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Introduction

The scholarship on (de)coloniality has largely overlooked the legacy of internal conquests and subjugations within African states such as Ethiopia that escaped direct European colonial occupation but itself was ‘invented’ on the logic of European colonial structure (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990), treated its subjects as a “near-colonial situation” (Tarake, 1991: 21) and produced its own complex core-periphery dynamics. Though some decolonial movements adopted ‘Ethiopianism’ as their name (Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2015) inspired by Ethiopia’s successful defense against Italian colony at the battle of Adwa in 1896, Ethiopia has its own evils of internal hierarchization and asymmetrical relations of power.

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Supported by the European colonial powers, Abyssinia (old Ethiopia) conquered the Oromo and other southern nations in the last quarter of the 19th century (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990; Mergessa and Kassam, 2019). Since their occupation the Oromo people employed different forms of resistance including peasant uprisings, liberation movements, and everyday forms of resistances to challenge and subvert dominating ideologies and institutions in their fight for freedom from Ethiopian coloniality (Regassa, 2023). The latest one is qeerrroo[i] movements (aka Oromo protests) of 2014-2018. This Oromo qeerroo movement widely employed decolonial discourses to mobilize and justify the protests activities against the Ethiopian government. The employment of decolonial discourses are critical in the success of the activists at mobilizing Oromos from all walks of lives to sustain street rallies for more than three years and to fource the then ruling party to transfer power to factions of Oromo elites.  The discourse was framed under the theme ‘Fincila Didda Gabrumma’ (literally translated as ‘struggle against enslavement’). The Oromo conceptualize their colonialism as “enslavement of a free born and self-governing people whose rule of law has been replaced rule of violence” (Mergessa and Kassam, 2019: 9). The qeerroos described the government they were protesting against as ‘sirna gabromfataa’ (enslaving system) and their protests activities as ‘qabsoo bilisumma Oromo’ (struggle for Oromo liberation).

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The paper argues that the discourses employed by the qeerroo activists were decolonial in tone, and emanated from the coercive and exploitative relationship between the Ethiopian empire and the Oromo nation. Since their forceful integration into the Ethiopian empire in the last quarter of 19th century, the Oromos were denied the cultural rights to use and develop their language, practice their religion, and exercise their tradition; subjected to rules by elites from Abyssinia and the exploitation of their natural resources; and suffered from dispossession and eviction from their land (Bulcha, 2005; Hassen, 1990; Jalata, 2020). Thus, decolonial discourses were employed to call for reestablishing indigenous systems while simultaneously challenging and destroying imperial legacies, institutions, and narratives through discursive and practical means (Regassa, 2022).

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This study analyzes the qeerroo movements giving emphasis to the discourses used during the protests and the implications of those discourses about the nature of relations between Ethiopian empire and the Oromo nation. I conducted a retrospective analysis of the discourses surrounding the qeerroo protests by using critical discourse analysis and placing the study within a decolonial literature. In addition to helping to understand and interpret the nature of internal colonial experience of the Oromos in Ethiopia and their resistance discourse, the essay also contributes to discussion of decolonial discourses in the context of resistance movements against coloniality beyond the immediate subjugation to direct Western occupation.

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Historical Context of Oromo Oppression and Emergence of Qeerroo Movements

The establishment of the modern Ethiopian empire in the 1880s marked the brutal end to the Oromo people's independent existence. The Oromo people lost both their history and sovereignty as a result of the invasion and annexation of their territory by Abyssinian empire (Hassen, 1990). Emperor Menelik solidified his imperial authority and instituted a settler colonial system throughout the entirety of the acquired lands, including Oromia (Holcomb and Ibssa, 1990).  As Markakis puts it:

 

a commensurate number of people moved from the Abyssinian homeland in the northern plateau to the conquered territories in the south to control and administer them. Many more followed to take advantage of fertile land offered by the imperial state practically for free in order to expand its tax base and to exploit native labour in conditions of quasi-serfdom. Appropriately known as neftegna (gunmen), the northerners comprised a ruling class that was essential to the maintenance of the imperial state and its economy. It was large, armed and a pillar of the imperial state (Markakis, 2011: 6)

