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African Social Research 6

The Political Economy of Inequality in Africa

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New Directions in the Study of Inequality in Africa

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The dismantling of inequality was at the center of the call for political independence in Africa during its high tide in the 1960s. The first generation of African leaders, many of whom had led liberation movements, viewed colonialism – and later neocolonialism – as the structural base from which all manner of inequalities emerged and were sustained. During this era from the pre-independence 1960s to the early 1980s, the dominant theoretical approach of African economists and leaders understood inequality as structural and societal in its causes and adopted a set of policies aimed at addressing those problems in equally structural ways.

At the domestic level, the new post-colonial African states initiated large-scale social programs aimed at the mobilization of resources towards the goal of reducing, if not eliminating, inequalities. In many cases, these states registered non-trivial rates of success. For example, the economist John Sender, in a remarkable essay published in 1999, documented the ways in which the post-independence African state achieved significant improvements in the societal standing of women across the multiple dimensions of education, health, agriculture and so on (Sender, 1999). At the regional level, African leaders joined other leaders in the Third World movement in calling for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that would reorient the global economy away from the unjust exploitation of developing countries towards one "based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States" (UN General Assembly, 1974, p1). Even though the NIEO did not succeed in its mission of reordering the global economic system, it had a substantial impact in shaping normative debates and strategies of emancipation in the Third World (Morrison, 1984).

The neoliberal revolution that swept through the western world in the 1980s and then spread to the rest of the developing world, including Africa, from the 1990s reversed the achievements of the previous two decades not least at the level of ideology. The neoliberal revolution resuscitated and rejuvenated theories that saw inequality as the result of *just deserts* – the result of bad policies and poor choices of African governments rather than structural barriers. African countries, under the mandate of the IMF and World Bank, begun dismantling the social programs that had been so successful in reducing inequality in the immediate post-independence era. At the international level, the Third World project collapsed under the weight of neoliberal globalization. Rather than banding together to demand structural changes to the global economy, developing countries now articulated strategies of economic development that eschewed cooperation and solidarity in favor of competition within and between countries. The result of all this has been, unsurprisingly, an explosion in inequality globally, and especially in Africa where neoliberalism has been its most violent (Wiegratz, 2024).

A series of shocks in the twenty-first century have forced a rethinking of these theories of inequality and the policies which resulted from them. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the ensuing recession was the first major such shock. These economic disasters were understood to be the result of unbridled capitalism and unchecked inequality over the preceding decades leading to mass misery across the world (Perugini and Collie, 2016). The Covid shock of 2020 to 2021 dramatically exposed vulnerabilities in the public health and global social safety net infrastructure caused by the neoliberal push to reduce the size and activity of the state. The Covid shock forced many countries in Africa and the Global South to question many of the

tenets of globalization, including the claim that global supply chains and innovations in the medical sphere were global public goods. A third shock, whose effects will unfold and intensify over the next couple of decades, is climate change, which in the absence of large-scale public intervention will wreak havoc on marginalized communities and increase inequalities within and between countries (Islam and Winkel, 2017).

This new issue of *African Social Research* reflects this global and African turning of the tide in rethinking inequality. The essays in this issue were first presented at an emerging scholars workshop held at the Lusaka Contemporary Art Center (LuCAC) in August of 2024 on the theme *The Political Economy of Inequality in Africa*. Participants at the workshop, who were advanced PhD students and early career academics mostly from Africa, presented early versions of their essays and received feedback from mid-level to senior academics many of whom were drawn from the University of Zambia.[1] The essays in this volume are a product of the interactions at that workshop. A number of key themes emerge from their contributions which reveal the shifting intellectual trends in African engagement with inequality and globalization.

The first theme that strongly emerges from this work and is represented across many of the contributions is that of **gender inequality**. The essays under this theme use a myriad of methods and interdisciplinary approaches that together weave a vivid picture of the lived realities of women in Africa. The essays by Wycliffe Alwago, Ebere Nnanwube and Tirsit Seme describe the occupational experiences of African women in respectively Kenya, Nigeria and Somaliland. The essays by Mellisa Kaliofasi and Jill Samukimba explore the different constructions and reconstructions of gender respectively among the Shona and amaXhosa in Zimbabwe and South Africa. A final essay in this theme by Bisimwa Makanishe explores the livelihood experiences of women who are survivors of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

A second theme that emerges from this work are the different intersections and contradictions between inequality on the one hand and **environmental sustainability** concerns on the other. The essay by Fadzai Chipato, for example, documents the ways in which climate change abatement strategies are themselves generating inequality in Zimbabwe. The essay by Mehdi Kharibouch studies societal impacts of phosphate extraction on marginalized communities in Morocco.

A third theme in this collection of essays looks at the **macroeconomic drivers of inequality** in Africa. The essay by Francisco Perez studies the impact of the flight of capital on inequality in Africa while the essay by Swetha Ramanchandra looks at the intersections between colonial regimes, foreign aid and inequality in Africa. Two papers by Colette Mborera and Takesure Taringana look at the roles of social policy in ameliorating or enhancing inequality in postcolonial Zimbabwe. The last two essays in this collection stand on their own and focus on issues unique to Malawi. The first essay by Mwayi Lusaka looks at inequality from the point-of-view of cultural and heritage production in Malawi. The essay by Tawonga Kayira grapples with the contradictions inherent in legislation in so far as the law is wielded to police the lives of sexual minorities in Malawi.

The individual and collective work of the emerging scholars brought together by the Program on African Social Research at LuCac gives a flavor of the richness and complexity of the *avant garde* in inequality studies in Africa. The next generation of African scholars are carrying forward the concern with inequality that was a preoccupation of an earlier generation of African scholars and statesmen. Their insights should inform not only local policy but also broader global debates about economic inequality, globalization, and policy.

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Endnotes

[1] In addition to myself, scholars who generously gave feedback were (in alphabetical order): Dr. Julius Kapembwa (University of Zambia), Dr. Mashekwa Maboshe (University of Zambia), Dr. Zachariah Mampilly (City University of New York), Victor Mutelekesha (LuCAC), Victoria Phiri (Livingstone National Museum), Dr. Cleopas Sambo (University of Zambia) and Dr. Malunga Syacumpi (University of Zambia). Dr. Dale Mudenda of the University of Zambia delivered a keynote on the relationship between trade liberalization and inequality.

Why women earn less: The role of occupational segregation in Kenya's gender pay differential

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Introduction

In recent decades, Kenya has witnessed a remarkable surge in female labor participation and employment rates, driven by a confluence of multifaceted factors. Demographic and cultural shifts have paved the way for greater acceptance and empowerment of women in the workforce, while the diversification and evolution of Kenya's economy have created new employment opportunities. Moreover, the promulgation and implementation of the 2010 constitution has played a pivotal role in promoting gender equality and supporting initiatives aimed at enhancing women's economic participation. Parallel to this, the realization of educational gender parity has equipped women with the necessary skills and qualifications to compete in the labor market.

