and Masunungure note, the policy’s redistributive programmes significantly improved access to education and health and the allocation of productive factors to the previously marginalised black masses.[9]  Free-for-all all health and education policies caused improvement in health indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy. There was enormous progress in school construction and a corresponding increase in school enrolment for both primary and secondary schools by 1990. State education up to universities was free. By 1990, Zimbabwe had successfully attained universal primary education for all its citizens.[10]

However, several structural challenges constrained the performance of the Growth with Equity policy in confronting inequality. The policy assumed that economic growth would be fast enough to create adequate revenue and resources to bankroll national ‘socialist’ projects. This projection was based on the euphoric economic prosperity between 1980 to 1982 owing to bumper harvests recorded, the removal of sanctions and a reduction in defence costs necessitating easy access to foreign aid and the doing of business. Yet, the growth in social sectors was not accompanied by similar growth in productive sectors. Zimbabwe faced trade deficits and negative balance of trade, shortages of foreign currency and a general decline in investment and capital formation which all contributed to sluggish economic growth.  

To support the goals of the Growth with Equity policy, in 1982 the government promulgated the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) which ran until 1985. The plan aimed at achieving social justice and equity through the conception of state enterprises (SEs) “to roll out government programmes, worker participation and social cooperation.”[11] However, throughout the TNDP, economic growth rates remained low and did not meet the target of 8%. This was primarily due to insufficient investment in productive sectors, a global recession, and severe droughts during the 1983 and 1984 agricultural seasons. The plan failed to address key issues such as equitable land redistribution, indigenization and empowerment. Although the TNDP had registered some headways in creating over 150,000 jobs and supporting small-scale communal land farmers, it overall failed at its goals.[12] During the TNDP period, the economy grew by 5% compared to the target of 8%. Inflation averaged 13%, worsened by rising budget deficits.

Due to the failure of the TNDP, the government promulgated the First Five Year Development Plan (FFYNDP) (1985-1990). The plan aimed to improve the living standards of the whole population, principally, the peasantry. Yet several factors again hamstrung government efforts and projections. The country once again suffered a severe drought in 1986/1987, adversely reducing agricultural output. The shacky performance of the economy, along with the allocation of significant resources to address social inequalities, led to budget deficits and a scarcity of funds for productive investment. As a result, public investment expenditure remained stagnant at less than 1% of GDP. Over 90% of total government expenditure was consumed by public service salaries and wages, interest on debt, and transfer payments. Thus, the economy was faced with internal and external imbalances.

Despite a few achievements registered in addressing inequality issues, the first decade was basically a false start.  What are the broader global factors at play in influencing the capacity of the socio-economic policies of the first decade to achieve their stated goal of eliminating inequality? First, it should be noted that the new government’s socialist slant scared away foreign investment, upsetting the development of the private sector. At the same time, the government partially relied on international aid (which was generally opposed to socialism) to roll out the programmes. Two important factors were critical in defining Zimbabwe’s capacity to sustain its programmes in dealing with inequality:  the Lancaster House Constitution, which protected the interests of white capitalists; and the reliance on donor aid from countries who were ordinarily opposed Zimbabwe's development as a socialist state.

The 1980s land reform exercise was couched within the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 which specified that all land be attained on a “willing-buyer willing-seller” basis and that payment for any land so acquired was to be designated in foreign currency. These tight conditions slowed down land reform and set targets were not met. While some land transfer occurred, it was below the official targets. Only one-fifth of the projected 162,000 families were resettled.[13] This poor performance was blamed on “incongruent forces that enter[ed] the system from outside [and] lack of imagination and commitment on the part of policymakers.”[14] Support from the donor community for the programme was meagre. Consequently, land was expensive and only available mainly in marginal production areas owing to the “willing-buyer willing-seller” condition. Despite the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1985, which gave the government the first option to purchase land on offer, it did not address the problem of the lack of adequate land where planned resettlement was more feasible. As Mandaza puts it, the Lancaster House Agreement provided “imperialism with the opportunity to be an umpire in a match in which it had vested interests.”[15]

The Second Decade (1991-2000): Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST)

By 1990, it was evident that the economy had failed to grow as projected in the previous decade. There was an expanding inverse proportion between employment and population growth, severely reducing incomes. The formal sector created only 18,000 jobs, only 10% of the required level. Given this realisation, on January 18, 1991, the government with advice from the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Fund and the World Bank) adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) from 1991 to 1995. The programme was mute on the need to address inequality but focused on attempting to restructure the economy from high regulation to liberalisation. ESAP aimed to reduce the deficit from 10% of GDP to approximately 5% by 19945. It was expected to reform public enterprises to abolish subsidies which caused a huge budgetary burden, and to reduce the number of civil servants.[16] The goal was to reduce the wage bill. It also wanted to facilitate labour law reforms by amending the Labour Act to rationalise appointment and dismissal and ease retrenchment processes.  