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After conquests the Oromo people suffered multiple violence in the hands of the colonizing Abyssinians. The ‘settler colony’ led to the destruction of cultural, material, and political systems of the Oromos. Large-scale exploitation and deculturation had been a part of the conquest and occupation of the Oromo (Hassen, 2002).  Oromo religious traditions were outlawed, the land was taken, cultural institutions were destroyed, and the Oromo indigenous system of government was abolished. From a historical standpoint, the assimilation policy of the successive Ethiopian rulers towards the Oromo people has always constituted sought to erase the Oromo language, culture, and national identity (Bulcha, 2005; Degefa, 2019). The Oromo farmers' status was diminished to that of gabbars (serfs), who worked as laborers for the armed settlers. The Oromo people were socio-culturally and psychologically dehumanized in addition to being exploited economically (Hassen, 2002).  Even though the Oromo people make up the majority of the population in the Ethiopian Empire, they have been reduced to a political minority since their conquest.

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The qeerroo movements which arose in 2014 were triggered by the proposed ‘Addis Ababa Integrated Regional Development Masterplan’ (The Masterplan, hereafter), which aimed to annex peri-urban Oromo farmlands within 40-100 kilometers radius to the city administration. The Masterplan was received with protests throughout Oromia, particularly from universities across Oromia in April 2014. After some lull in the protests, persistent protests commenced on 12 November 2015, triggered by privatization of a soccer field, and the selling and clearing of the nearby Chilimoo forest in Ginchi, a small town 65 kilometers away from Addis Ababa in the west. The protest then spread to other large and smaller cities/towns in Oromia. The Masterplan was viewed by protesting qeerroos as “ethnic cleansing” (Degefa, 2019), a “Master Killer” (Gutu, 2019), and as “politically motivated land grabbing” (Wayessa, 2020: 73).

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In hundreds of towns and cities around Oromia, thousands of youths joined the movement by closing down businesses and blocking roadways. The response from the state was quick and violent in reaction to nonviolent protest actions. For instance, in Oromia in 2014 alone, security forces killed 500 protestors (Amnesty International, 2014). Protests at the Irreecha festival in October 2016 led to a stampede due to security forces firing at the crowds. This led to more violent protests in the following days, before the Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency (SoE) on 09 October 2016. The SoE forced the movements to subside, but did not stop them. After the lifting of the SoE in August 2017 the qeerroos resumed with vigour and higher degree of mobilisation using events such as street rallies, market boycotting, road blockages etc. That led to declaration of a second SoE on 16 February 2018. When confronting the qeerroo resistance movements, in addition to using draconian laws and security forces, the government widely utilized colonial infrastructures to crack down including imposing large-scale network shutdowns, as well as focused website blocking and throttling to preventing qeerroo activists from mobilising online (Murrey, 2023). It also employed colonial repression practices at its disposal from disappearing, beating, and killing activists, to surveillance and intimidation, to arrest and prosecution, to dismissing dissenters as terrorists and more.

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The qeerroo movements, although triggered by the Masterplan, were an expression of multiple political, economic, socio-cultural questions (Wayessa, 2020; Gutu, 2019). As such, shelving of the Masterplan in 2016, did not convince them to back down but rather caused them to reframe demands for wider political and economic rights and empowerments. The Oromo qeerroo movement arose from historical and socioeconomic circumstances sparked by long-standing frustrations over being marginalized, suppressed, and uprooted from their lands under various pretenses by both the present and former governments. In the end, the qeerroo movement contributed to the resignation of former premier and selection of Abiy Ahmed as prime minister in 2018 (Forsén and Tronvoll, 2021). The rise of Abiy being the first Oromo to take the top leadership of the country created a feeling of shared hope and optimism for the qeerroos, but it was short-lived.

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The Discourses of Qeerroo Movements

The qeerroo movement’s discourses were amplified via slogans chanted by qeerroos on series of protest rallies across Oromia including; “Lafti keenya lafee keenya!” (Our land is our bone), “Oromia is not for sale!”, “Finfinnen handhuura Oromiyaati!” (Finfine is belly button of Oromia), “Finfinneen kan Oromooti!” (Finfinne belongs to the Oromo), “Down down Woyane!”, and “free all Oromo political prisoners!” among others. 