The rise in female employment rates has been accompanied by constant changes in the country's occupational and industrial structures. There has been a transition in the labor market from predominantly formal employment to a prevalent informal sector (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics [KNBS] Economic Survey, 2023; Abdiaziz & Kiiru, 2021; UN Women, 2023). The total employment outside small-scale agriculture and pastoral activities in Kenya increased from 18.3 to 19.1 million from 2021 to 2022 with a total employment rate of 65.3% for individuals aged 15–64. However, the employment rate for women (60.3%) is lower than that for men (70.4%). Looking at the occupational and industrial structures, women have a higher representation as professionals (10.9% women, 8.4% men), technical and associate professionals (15.5% women, 10% men), service and sales workers (22.3% women, 13% men), and elementary occupations (34.2% women, 32.9% men). Conversely, men dominate plant and machine operator and craft and related worker roles (KNBS Economic Survey, 2023; UN Women, 2023). These employment trends mask significant gender disparities within specific sectors and occupations which help to explain the prevalence of gender wage inequality in the Kenyan labor market despite the advancement in women's economic participation. The present study attempts to examine these phenomena and contribute to the literature by examining the role of occupational and industrial segregation in explaining the gender wage gap in Kenya. An understanding of the factors driving male-female wage differentials is relevant since it helps direct public policies and evaluate if previous efforts to reduce gender wage inequalities have been rewarded.

The literature has sought to explain the well-known discrepancy between the average wages of men and women with a focus on the issue of unequal pay for equal work (Blau & Khan, 2017; Firpo et al., 2009; Oaxaca, 2007; Machado & Mata, 2005). However, there is a growing body of evidence that gender differences in occupational and industrial distribution comprise an equally important source of the aggregate wage differentials (Orraca et al., 2016; Ismail et al., 2017; Goy & Johnes, 2012; Demoussis et al., 2010; Khitarishvili et al., 2018). Although the literature recognizes the importance of these drivers of the gender wage gap, most studies focus primarily on the former. As a result, we do not yet have reasonable measures of the relative size of the wage gap resulting from occupational segregation, nor can we identify the effects of discrimination that remain after accounting for characteristics that help to explain both wages and occupational distribution. This paper attempts to fill in these gaps by decomposing the male-female wage differential into occupational and wage components in the Kenyan context.

Most studies that have examined gender wage differentials in Kenya (Kabubo-Mariara, 2003; Agesa et al., 2009, 2013; Omanyo, 2021; Abdiaziz & Kiiru, 2021, UN women, 2023) have done so under the framework developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) and its variants (Firpo

et al., 2009; 2018), focusing on the issue of wage discrimination or unequal pay for equal work. For the "index number" problem in Oaxaca-Blinder type decompositions, the discrimination effect is calculated as the unexplained difference between two reduced-form wage equations estimated separately for men and women. However, this conventional approach does not account for occupational distribution between men and women and assumes that occupational choices between men and women are exogenously determined. Consequently, if occupational choice is subject to labor market discrimination, then these conventional approaches would be inappropriate; in other words, the OB approach fails to adequately separate the effects of wage/job discrimination from occupational segregation (Liu et al., 2004). To address this, Brown, Moon, and Zoloth (1980) proposed an alternative framework treating occupational choice as endogenously determined and decomposing of the gender wage gap into within-occupation and between-occupation differences. The BMZ framework further decomposes the within- and between-occupation components into effects attributable to differences in observable productivity characteristics and differences in estimated coefficients. Specifically, the between-occupation effects provide a direct estimation of the impact of occupational segregation on the gender wage gap (Brown et al., 1980; Orraca et al., 2016; Ismail et al., 2017; Goy & Johnes, 2012; Teo, 2003; Demoussis et al., 2010; Khitarishvili et al., 2018).

This paper conducts a novel examination of the role of occupational segregation in explaining the gender wage gap in Kenya, using data from the Kenya Continuous Household Survey (KCHS-2021). Given the limited research on this topic in Kenya, international comparisons are made to gauge the relative magnitude. This study distinguishes itself in three ways. First, it constructs a dissimilarity index to objectively measure the differences in occupational and sectoral structures between males and females. Second, it treats individuals' occupational/industrial attainment as an endogenous variable using observable characteristics of males and females to determine occupation selection. Thus, we simulate an occupational distribution for female workers, assuming they face the same occupational attainment structure as men. Third, it investigates the separate effects of within- and between-occupation differences by adopting Brown et al.'s (1980) decomposition technique. To account for the potential bias introduced when occupation is incorrectly included and address sample selection bias of self-selectivity, a reduced-form multinomial model is employed to estimate the predicted occupational distributions, considering that securing a job may not be an individual's only priority. Therefore, this study addresses the following research questions.

i. Do the gender differences in occupational and industrial structures drive the wage disadvantage experiences by women in Kenya?
ii. What is the extent of divergence or differences in occupational, industrial, and sectoral structures between men and women in Kenya?

Literature Review

The literature on the gender wage differentials in Kenya is limited but growing. Studies have proved that women earn less than men, and the magnitude of the gender wage gap fluctuates depending on the period of study and the coverage of the data source used. Maina (2021) conducted a study in Kenya on the impact of occupational segregation on the gender wage gap. The study, employing data from the 2019 Quarterly Labor Force Survey, found a substantial gender wage gap, with male workers earning approximately 58.8% more than their female counterparts. Moreover, the study assessed segregation across occupations using the Duncan index and found that 42.73% of women would need to switch jobs for full integration to occur. Abdiaziz and Kiiru (2021) conducted a study in Kenya using data from the 2013 World Bank Skills Towards Employability and Productivity Survey to examine gender pay gaps across industries. The study analyzed the data using the Mincerian earnings framework and Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition. They found that men's wages were 27.2% higher than women's in the commerce and trade sector. In the services sector, men earned 28.5% more than women and, in the manufacturing, and construction sector, men earned 23.1% more than women. In the agriculture, fisheries, and mining sectors, 57.9% of

the wage difference was attributed to human capital characteristics.

Chakraborty (2020) examined gender pay differentials in India across the private and public sectors using data from the Periodic Labor Force Survey for 2018–2019 by employing the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition approach and the Brown–Moon–Zoloth technique for robustness checks and comparison to identify factors contributing to the gender wage gaps in both sectors. The findings confirmed significant gender pay differentials resulting from occupational discrimination. Specifically, the study revealed that rural women faced more significant wage gaps across occupations than urban women. Furthermore, the study argued that eliminating occupational discrimination from the labor force could reduce average wage differentials by 57% in rural and 67% in urban areas.

Ismail et al. (2017) conducted a study in Malaysia on gender occupational segregation and the wage gap. They used data from the Malaysian Working Households 2011 survey and identified that women's participation in the labor market has increased. However, occupational segregation and wage disparities between men and women persist. The study employed the wage decomposition model proposed by Brown et al. (1980) to analyze the factors contributing to gender-related wage differentials. The findings indicate that within-occupation differences account for the most significant portion of the wage gap between men and women. Furthermore, the study underscores the significance of wage discrimination within occupations as contributing to the gender wage gap. Orraca et al. (2016) conducted a study in Mexico on the role of occupational segregation in explaining the gender wage gap. Using census data and applying the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition technique, they determined that the wage differentials between men and women increased between 2000 and 2010. In both years, within-occupation wage differentials largely contributed to widening the gender wage gap, while between-occupation wage differentials had the opposite effect. Notably, the within-occupation wage differentials were largely driven by the unexplained component, implying that differences in the average returns to productivity-related characteristics within occupations are the main contributors to the gender wage gap. Notably, despite the notable differences in the occupational structure of male and female workers, occupational segregation did not exacerbate the gender wage gap. Women do not encounter significant barriers to accessing high-paying occupations.