ESAP broadly failed to stimulate economic development in Zimbabwe and worsened inequality in the country. What was the role of international financial institutions and ‘global forces’ in perpetuating social and economic disparities in Zimbabwe? Crafted by the IMF and the World Bank (apostles of global capitalism), ESAP was perceived by the Zimbabwean public as a tool to reorient the economy from its socialist slant to a capitalistic one. By suspending subsidies on social services and cutting the wage bill through retrenchments, ESAP worsened inequality and became synonymous with poverty in Zimbabwe’s shopfloor lingo. Suspicion over the intentions of the IMF and WB, given the competing ideological grounding of the Zimbabwean state and the international financial institutions, complicated the implementation of ESAP programmes. From the economic front, liberalisation exposed the local manufacturing sector to stiff import competition. At a local level, the programme was also affected by natural factors, particularly the prolonged 1991/2 drought. By 1995, the country’s deficit had reached up to 13% of GDP. Inflation worsened, which eroded peoples’ purchasing power.[17]

In reaction, the government launched the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) (1996-2000). Although it was meant to continue the unfinished business of ESAP, such as  parastatal reforms, financial sector reform, and civil service reform, it also vowed to address worsening inequality by confronting the “constraints to economic growth, employment creation and poverty alleviation as well as facilitating public and private savings and investment.”[18] ZIMPREST aimed to “provide a firm basis for sustainable growth, greater employment and equitable distribution of incomes… to prop up private sector role in production and distribution of goods and services with government to act as an enabler while the private sector was to lead in growing the economy and employment creation.”[19]

Like preceding policies and programmes, ZIMPREST fared poorly. Owing to its waning political chances, the ruling party government ditched meaningful programmes to redistribute incomes and widen economic chances to the broader population. It decided to patronise key stakeholders in its political life, particularly liberation war veterans.  In 1997 the government made an unbudgeted once-off payment of Z$50,000 (then worth $1,315) and long-term pensions to 60,000 liberation war veterans.[20] At about the same time the government participated in an expensive civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Those massive expenditures reduced the financial resources to roll out programmes to improve the standards of the people.  The economic consequences of this had lasting repercussions. On November 14, 1997, the local currency lost 71.5% of its value against the United States dollar and the stock market crashed by 46%.[21]

The Third Decade (2001-2010): The Fast-Track Land Reform Programme 

Zimbabwe’s third decade of political independence was marked by social and economic turmoil that headlined globally. Within the context of challenges, the government developed several economic policies, most of which were never implemented, evaluated or even talked about. One key programme nonetheless dominates the discourse on Zimbabwe’s third decade: the 2000 Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The FTLRP was an unparalleled countrywide occupation of farms and estates owned by white farmers by the supposedly landless blacks due to delayed land and agrarian reforms.[22] The FTLRP occurred in two main phases. The first phase was the 1998-2000 seizure of white-owned farms by war veterans. However, such occupations and the demand that 20% of the land be set for the war veterans were not recognised by the ZANU-PF led government.[23] The second phase was the formalisation of land acquisition and speedy redistribution of the land from July 2000.[24] While the programme was a reaction to the colonial processes of land dispossession among the black majority and slothful agrarian change during the post-colonial period, the political motivations of the FTLRP distorted its justification as a fight against inequality. 

Whereas the major objective raised for the FTLTP was the need to amend the problem of unequal distribution of land emanating from colonialism and to support agricultural production in communal areas, the FTLRP was perceptibly an issue of political survival. Among the many political pressures threatening the survival of the ZANU PF government included the failure of bilateral negotiations for funding the land reform with Britain in 1997, and the demand for land by the war veterans. These pressures were worsened by the rejection of the 2000 draft constitution in a referendum which meant political doom for ZANU-PF.[25] These and other political threats led the government to use farm invasions to revive its political fortunes. Owing to the political overtures, access to land was largely guaranteed by loyalty to the ruling party rather than any genuine reason to redistribute land.[26]

Importantly, the way the FTLRP was carried out provoked the USA to pass the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001. ZIDERA was meant to pressure the Zimbabwean government to respect human and property rights in response to the land appropriated from mostly white commercial farmers for redistribution to the majority land hungry black Zimbabweans. The Act had widespread implications to the Zimbabwean economy as it comprised of freezing of assets and imposing travel restrictions to some Zimbabwean officials, restrictions on USA investment and trade with Zimbabwe and prohibition of USA international financial institution loans to Zimbabwe. In 2002, the EU followed suit by imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe which included travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargo and restrictions on financial transitions and trade with Zimbabwe.[27] The impact of ZIDERA and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe’s economy and society has been widely debated. However, what is notable is these two global forces made a significant impact in worsening poverty in Zimbabwe and further compromising Zimbabwe’s fight against inequality. The policies that were developed in the following years were crafted within the context of sanctions and were significantly influenced thus.   