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The slogans “Lafti keenya Lafee Keenya!” literally translated as “Our land is our bone” and “Oromia is not for sale!” articulated resistance against the eviction of Oromo peasants from their farming land and the wide scale land grabbing around Finfinne and beyond. The Oromo people's claim to their ancestral land is part of the decolonization endeavor, which aims to free them from centuries of imperial oppression by reconfiguring the political, structural, and epistemological framework of the imperial system (Regassa, 2023).  It is a general resistance against economic marginalization. New colonial networks and relationships are being solidified as a result of Ethiopian government’s attempts to seize land from the Oromo people and give it to businesses from emerging economies such as China and India operating under the guise of South-South cooperation (Arora, 2019).

The motto “Finfinnen handhuura Oromiyaati!”, which literally means “Finfine is the belly button of Oromia”, ascertains Finfinne (Addis Ababa) as the center of gravity for Oromia implying the centrality of Finfinne question for the Oromo. During the protests, the related slogan “Finfinneen kan Oromooti” (which means “Finfine belongs to the Oromo”) reverberated throughout Oromia. It is a claim for administrative and symbolic ownership by Oromos over the city. Examining the establishment of Finfinne aids in placing the Oromo people's contemporary grievances in historical context. Before it was made a capital city of the Ethiopian Empire, Finfinne was inhabited by different Oromo clans such as Galan, Gulale and Eka of Tulama Oromos (Getahun, 2000). It was an important place for Oromo spirituality since it was the location of the annual Irreecha (Oromo thanksgiving) ceremony and was the seat of Abbaa Muudaa, the spiritual father of the Oromo traditional religion. The making of the capital city involved the dispossession and evictions of the Oromos from their land. Land payments to northern settler soldiers frequently accompanied the southerly territorial expansion of the Abyssinians and the annexation of modern-day Ethiopia's southern territories (Markakis, 2011). This resulted in the establishment of political and military command centers known as ketema (garrison towns), such as Finfinne/Addis Ababa, and the consequent movement of the elites as well as ordinary persons from the northern to the southern regions. Markakis (2011: 27) notes, “The historic role of the conquered territories was to host the excess population displaced from the north by land scarcity”. The Oromo clans that were indigenous occupants of the area were disappeared.

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The establishment and growth of Finfine also reflects Ethiopia's contentious history of colonial expansion and state construction. A large portion of Ethiopia today bears the scars of internal subjugation with regard to the exclusion of the indigenous people's culture. Finfine is the most visible place in Oromia where the Oromo identity has been uprooted and land has been seized. Such historical injustice is the source of grievances that call for the restitution of the Oromo to their rightful place (Milkessa, 2021). It is seen as a representation of Oromo oppression and the focal point of their fight to reclaim their identity and the right to possess resources. In order to restore Oromummaa—a shared identity as Oromo—the qeerroos resurrected the idea that Finfinne belongs in Oromia's administrative domain (Gutu, 2019). At the very least, the qeerroos seek to see the 1995 constitutional promise of Oromia’s “special interest” in the capital to be fully articulated in law and stop its spiral into Oromo land.

The “down down Woyane!” had been an anthem of Oromo protest.[ii] The motto reveals the call by the qeerroos to end oppressive Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated government of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) (now defunct) and quest for political empowerment of the Oromo (Interview). It emanated from the fact that the elites from Tigray that allied with the TPLF disproportionally dominated the political, military and economic powers. The qeerroos demanded democratic governance in ways that reflect genuine federalism; self-rule in their region and shared rule at the federal level and equitable allocation of benefits of regional resources and growth (Ezekiel, 2019). The call for “Free all Oromo political prisoners!” is extension of the quest for liberty, freedom of expression and association for the Oromos. Many of the Oromos that spoke against the regimes, including opposition political party leaders, journalists, activists and bloggers, were incarcerated by the government. The qeerroos were asking for the release of those political prisoners.