To sum up, empirical studies investigating gender wage disparities present varied findings regarding the influence of occupational segregation on the gender wage gap. Some studies find that occupation segregation contributes to widening the gender wage gap (Herrera et al., 2019; Chakraborty, 2020), while others suggest that there is minimal or no effect (Orraca et al., 2016). In the case of Kenya, limited research exists on gender wage differentials that consider occupational disparities. To the best of our knowledge, only one study in Kenya (Abdiaziz & Kiiru, 2021) estimates interindustry wage differences without detailed decomposition while not explicitly examining occupation-specific wage functions in relation to gender wage differentials. Therefore, further investigation is necessary for a better understanding of the issue of gender occupational wage disparities in Kenya.

Methodology

The conventional decomposition of wage disparities typically focuses on wage discrimination (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973; Nuemark, 1988; Cotton, 1988; Oaxaca & Ransom, 1994; Machado and Mata, 2005; Firpo et al., 2009), overlooking the variations in occupational choices between men and women (Brown et al., 1980; Meng, 1998; Orraca et al., 2016). Consequently, these approaches assume that the factors determining wages and occupational selection are the same. However, if additional factors, such as discriminatory barriers to entry, influence occupational status, these approaches may underestimate the discrimination component (Brown et al., 1980). To address this limitation, Brown et al. (1980), hereafter BMZ decomposition, expanded the model and incorporated the distinction between wage differences across-occupation (industries) and within-occupation (industries) into the analysis of wage differentials. The BMZ decomposition can be expressed as follows:

$$\overline{lnW}^m - \overline{lnW}^f = \sum_{j=1}^{J} P_j^f \hat{\beta}_j^m (\bar{X}_j^m - \bar{X}_j^f) + \sum_{j=1}^{J} P_j^f \bar{X}_j^f (\hat{\beta}_j^m - \hat{\beta}_j^f) + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \hat{\beta}_j^m \bar{X}_j^m (P_j^m - \hat{P}_j^f) + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \hat{\beta}_j^m \bar{X}_j^m (\hat{P}_j^f - P_j^f) \quad (1)$$

Where lnW_{ij} represent the natural logarithm of the hourly wage for an individual i employed in occupation $j = 1,2,3 \ldots \ldots J$ which denotes the total number of occupational groups being considered, X_{ij} represent the individual's characteristics, β_j is a vector of wage coefficients specific to occupation j to be estimated. Moreover, $ln\overline{W}^m$ and $ln\overline{W}^f$ represent the average natural logarithm of male and female wages, respectively, hence, gross logarithmic gender hourly earnings differential ($\overline{lnW}^m - \overline{lnW}^f$) and P_j^m and P_j^f indicate the proportions of male and female workers employed in occupation category j. $\hat{P}_j^f$ represents the hypothetical occupational distribution structure for women under the assumption that they face the same occupational distribution as men. This predicted occupational distribution for female employees is generated from female characteristics using male occupational attainment as the non-discriminatory norm. Hence, the difference between the occupational distribution of actual males and predicted females is simply the non-discriminatory differences arising from male and female productivity-related characteristics (Sung et al., 2001). The computation of non-discriminatory occupational distribution for female employees requires a model of occupational attainment to be estimated. Brown et al. (1980) suggested a reduced form multinomial logit model to capture how various variables influence the probability of an employee i working in occupation j. We follow this approach. Goy and Johnes (2012) point out that gender differences in characteristics alone are insufficient in explaining why women tend to be concentrated in low-paid occupations. To address this issue, we employ a methodology (Heckman, 1979) that considers sample selection bias when estimating wage regressions for both men and women to generate the inverse Mills ratio ($\hat{\lambda}_{ij}$).

In accordance with Brown et al. (1980), the first component on the right-hand side of Equation (1) is referred to as the within-explained (WE) component and it represents wage differences resulting from gender disparities in average characteristics within-occupations. The second component is the within-unexplained (WU) which captures the wage effect resulting from vertical or hierarchical segregation within-occupations. It captures unexplained differences in the occupational achievement structure or the unobserved factors that contribute to the under- or overrepresentation of certain groups in higher-paying positions within specific occupations (Salardi, 2013). The third component is known as the between-explained (BE) and it accounts for wage differentials arising from variations in participation shares between-occupations. The last component is the between-unexplained (BU) term represents the wage effect of horizontal or occupational segregation between-occupations, providing insights into the equality of access between men and women to different occupations (Liu et al., 2004). The 'unexplained' term refers to wage differentials that cannot be accounted for based on productivity endowments and is commonly interpreted as a measure of labor market discrimination.

Data Description.

This study uses data from the 2021 Kenya Continuous Household Survey (KCHS) collected by the KNBS. The KCHS-2021 survey covered 17,042 households and 68,677 individuals within the households. Our sample is restricted to workers aged 15–65, which is considered the working age range in Kenya in accordance with the Employment Act of 2007 (Omanyo, 2021).

Following these restrictions, we have a final sample of 6,653 waged employees, including 4,210 male employees and 2,443 female employees, aged between 15 and 65 years. This study's decomposition of the gender wage gap takes the term "wages" to refer to gross income from waged employment, covering wages, salaries, and other earnings, including allowances, received in the past month. Table A1 (see Appendices) presents the main variables applied in the analysis while Table A2 describes the nine occupational groups which are defined according to Kenya Standard Classification of Occupations (KeSCO-2022, State Department for Labor and Skills Development).

Results and Discussions

The Duncan index of dissimilarity shows that approximately 8.9% of women would need to change jobs across employment sectors to obtain the same sectoral distribution as men. Furthermore, approximately 37% and 30% of women would need to change occupations and industries of work to have identical occupational and industrial distribution as men. Notably, the dissimilarity index for occupational segregation in Kenya has decreased over time. Maina (2021) reported a value of 0.4273 based on the 2019 Quarterly Labor Force Survey.

Table 1: Dissimilarity Index for KeSCO-2022 Occupations, Industrial classification, and Sectors of employment.

Occupation Category	Dissimilarity index	Industry category	Dissimilarity index	Sector of employment	Dissimilarity index
Occ1: Legislators, Administrators, and Managers	0.005189	Primary sector	0.059335	Public sector	0.07998
Occ2: Professionals	0.094391	Manufacturing	0.037715	private formal	0.008541
Occ3: Technicians and Associate professionals	0.014346	Tertiary sector 1	0.183123	Private informal	0.088521
Occ4: Secretarial, Clerical services, and related workers	0.049657	Tertiary sector 2	0.042		
Occ5: Service workers, shop, and market sales workers	0.065121	Tertiary sector 5	0.197696		
Occ6: Skilled Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery workers	0.099022	Tertiary sector 3	0.126169		
Occ7: Craft and related trade workers	0.008758	Tertiary sector 4	0.02683		
Occ8: Plant and Machine operators and assemblers	0.200148	Mining/ extractives	0.020753		
Occ9: Elementary Occupations	0.11882	Tertiary sector 6	0.095561		
Dissimilarity Index $\frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\left\lvert {}^{M_i}/_{M} - {}^{W_i}/_{W}\right\rvert$	**0.369**		**0.30**		**0.0885**

Source: Author's calculations (2024) based on KCHS-2021 data.

The first stage of the Brown *et al*. (1980) decomposition requires the estimation of *K* occupation specific wage regressions for male and female workers as defined in Eqns. (1) and a multinomial logit occupational attainment model. While we do not present the first-stage estimations due to space constraints, our focus is on the wage decomposition results; these results are available upon request.