The Fourth Decade (2011-2020): Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET)

Following the end of the Government of National Unity (GNU) (2009-2013)[28] the government launched the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET). ZIMASSET’s theme was “Towards an Empowered Society and a Growing Economy.” ZIMASSET aimed to foster economic growth and be one of the strongest economies in Africa within the context of the USA and EU-imposed sanctions. ZIMASSET focused on four critical clusters: food security and nutrition, social service and poverty eradication, infrastructure and utilities and poverty eradication, and value-added beneficiaries.[29] ZIMASSET was essentially a populist socialist policy from which everyone in the country would benefit. The agricultural sector and infrastructural sectors largely focusing on transport; power generation; ICT; tourism and enhanced support for the SMEs and cooperative sectors, were deemed to be the key drivers of the economy to create employment.

However, like many of its predecessors, the implementation of ZIMASSET was fraught with many structural challenges which triggered its failure to reduce inequality and eradicate poverty in the country. Its major limitation was funding. Given its ambitious nature, ZIMASSET needed a huge amount of foreign currency through donor aid and foreign direct investments. However, Zimbabwe’s socialist empowerment policies like the FTLRP and indigenisation policies scared away donors and foreign investment.  Furthermore, the high unemployment rate in the country significantly narrowed the tax revenue base that the government targeted to use to supplement its ZIMASSET policy. Furthermore, the agricultural sector which is one of Zimbabwe’s main sources of foreign currency was decimated during the FTLRP.

The Fifth Decade (2021-2025): The National Development Strategy 1 (NDS 1)

After ditching the ZIMASSET policy, the government introduced NDS1 expected to run until 2030. NDS1 is a framework designed to facilitate transformative economic growth while ensuring sustainability inclusivity. It is a medium-term guideline aimed at achieving the long-term desire of Zimbabwe to become a prosperous equal upper-middle-income society by 2030. The NDS1 incorporated almost all the objectives of Vision 2030.[30] The strategy, which emphasises the principle of common prosperity summed in the rhetoric “leaving no one and no place behind” was aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The NDS1 builds on four guiding principles; “bold and transformative measures,” “domestic growth mobilisation,” “leveraging competitive advantages” and “commitment to good governance.”

Five years after its promulgation, NDS1 is yet to make any meaningful results as far as the desire to reduce inequality in Zimbabwe is concerned. For instance, the 2022 to 2024 national budgets, which were part of the implementation of NDS1, were criticised for widening inequalities between rich and poor Zimbabweans and not doing enough to eradicate poverty. The distribution of resources and economic opportunities remain skewed, pushing it further from achieving equality. The austerity measures introduced in the 2022 budget increased the tax burden on the poor who subsist on the informal economy. These measures constrained household incomes through skewed resource transfers which worsened poverty and inequality. Overall, despite efforts outlined in the NDS1 to promote inclusive growth and leverage Zimbabwe’s competitive advantages, the current economic situation reflected in the 2022 -2024 budget does not seem to be effectively addressing inequality or poverty in any significant manner.

Conclusion

Zimbabwe’s fight against inequality since 1980 has largely been piecemeal. Rather than reducing inequality, poverty and the gap between the rich and the poor have worsened. The country’s economy remains fragile. This calls into political economy question, who benefitted from the succeeding economic policies, and what interests (local and global) were at stake in shaping the course of Zimbabwe’s confrontation with equality.

Locally, the politics of patronage remains a glaringly big factor in expanding the gap between the rich and the poor. The allocation of resources – land and mineral rights, for instance – is skewed in favour of the political elite with strong connections at the expense of the masses. This opens another impeccable lead to another factor – corruption. Together, these factors have created structural inefficiencies in the implementation of programmes to improve the lot of Zimbabwean masses.

Globally, Zimbabwe’s socialist ideological orientation since independence has also contributed to the failure of projects designed to reduce inequality. International financial institutions, the donor community did not support Zimbabwe’s socialist programmes and they fell outside capitalism and the principles of liberal democracy. The introduction of ESAP, which worsened inequality in Zimbabwe, was an effort to remove Zimbabwe from its socialist slant. ZIDERA and the EU sanctions were imposed largely to oppose Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform programme. Given the failures of the past four and half decades in addressing inequality in Zimbabwe owing to both local and global forces, the prospects for Vision 2030 seem grim.