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The qeerroo movement discourses also emphasized the resistance against cultural and linguistic hegemony and supported the quest to revive and promote Oromo language, culture and identity. The resistance against the Master plan wasn’t only against displacement and land grabbing but also opposition to linguistic and cultural destruction. The Master Plan proposed Amharic replacing Afaan Oromo as the official language of government and education, an unacceptable change for the Oromos considering the long history of linguistic marginalization (Murrey, 2023). Up until 1991, Afaan Oromo was not forbidden for use in government functions and educational institutions. The qeerroos demanded the development of Oromo language and culture, and making Afaan Oromo another working language of the Ethiopian government in addition to Amharic. The founding of Addis Ababa as a settler colony and the city's ongoing expansion into the neighboring Oromo lands are seen by the qeerroo protesters as perpetuation of coloniality. In addition to the tangible aspect of large-scale land grabbing, the Addis Ababa expansion has been framed as “cultural genocide” (Debelo and Soboka, 2023: 715) and “ethnic cleansing” (Degefa, 2019) because it has upended indigenous social networks and cultural practices of the Oromo. In general, the discourse of qeerroo movement evolved from single opposition to implementation of city Master plan to economic empowerment, political self-determination, human right protection, genuine federalism, promoting Oromo culture and identity, and finally to demanding profound changes in the Ethiopian political system.

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Concluding Remarks

The quest for land intertwined with identity and self-determination lie at the center of Oromo qeerroo movements. The modernity manifested through urbanization and infrastructural expansion in Oromia has entangled with tragic consequences of land dispossession, political marginalization, and socio-cultural genocide. The Oromo qeerroos resistance against the expansion of Finfinne was informed by the memory of the violent structural arrangement of internal colonial settlements and administration headquartered in garrison villages, which later evolved into urban centers at the curse of the indigenous Oromos political, economic, social, cultural, and collective identities. Though numerous immediate causes might be linked to qeerroo movements, the core igniting quests are grounded against the colonial legacy of Abyssinian imperialism. It has been centered on the core elements of regaining the lost political philosophy and its premises that existed in Gadaa rules and are concordant with modern democratic rules. The Oromo people proposed big visions of democratic political ideals and self-determination rather than change to a new regime in the name of belonging to its nation. The reference to the Gadaa system—a traditional democratic political structure of the Oromo—speaks to the postcolonial aspiration of reclaiming pre-colonial political philosophies as a means of resisting continued subjugation.

Even though the Master plan was the immediate cause there were many underlying causes of the qeerroo movements that are part of deep rooted Oromo questions in Ethiopian politics. As Merera (2016) argues the underlying social ferment for the qeerroo movement was the “historical marginalization of the Oromos as well as the continued marginalization, […] maladministration and the discrimination thereof”. Thus, the qeerroo movement’s discourses echoed “the pleas of Oromo farmers who were dispossessed of their land, disconnected from their kinship, and agonized because of settler colonial system and exploitative economies under successive regimes in Ethiopia.” (Regassa, 2023: 2).

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The qeerroos adoption of the decolonial discourse offers an alternate account to the widely held belief that Ethiopia was the only country in Africa to resist imperialism (Arora, 2019). Within the Ethiopian context, colonialism can be expressed as the perpetuation of various forms of brutality and dominance, as well as the subordination of many cultures and ethnicities into the dominant Abyssinian political, cultural, and economic systems (Murrey, 2023). By instituting colonial policies and practices and denying civil equality to the Oromo and other groups, the "modern" Ethiopian state that arose in the final decades of the 19th century established a system that has continued exploitation and oppression.  By opposing the colonial policies and practices the qeerroo movement emerged to alter the Oromo nation's subservient status. Therefore, the fundamental decolonial turn for the qeerroo movement is exercising “self-determination, sovereignty, and multinational confederal or federal democracy by radically transforming the Ethiopian colonial state and its racist political structures” (Jalata, 2020: 1). It is about transforming of Ethiopian empire into a viable state by reestablishing indigenous systems while simultaneously challenging and destroying imperial legacies, institutions, and narratives through discursive and practical means.

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By using both overt and covert forms of protests to challenge the force of control, the qeerroo movement inspired inspirations of liberty. In this regard, the qeerroo movement was able to influence changes in government policies and leadership as well as increased awareness and pride in Oromo identity. However, the movement faced various challenges and setbacks. The government of Abiy Ahmed that came to power on the back of qeerroo movements is unable and/or unwilling to meaningfully decolonize the Ethiopian empire. It instead embarked on the ambition to inherit the colonial power for personal and/or group interests, which led the qeerroos to shift to armed insurgency under the umbrella of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). Future study should investigate the dynamics underlying transition from urban based qeerroo movements to armed insurgency by OLA and its implications for Oromo national struggle.

 

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