The Brown-Moon-Zoloth decomposition.

Table 2 and Figure 1 present the findings of the BMZ wage decomposition between men and women disaggregated by occupational segregation and place of residence. The results demonstrate that aggregating data for all the occupations categories, a mean wage differential of 0.1144 log points exist between male and female employees. That is, female employees earn approximately 87.9%[1] of men's monthly earnings, indicating a gender wage gap of 12.1% in the Kenyan labor market. Notably, the gender wage differential has declined since earlier studies were conducted in Kenya. Previous studies reported mean log wage differentials of 0.2 and 0.6 log points in the public and private sectors, respectively (Omanyo, 2021), suggesting a positive trend toward reducing the gender wage gap in Kenya, potentially attributed to government policies to close the wage gap.

Table 2: BMZ wage decomposition between men and women by occupational segregation.

	Full sample	Percentage of total	Urban	Percentage of total	Rural	Percentage of total
Total log wage differential	0.1144 (0.0564)	100	0.0273 (0.100)	100	0.246 (0.0675)	100
Explained: Differences in mean characteristics						
Within	0.0487 (0.0143)	42.6	0.0790 (0.035)	289.4	-0.648 (0.0145)	-263.4
Between	-0.141 (0.0100)	-122.9	-0.116 (0.0168)	-424.9	-0.105 (0.00936)	-42.7
Total explained	-0.0923	-80.7	-0.037		-0.753	
Unexplained: Differences in coefficients						
Within	0.157 (0.0366)	137.6	0.107 (0.0592)	392.0	0.943 (0.0469)	383.3
Between	0.0438 (0.0392)	38.3	-0.0456 (0.0713)	-167.0	0.048 (0.0455)	19.5
Total Unexplained	0.2008	175.5	0.0614		0.991	
Sample selection bias	0.0059 (0.001)	5.2	0.0029 (0.001)	10.6	0.008 (0.002)	3.3

Source: Author's calculations (2024) based on KCHS-2021 data. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: Male coefficients are taken as the non-discriminatory vector. Decomposition based on mean values of all variables in Table A1, the estimated results from occupation specific wage regressions, and the predicted occupational attainment model. Occupation category 7 is the base category in the wage regression estimations.

Several notable points arise from the BMZ decomposition results. First, the gender wage gap is primarily driven by gender differences within-occupation. The sum of WE and WU, which equals 0.206 log points, or 106.6%, indicates that the gender differences within-occupation account for the entirety of the observed gender wage differentials. However, the sum of BE and BU equals –0.0972 log points, accounting for (–) 85% of the wage differentials, while only 5.2% of the differential is due to sample selection bias.

Nonetheless, analyzing these components of the total wage differential shows substantial heterogeneity in their effects. Explicitly, the WE component (due to productivity-related characteristics) decreases to 0.0487, accounting for 42.6% of the total observed wage differentials. The result indicates that nearly half of the wage gap is due to gender differences in endowments within occupations that positively contribute to widening the wage gap. This implies that based on their average productivity-related characteristics within occupations, men have better endowments than women, *ceteris paribus*, and this gender difference increases the wage gap.

Figure 1: BMZ wage decomposition between men and women by occupational segregation.



The WU component stands out prominently, rising to 0.157 log points and accounting for approximately 138% of the total wage differentials, all else being equal. This finding indicates that the largest share of the observed gender wage gap is primarily due to the unexplained component of the within-occupation, suggesting that the wage gap is largely driven by vertical segregation, that is, by gender differences in returns to average productivity-related characteristics within each occupation. Consequently, this signals that based on the returns to their average characteristics within each occupation, the size of the actual gender wage gap would have been more extensive than what is observed. This finding is consistent with Ismail et al. (2017) and Orraca et al., (2016), who found that a larger portion of the gender earnings differential in Malaysia and Mexico was attributed to unexplained factors within occupations. Second, the BE term is –0.141 log points, accounting for (–) 123% of the observed wage gap, while the BU term is equivalent to 0.0438 log points or 38% of the total wage gap. Notably, we observed that the effect of the BE component is greater than the BU component; that is, the BE component is not offset by the BU effect.

This finding indicates that on average, women are allocated in better-renumerated positions than men across occupations. Although the BU component is positive, indicating a positive effect, that is, increasing the gender wage gap, surprisingly, this effect is offset by the BE component; thus, women encounter fewer barriers to entry into occupations. If women had the same occupational attainment structure and choice as men, their shift to higher-paying occupations would completely curb the gender wage gap, implying that occupational segregation partially favors women in the Kenyan labor market. However, we caution against completely ruling out horizontal occupational segregation in the Kenyan labor market since the BU component is positive, suggesting the existence of barriers to entry into higher-paying occupations for women.

Third, the sum of WE and BE terms (total explained), capturing gender differences in characteristics within and between occupations, equaled –0.0923 log points, suggesting that according to their average characteristics, women should have had higher earnings than men. In other words, women possess better labor market endowments, and based on these average endowments, the gender wage gap would significantly reduce by 81%. However, the sum of the WU and BU, which captures differences in coefficients to endowments, equals 0.2008 log points or 176% of the observed gender wage gap, signaling that the size of the gender wage gap should have been larger than what is observed, according to the returns on their average characteristics. Nonetheless, when separating the two unexplained components, a different pattern emerges: the WU component is equivalent to 0.157 log points, while the BU term is 0.0438 log points. Notably, the effect of BU is offset by the BE component, while the WE component does not offset the WU term. Thus, we can conclude that the returns to average characteristics, i.e., unexplained factors associated with discriminatory practices (e.g., vertical segregation) largely drive the wage differential in Kenya within each occupation. Moreover, women somehow encounter fewer entry barriers across professions. The higher contribution of the total unexplained portion may suggest less effective legislative controls in the Kenyan labor market to curb discriminatory practices in the pre- and postentry labor market.

The gender wage gap varies significantly between urban and rural localities, being higher in rural areas, at 0.246 log points, compared with 0.0273 log points in urban areas. In metropolitan regions, the combined effect of the WE and BE components accounts for –0.037 log points or –136% of the gender wage gap. This suggests that based on their average characteristics, women in urban areas have better endowments, leading to a decline in the wage gap. However, the WU and BU components total 0.0614 log points or 225% of the wage gap, indicating that the size of the wage gap would be larger based on the returns on their average characteristics. Moreover, the combined WE and BE components account for –0.753 log points or –306% of the wage gap in rural areas, indicating that most of the wage gap in rural areas would be eliminated due to differences in average characteristics within and between occupations. Conversely, the WU and BU components total 0.991 log points or 403% of the gender wage gap, suggesting that the size of the wage gap would have been even more prominent based on the returns to their average characteristics.

The results indicate that the effect of "explained factors" (WE and BE) in reducing the gender wage gap is more pronounced in rural areas, while the impact of "unexplained factors" (WU and BU) is less significant in urban areas. Notably, the urban BU component is –0.0456 log points, indicating that on average, women in urban areas are allocated to better-remunerated positions than men. Subsequently, the positive WU component in rural and urban regions suggests that the wage differential is largely driven by vertical segregation.