 

 

 

[1] A. B. Atkinson, Inequality: What can be done? Harvard University Press, 2015.

[2] See C. Harman, "Base and superstructure." International Socialism 2, no. 32 (1986): 3-44 for an appreciation of how inequality is a product of the differences in the materialistic conditions of the people emanating from how resources are distributed.

[3] G. Zhou, and H. Zvoushe, Public Policy Making in Zimbabwe: A Three Decade Perspective. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 8 [Special Issue – April 2012], 2012, Pp. 212-222.

[4] M. Rukuni, P. Tawonezvi, C. K. Eicher, M. Munyuki-Hungwe, and P. B. Matondi, eds. Zimbabwe's agricultural revolution revisited. Harare: University of Zimbabwe publications, 2006.

[5] R. Riddle, cited in G. Zhou and H. Zvoushe, “Public Policy Making in Zimbabwe; A Three Decade Perspective, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol.2. No. 8, 2012, p. 214.

[6] S. Agere, S., “Progress and Problems in the Health Care Delivery System”, in I. Mandaza,  (ed.), Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition 1980 – 1986, Dakar: CODESRIA, 1986, p. 359.

[7] L. M. Sachikonye, “From Growth with Equity to Fast Track Land Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question”, Review of African Political Economy, No. 96, 2003, p. 228.

[8] M. Mutenga,  and V. D. Shikha, “Assessing Economic Policies in Zimbabwe the Growth with equity policy 1981,” Journal of Economic Development, Environment and People, Vol. 11, No. 1, Nov. 2022, pp. 48-58. DO - 10.26458/jedep.v11i4.786

[9] E. Masunungure, G. Zhou, and Africa People’s Solidarity Network. "An Analysis of the Objectives and Effects of Privatisation on the Public Sector on the Role of the State in Zimbabwe." Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD) and the Southern Africa Peoples’ Solidarity Network (SAPSN) (2006)

[10] E. Shizha, and M. T. Kariwo. "Deprofessionalisation of the Teaching profession." In Education and Development in Zimbabwe, Brill, 2011, pp. 59-72.

[11] Government of Zimbabwe, Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85, Volume 1, Harare, The Republic, 1982.

[12] J. Mapuva, "Skewed rural development policies and economic malaise in Zimbabwe." African Journal of History and Culture 7, No. 7 (2015): 142-151.

[13] Government of Zimbabwe, First Five-Year National Development Plan, 1986-1990, vol. 1, April 1986, p. 1. 

[14] Ibid. 

[15] Ibid p. 14.

[16] A. S. Mlambo, The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in Zimbabwe - 1990-1995, Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1997.

[17] Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), Harare: Government Printers, 1998.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] V. Sibanda and R. Makwata, Zimbabwe Post Independence Economic policies; A critical Review, Saarbrucken: Lambert Publishing, 2017.

[21] G. Marawanyika, “Zimbabwe Marks 10 Years Since Black Friday.” Mail and Guardian, http://mg.co.za/article/2007-11-11-zim-marks-10-yearssince-black-friday

[22] Z. W. Sadomba, “A decade of Zimbabwe’s land redistribution: the politics of the war veteran vanguard,” in S. Moyo and W. Chambati, (eds.), Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond White-Settler Capitalism, Dakar CODESRIA, 2013, p. 84.

[23] T. Tom and P. Mutswanga, “Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP): A Transformative Social Policy Approach to Mupfurudzi Resettlement (Shamva District, Zimbabwe),” p. 56.  

[24] “Zimbabwe Coffee Study Sector,” (Unpublished), Ministry of Agriculture, 2010, p. 28.

[25] Ibid, p. 19. 

[26] My findings here differ with I. Scoones, N.,  Marongwe, B. Mavedzenge, J. Mahenehene, F. Murimbarimba, and C. Sukume, Zimbabwe's Land Reform: Myths & Realities, Oxford: James Currey, 2010’s argument that the FTLRP was redistributive and was for the benefit of the landless poor. 

[27] M. Ndakaripa, The Debate Over the Nature and Impact of the United States and European Union ‘Sanctions’ On Zimbabwe, 2001-2012, OSSREA, Vol. x, No. 2., 2013, p. 29.

[28] The GNU was a government formed by combining ZANU PF and the two MDC formations, one led by Morgan Tsvangirai and the other by Arthur Mutambara.

[29] V. Matutu, Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZIMASSET 2013-2018) A Pipeline Dream Or Reality. A Reflective Analysis of The Prospects of The Economic Blueprint. Research Journal of Public Policy, 1(1), 2014, pp. 1-10.

[30] Government of Zimbabwe, Vision 2030, Harare: Government Printers, September 2018.