Finally, the selection term differential, which is attributed to sample selection bias, is 0.0059 log points (5.2%), 0.0029 log points (10.6%), and 0.008 log points (3.3%) for the entire sample, urban, and rural localities, respectively. The selection correction terms are favorable, indicating the wage offer gap is slightly smaller than the total wage gap due to the selectivity bias in occupation

choice. The findings regarding the contribution of sample selection bias in this study appear to be more realistic than those of Goy and Johnes (2012) and Ismail et al. (2017), who reported that sample selection bias accounted for 63.1% and 35.8% of the total wage differential, respectively.

Conclusions

The literature on the gender wage gap in Kenya typically attributes the wage gap to gender differences in productivity-related characteristics and returns to endowments. However, wage determination may be altered by a sorting mechanism that slots workers into various occupations according to their skills and gender. Moreover, occupational choices are not exogenous but rather endogenously determined. Employing the Brown et al. (1980) decomposition technique, this study examined the role of occupational segregation in explaining the gender pay gap in Kenya. The analysis is based on the 2021 KCHS data, comprising 17,042 households and 64,677 individuals.

The findings are remarkable and novel. The results show that approximately 8.9%, 37%, and 30% of women would need to change jobs across sectors of employment, occupations, and industry of work, respectively, to achieve the identical sectoral, occupational, and industrial distribution as men. Based on decomposition results, men on average have higher log monthly earnings than women, and the pay gap is significantly greater in rural regions than urban localities. Notably, since within-occupation pay differentials are largely driven by the unexplained component, we conclude that the gender page gap is primarily a product of differences in average returns to endowments within occupations. Moreover, while the results reveal that male workers' occupational and industrial structures differ considerably from those of their female counterparts, occupational segregation does increase the gender page gap since women appear to experience barriers to high-paying occupations.

Based on these results, we recommend that for the pre-labor market entry policies, the monitoring mechanism could be applied to prevent gender discrimination in hiring, working to the earnings disadvantage of female workers being recruited for similar occupations as men. In all establishments, affirmative action laws should be implemented, requiring human resource departments to prepare regular reports on the hiring process, detailing the job positions by gender, and rewarding firms and enterprises that do not discriminate hiring. Legal compliance with the affirmative action labor law should be among the criteria for business license renewal and eligibility for tax exemption incentives by county and national governments in Kenya.

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Endnotes

[1] The percentage figure is calculated as (e0.1144 – 1) × 100.

Green grabbing in the name of forest carbon sequestration? Exploring the institutional and policy framework in Zimbabwe

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Climate change is an issue of global concern and one of the major developmental issues facing Zimbabwe. The Metrological Service Department of Zimbabwe has estimated that minimum temperatures have risen by 2.6 degrees and rainfall has declined by 5%, showing changing weather patterns over the past century. Climate change is already causing flooding, heat waves, and droughts worldwide. There has been a call for implementing climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. Africa is at the centre of these measures, such as forest carbon sequestration projects, involving protecting the trees at risk of being chopped down in exchange for payment to the landowner. Cameroon, Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zambia are some of the countries that have adopted carbon sequestration projects (Pagop & Savard, 2024; Leach & Scoones, 2014). Another mitigation measure is forest carbon offsetting, including afforestation or reforestation, avoided conversion, and improved forest management (Leach & Scoones, 2014). Three-quarters of the offset projects in 2022 took place in developing countries (Siele, 2024), mostly initiated by companies in the Global North. These projects have a dual effect: they conserve massive tracts of forests, while reducing carbon emissions and offsetting emissions caused by other countries. Green grabbing is the appropriation of land and resources for environmental conservation or climate change mitigation. Scholars like Fairhead et al. (2012:1) explain that green grabbing "builds on well-known histories of colonial and neo-colonial resource alienation in the name of the environment….. involving commodification and markets for pieces and aspects of nature."

Zimbabwe finds itself in the conundrum of both being affected by climate change and being a potential source of mitigation measures. Several measures have been put in place to mitigate the effects of climate change. These measures include forest carbon sequestration, investments in lithium mining, renewable solar energy, conservation agriculture, and new legislation (Tabelin et al., 2021; Jenniffer, 2023; O'Dell et al., 2020). The Zimbabwean government has also embraced carbon sequestration projects in partnerships with foreign investors as part of the mitigation measures. The latest among these state-driven carbon-trading projects is the September 23 acquisition of 7.5 million hectares (a fifth of the country's landmass) of forest in Binga by the United Arab Emirates-based Blue Carbon Blanket.

Binga, which is primarily communal land, is home to the indigenous minority, the BaTonga people, whose population is around 300,000 (Jeniffer, 2023). Binga is characterised by inhospitable climate conditions that make it drought-prone. The livelihood of the BaTongas (also known as the river people) depends on fishing and the production of non-timber forest products (NTFPs). For the BaTonga, farming is a recent livelihood, and the community has mainly remained "a migrant farming community in a *chronic liminality* condition" (Cliggette, 2014). In the face of carbon credit deals, the BaTonga are facing resource dispossession, where their livelihoods depend on the resources earmarked for the carbon sequestration projects. In rural communities in Zimbabwe, women bear the burden of social reproduction roles (Ossome & Naidu, 2021). Women gather, sell wild fruits by the roadside, and use firewood from the forest (Mudekwe, 2017; Thebe, 2017), to which they now have been prohibited access due to climate change mitigation projects. These occupy an essential part of their day-to-day lives and ease the burden on the women's reproduction capacities.

Against this background, the paper focuses on understanding the institutional and policy framework guiding carbon offset projects and how

they undermine communities. This paper attempts to answer the question of the effectiveness of policy and legal framework protecting local communities involved in carbon credits. The paper argues that the existing legal and policy frameworks are Statutory Instrument SI 150 of 2023, Constitution of Zimbabwe, Section 73 and the climate change management bill to be soon turned into law. Zimbabwe has also ratified global and international treaties and conventions, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol in 2009 and the Paris Agreement in 2015.

Methodological Reflections

The paper utilises secondary data sources, involving a systematic review of various documents including online sources, government and international reports, published journals and books. Some of the policy documents reviewed include the Zimbabwe Climate Change Management draft bill, Zimbabwe National Development Strategy 1, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development initiatives and agreements. Some of the dominant themes that emerged from the systematic review are the livelihood benefits of the schemes and benefit sharing, environmental conservation and sustainability, community participation and empowerment, institutional and policy framework issues, conflict and social-cultural issues. The review concentrated on the themes relevant to this paper: institutional policy frameworks and their effectiveness. The data from these sources was triangulated, drawing themes and conclusions on Zimbabwe's institutional and policy terrain of forest carbon sequestration projects.

Institutional and policy terrain

Zimbabwe has ratified and acceded to international climate change adaptation, mitigation and financing instruments, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, the Kyoto Protocol in 2009, the Paris Agreement in 2015 and the Sustainable Development Goals 2030 Agenda (SDG), where goal number 13 on climate action has been prioritised in the National Development Strategy (NDS 1). Noteworthy is that the carbon offset projects and the other projects in Zimbabwe are ratified under the Paris Agreement. Despite this commitment to international treaties, citizens must learn more about these provisions; at the moment, they need an understanding of the principles, including the provisions of the instruments.

To complement these treaties at the country level, Zimbabwe has made environmental and climate change issues an essential part of the legal and policy terrain. In terms of the law, the Constitution of Zimbabwe, Section 73 takes the realisation of the rights to the environment and ways the environment should be protected for sustainable development. In 2023, a Statutory Instrument SI 150 of 2023 was introduced to regulate carbon credit trading projects; before that, the projects implemented in Zimbabwe were not regulated. Following this, in 2024, the Zimbabwean government has made significant strides in advancing the development of the Climate Change Management Bill. This legislative initiative represents a critical step in the country's efforts to address the growing challenges posed by climate change. The bill, once finalized, is expected to be enacted into law, providing a comprehensive legal framework to guide climate action, enhance environmental sustainability, and promote resilience against climate-related risks. The proposed bill is being developed through inclusive participation by various actors to capture the diverse perspectives of all stakeholders. The bill focuses on eight principles that are meant to promote low-carbon development. These principles capture mitigation and adaptation, financing, measuring, reporting and verification, establishing designated National Authority on Carbon Trading, Benefits sharing, National Climate Finance, Green House Gas Emission Standards and Gender Mainstreaming.

Of the eight principles on the proposed bill, two are most pertinent to this paper: principle four focuses on establishing a Designated National Authority (DNA), and principle five is on benefit sharing. The bill has raised questions regarding the emphasis on carbon credit projects. Sceptics

worry about the duties and roles of the proposed DNA on carbon credits, raising questions on whether it will not duplicate the roles of the Environmental Management Authority, which is already a regulatory body. Other questions are raised on the benefit-sharing mechanisms in the carbon schemes and whether the benefits will trickle down to the communities where the projects are situated. Additionally, it raises questions on whether the project components will adhere to best practices or if it is an extension of the neoliberal agenda through carbon projects. However, some best practices can be drawn from earlier community-based natural resources management projects, such as the country's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), which has noted the best practices for environmental and wildlife conversation that have benefitted the communities in Zimbabwe (Taylor,2009; Peter et al., 2008).

The Government of Zimbabwe has also mainstreamed climate issues, making them central to national development strategies. Other national provisions include the National Climate Change Policy, National Adaptation Plan and National Climate Strategy. These frameworks provide a road map for implementing climate action by 2030, and USD 15 billion is needed for climate financing to achieve this 2030 agenda. Despite these sound institutional and policy frameworks, climate action needs more financing. There is consensus that a lack of institutional capacity has limited the participation of African countries in existing climate change mitigation programs (Adenle et al., 2017). Criticisms have also focused on the lack of decentralised offices to deal with these issues; climate financing in Zimbabwe is managed and administered using a top-down bureaucratic manner that has often coupled with allegations of corruption. Decentralised governance, which includes creating and making emerging markets locally relevant through participation and coordination, can address climate change (Zulu et al.,2020).

Green grabbing in the name of forest carbon offsetting

Before the SI 150 of 2023 was promulgated, forest carbon offset projects needed to be regulated and registered with rural district councils and traditional community leaders. The acquisition of land by Blue Carbon in Binga needed to have been preceded by more consultation with the community, which had been the custodians of the land. The forest carbon project in Binga is still in its early stages, and stakeholders are optimistic about the potential benefits. However, grassroots organisations are unsure of these benefits, especially since the process of the acquisition of 7.5 million hectares of land by Blue Carbon was unclear and lacked a participatory consultative process. There is a need for engagement or consultation on the forests to be earmarked for the projects (Hlatywayo & Mangongera,2020; Nyama & Mukwada,2023). This has been the trend in most African countries where there is exclusion of the indigenous communities. In Kenya, similar trends have also been noticed, such as a lack of consultation among the Masaai people, known for pastoralism, resulting in clashes between the project managers and the local community (Siele, 2024). Traditional and Indigenous groups are rarely consulted about carbon credit projects and have viewed it as a gold rush on their lands in the Amazon (Schrasmki & Neto, 2023)

The project involves protecting carbon and the resources in the trees that are in the area, resulting in restricted access to the resources. In Binga, community members are no longer allowed access to the forest resources that have been part of their livelihoods. Additionally, the benefits from the projects have yet to reach the community. In this regard, forest carbon projects are a new form of green grabbing (Scoones, 2024) and an expansion of the neoliberal agenda through climate change mitigation. The idea of preserving already underutilised forests that are not posing a risk of deforestation to offset emissions elsewhere leaves questions on who benefits from the practices. Countries can continue with emissions elsewhere while hiding in the blanket of sequestration through massive forests in Zimbabwe and Africa. The commodification of carbon is at the centre of climate change mitigation, where communities on the periphery with no voice are caught in the mix, and the forests are not delivering the claimed climate benefits. Paradoxically, with so much rush in preserving forests, there are questions

surrounding the real benefits of preserving forests. A recent study by Macintosh et al., (2024) showed that the forests in Australia were not regenerating as anticipated, and experienced negligible change in vegetation cover.

Forest carbon projects elsewhere have shown that the benefits are not reaching the anticipated communities as envisaged (Macintosh et al., 2024). This results in an imbalance in benefit sharing from the projects where community members are not benefitting. Essential questions were raised on whether the resources will trickle down to the community level as envisioned. Political capture and corruption have been central to many projects in Zimbabwe (Chipato et al., 2020). There needs to be more development in Binga District which are impeded by the various conservation projects in the area (Matsa et al., 2023). The area needs better infrastructure, more health institutions and schools, and people walk long distances to access services. The project alienates the community from the natural environment, which forms their livelihood base. The livelihoods of communities in Binga are intricately tied to the natural resources provided by local forests, which sustain activities such as foraging for wild fruits, hunting, cattle grazing, and gathering firewood. These practices are not only central to their daily subsistence but also form the foundation of their cultural and economic systems. However, the recent designation of these forests for carbon sequestration initiatives has imposed restrictions on access to these critical resources, raising concerns about the potential socio-economic impacts on the local population.

As the implementation of the sequestration project progresses, it is imperative to conduct further research to comprehensively understand its implications for the livelihoods of Binga people. Such research should focus on assessing the extent to which restricted access to forest resources affects food security, income generation, and overall well-being. Additionally, it is essential to explore viable alternatives or compensatory mechanisms that can mitigate adverse effects while ensuring the success of the sequestration project.This has been termed a new 'carbon colonialism', where it has resulted in the possibility of livelihood disruption for indigenous communities (Adebayo, 2024). In contrast, in some communities in Kenya, these schemes are beneficial, as community members have improved their livelihoods (Lungat, 2023). This is attributed to the fact that Kenyan laws are proactive and support minorities; a case in point is the Ogiek people, who won a case against the Kenyan government at the African Court on Human and People's Rights in 2012 to avoid Evictions and they recognised as Indigenous communities with rights.

In Binga, resistance is mainly covert, where the community members discuss these schemes on their own, voicing their concerns when they meet without necessarily taking a stand or organising themselves to resist this grabbing. The community members are still indifferent and need to figure out the outcomes of this project imposed on them. Though important, these everyday forms of resistance often lead to little or no policy change and impact broader struggles on green grabbing, which can be ongoing (Scott, 1985; O'Brien, 2007). Local communities need to understand these carbon credit schemes and the top-down nature in which they are administered, which is exclusionary of the communities. In some parts of Africa, these forest carbon sequestration projects have been met with resistance, showing the communities have agency. Pastoralists in Kenya have been clashing with the managers of carbon credit schemes, highlighting that the projects have damaging consequences for the communities (Siele, 2024). In Zimbabwe, this has not yet materialized.

Conclusion

Forest carbon sequestration deals and transactions are taking centre stage in climate change mitigation, with most countries entering deals with Sub-Saharan African countries. It is still new to understand the consequences of these endeavours. However, they are guided by a solid institutional and policy trajectory, including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. The institutional and policy frameworks guiding climate action in Zimbabwe are comprehensive, and the country has ratified global treaties. Zimbabwe is also working on a climate change bill that will soon be enacted. Despite

government commitments, citizen exclusion and lack of awareness about climate treaties hinder effective implementation and inclusivity. A new scramble for Africa's carbon resources is looming, and little is known about these deals, with no consultative processes for the indigenous community. The current rush on the forests' carbon credits is called 'carbon colonialism' or 'green grabbing', where these terms cite negative connotations of the projects, whereas, on the other hand, proponents view it as an essential part of climate action. The state and investors have the upper hand, neglecting minority communities in these transactions. It is too early to understand the livelihood implications on the indigenous communities; however, the lack of participation in the deals shows the exclusion of local communities.

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Feminine Intra-inequalities: The meeting and Divergent Points of Lagos Women Plastic Collectors.

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Academic discourses are rife with knowledge production on the persistent differences in opportunities and life outcomes of men and women in diverse work fronts. Less attention has been channelled towards the intra-gender inequalities and polarization existing among certain minority groups, for example women within similar work enclave and working to actualize broad sustainable objectives such as plastic pollution management. Using the case study of Lagos women plastic waste collectors, this exploratory study provides insight to existential but often ignored inequalities resulting in different life outcomes for formal and informal women actors. Guided by the constructivist epistemology, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and non-participant observation methods, the study obtained a deeper understanding of the nature of roles being created and played by formal & informal sector women waste collectors, how they work, what brings them together, their differences and resulting consequences on their human capital outcomes.

Introduction

Plastic waste collection serves as both a profession and livelihood to a distinct group of urban migrants, one of which is women of various demographic variables and socio economic statuses. The categories of formal and informal largely determine the sectoral arena where women would work. The two sectors of waste collection are marked by distinct differences whereby the formal is characterized by privately built and sanitized recycling hubs, usually a secured land space that is partitioned into given spaces for various kinds of solid waste, such as plastics, cans, garden waste, bottles, and paper. Also, there is usually a baling machine, workers and a bunch of medium sized trucks for city round collection.

Several of my interlocutors offer insight into the formal sector arena:

> "I am from Ondo state, born and raised in Lagos. I studied Law in the university. I am passionate about the environment, I love nature and that is basically what dragged me into the waste recycling enterprise." (Woman CEO waste collector)

> "I love doing the business. It is exciting if you have passion for it, if you don't have passion for it, you won't be able to deal with the Mallams (northern informal collectors), because we deal basically with the Mallams, sometimes we get insulted. So it is my passions for the job that makes me adapt." (Woman CEO waste collector)

The formal system is efficiently run by a highly educated and privileged class of women who chose this profession of their own volition, and are equally governed under an umbrella association that helps them champion their interests, projects their relevance and brings them closer to the government.

The informal waste collection sector is domiciled in the dump and landfill sites. While both spaces are used for dumping waste, a dumpsite is usually smaller than a landfill which also often serves as the final burial destination of unwanted materials (Samson, 2008). It is typified by its unsanitary/ unsafe nature which endangers the health and life of waste collectors (Gutberlet and Baeder, 2008; Ogwueleka, 2009). However, these place(s) has become the unparalleled place of material recovery and meeting point of formal and informal waste collectors, because this is where bulky volume of recyclable materials can be recovered.

The landfill can be envisioned like a mini city within the larger city that is governed by the state government waste management agency and other grass root associations that are run by retired and well off waste pickers. It houses a group of urban migrants with low socio-economic statuses whose daily needs are also met with materials that are recovered from the fields. Women usually travel from their homes to the landfills on daily basis for their routine picking and sales of materials. Numerous waste collection trucks dump municipal waste on the landfills at given moments of the day. The trucks line in their numbers, emptying their waste unto the ground. After each round of picking by the collectors, the left over waste is pushed away by the caterpillar trucks, making space for newer waste. This is why men and women trooped to the land fields, in anticipation of useful materials they can sell and use. It ideally serves as their moment of joy.

In the narratives below, women share why they embraced the livelihood of informal waste picking:

> I didn't choose it, it is condition that brought me here, I didn't choose it, I didn't dream of it at all, its condition. (Woman landfill waste picker)

> It is because I don't have any other thing to do, I have a shop but the business isn't doing well and my husband is late and I have to cater for my children. That is why I am doing this. (Woman landfill waste picker)

This bipolar categorizations discussed here does not summarize the entire group of women collectors. In the discussion section of the paper, I discuss further categorizations of informal women collectors whose experiences differ remarkably from those of landfill pickers. The section shall also discuss emerging themes that summarizes positions of inequalities of the entire women categories, their outcomes and policy implications.

This study aims to explore the concept of intra-feminine inequality, not as the classical term for domination and control by privileged against underprivileged class but as a tool for understanding how women, despite generally being a marginalized gender group, are also able to launch enterprises that brings relevance to sustainable development issues; e.g. plastic pollution, job creation and livelihood, executed in different levels of formal and informal collection.

Conceptual Framework and Methodology

This study adopts McCall's (2005) concept of inter-categorical complexity, also known as the categorical approach to intersectionality, which studies how inequality is dynamically arranged along different and opposing areas of multiple social groups. The thrust of this intersectional approach is to recognize that already existing social groups are unequal, imperfect and dynamic and aims to use extant analytical categories to build knowledge which exposes the complexities of structural relationships that foster inequalities among women which becomes the centre of analysis. Although inter-categorical complexity by virtue of its focus on structural relationships and use of apriori categories tends to limit focus to contexts, this limitation will be overcome by considering and making explicit the various analytical levels to this intersectional study.

I adopted the exploratory approach and the constructionist epistemology to understand the roles and positionalities of women in the plastic recycling sectors of Lagos state. Social constructionism helps us to know how women understand and interpret their experiences within their work enclaves, the formal and informal recycling settings (Young & Collin, 2004). This attempt supports the idea of studying the processes and institutional histories of intersectionality in a more contextual and comparative manner, thus abating the limitation of structural focus of inter-categorical complexity (Choo and Ferree, 2009). This further cements the intersectional goal of using constructionism to produce knowledge from various locations of exclusion and vocalizing the views of multiply oppressed groups (Choo and Ferree, 2009; Atewologun, 2018) such as widowed migrant landfill pickers.

I also incorporate the intersectional agenda of studying both marginalized and privileged classes of women without projecting only a group of women's multiple dimensions of marginality and its implications for their agency (Nash, 2008; Dhamoon, 2011; Tatli and Özbilgin, 2012; Atewologun et al., 2015). Thus, I illuminate the cases of one class of women in the formal sector who comprise the founders & managers and two classes of women in the informal sector who I categorized as landfill and non-landfill collectors.

Data was collected through observation, in-depth interviews and focus group discussion. Two among 4 major landfill sites in Lagos were purposively selected and 13 women pickers were interviewed at each, leading to 26 landfill pickers. 11 women collectors in the formal sector were selected via the snowball technique given their obscure identity. A group of non-landfill women collectors were also observed during my pilot observation and 8 of them were likewise investigated. This brings the total population of women to 45. Data was analyzed thematically in tandem with proposed objectives.

Brief Discussions and Arguments

The following excerpt from a formal sector CEO invites us into some sustainable principles driving active creation of playing grounds in the Lagos plastic recycling sector:

> "It was couple of different things. One, I saw a problem or need within my immediate environment. I was working actively at the time and being somebody who is sensitive to her environment I always noticed that whenever it rained there is either flooding so you hardly see where you are going, or my car tyres would get hooked at a particular route I used. This is still happening in some areas today. For me it was a personal pain, because whenever I am getting ready to go to work and it starts to rain my mood changes. And then, to make matters worse, at the end of the day, you then realize that when those waters recede, you see all of these things (plastics) just on the streets. The gym that I use is located opposite of that road so I often saw them sweeping and gathering all the plastics that the flood had washed out. Then, I started to research and ask questions. When I saw them gathering those things I would ask "Why, you know, why all of these things?" I continued to research because for me it was a problem; then I realized that this thing can be recycled rather than constituting a nuisance. I kept researching the process towards recycling them and who was already doing that. At that time, it was very intriguing to find out that it was only Wecyclers and Recycle Point. It was funny to me that such a huge problem existed and not many people were doing anything about it. So, all of that got me more curious, and I'm generally a very curious person. So, I said, ahah! What's inside that thing? Let's look for it. The more I researched, I saw all the possibilities, the impact that could be made, all the lives that could be changed, the impact it had on the environment and how it even affects me. I love sea food. If I go to a Chinese restaurant now or I go anywhere and there's Seafood Okro, those are the things I would naturally want to go for. I like fish. I like those kinds of things. And I am thinking it will get to a point that I can be eating plastic. *Olorun maje! God forbid!* So, those are some of the things that got me more and more interested in recycling so I started. I started from the garage of my house and today we are looking into building facilities." (38 year-old Woman CEO/Founder, waste collection/aggregation company)

These arguments also largely inform the principles driving other women in the formal sector who are creating a professional niche to combat plastic pollution in Lagos state. Beyond collection, women in this category also have developed further levels of enhancing collected plastics into pre-recycled state, semi-recycled or other finished products.

Other women who are not able to articulate these visions have likewise created roles to fit into the economic demands trickling from mega plastic recycling companies at the top of the value chain. Their various levels of involvement have led me to

categorizing these women in the informal sector in two ways: landfill and non-landfill based plastic collectors.

The first group is comprised of women usually of lower socio-economic statuses who converge at various landfills to pick and sort plastics and other recyclables to be sold to waste aggregators, including women formal collectors. The women created this role out of survivalist need as depicted in the quote from one of my interviewees:

> "I am here to pick nylon and sack. We pick them just to sustain ourselves and family. It's not a work that a human being should do, because of the odour, stress and the pain. It is because we have no option that's why most of us are adapting to what we are passing through." (50 year-old woman landfill waste picker)

On the other hand, non-landfill based plastic collectors consist of women who created roles as street pickers, aggregators and middle women. This group of informal collectors form a higher echelon in the informal sector collection. Unlike the landfill pickers, street pickers are women who source plastics in the broader society rather than landfill sites. The gender biases that are faced by women formal collectors have also increased the number of women who are employed as street plastic pickers by the women CEOs. Like their landfill counterpart, this is also a means of survival; however, they earn and endure better working conditions:

> "My business is plastic. I have been in this business for over 15years. Before, I sell these plastics in dozens, I usually collect them from households; neat plastics are being kept aside for me. I do carry them to Alaba-Suru market to sell them in dozens to people selling groundnut oil and palm oil, and they are very neat plastics o. Later I heard about some Chinese company, I have forgotten what their name is, the company uses plastics to make ceiling. I have done this for over 15 years to train my children. I have a child in the polytechnic and one that is about to graduate from secondary school. I pay my children school fees from this business, I thank God for this business, and I can't regret doing this business." (50 year-old woman street picker)

Aggregators (similar to some formal sector CEOs) are women who source plastics and other recyclable waste through various means, store them up in large quantity and are in turn patronized by other value chain actors including recycling companies and middle-women who in turn supply to companies in demand of them, in some cases after slight treatments. Some aggregators own land spaces at dumpsites and are usually women who inherited this occupation from their late husbands. The middle women work mainly like traders, buying and supplying bulky volume sometimes with personally acquired trucks. The various roles which are occupied by women in the formal and informal recycling sectors are largely determined by their socio-economic statuses and demographic profiles, e.g. educational attainment, income status, and environmental factors.

The Divergence of Women Plastic Collectors and Structures of Inequality

Following feminism's intersectional goal of studying both marginalized and privileged positionalities of women (Nash, 2008; Dhamoon, 2011; Tatli and Özbilgin, 2012; Atewologun et al., 2015), I briefly highlight in this section the sources of structural inequality between formal and informal sector women plastic collectors by highlighting the structural dynamics shaping how their roles are executed and their economic outcomes and agency impacts.

Firstly, the divergence of women on the basis of role performance reflects structural inequalities in the collection niche of the waste recycling sector. Role performance as found in this study is uniquely distinct from the traditional concept of role division. This is expressed in the unique experiences of a diverse group of women collectors who perform the same role in different styles given their socio-economic opportunities and experiences. Typically, formal sector CEOs and informal middle-women, aggregators, landfill and

street pickers all collect plastics and other wastes using different modes of operation.

Secondly, sources of inequality emerge from their sectors of operation which are structured differently to serve different classes of individuals. The superimposing factor determining the variation in how similar roles are performed among the women is the structural organization of the sectors which have unique structures and features. This is especially noticeable in their organizational skill/level, sources of information and opportunity for upward mobility. For example, formal sector collectors are highly organized within recognized associations from which they draw information and promote their works, share and exchange ideas through conferences which also attract government and non-government agencies, and position themselves for local and international collaborations and support.

These qualities no doubt better position formal sector collectors for upward social mobility and is hugely enabled by their skills, class privileges and well developed human capital, given that the majority of them are schooled in advanced tertiary education. Although a marginal group of informal women collectors are tertiary educated, they have not translated their skills into higher operational mode that goes beyond working for a living. Hence, women in this category are generally unaware of the numerous potentialities that lie in their field and how to tap into them.

Formal women collectors on the other hand are able to draw the attention and support of government and non-government agencies into collaborations that make lasting impact on communities. This is possible given their access to useful information, ability to organize to acceptable standards and other privileges that come from their high class positions such as the capacity to organize forums where sector issues and solutions are discussed, also in collaboration with other environmental agencies, earning them a high level of recognition in policy drafts and execution. Below, is a quick illustration of some basic structural issues underpinning inequality between both sector women:

Structures of Inequality between Women Formal and Informal Collectors

Formal collectors	*Landfill pickers*
Highly educated, creative women from privileged SES earning while consciously adding environmental value.	Mainly uneducated, underprivileged women surviving at the base of the recycling chain & unconscious of their environmental value.
Recognized drivers of the circular economy.	Unrecognized.
Able to pull external resources and validation.	Subsistent.
Minimal incidence of gender based discrimination and violence	Largely exposed to gender-based violence (basically at landfills).
Able to influence community environmental behaviours	Does not exercise agency in community.

These variations shape the agencies and outcomes of both women groups. Admittedly, while the life of both sector women goes beyond their occupational enclaves such that they can exercise agencies in their personal lives and families, this may not be generally admitted in their occupational arenas. There is a limitation to the occupational growth of informal collectors whereby the aspiration does not rise above collection for income. Collection in this sense is equally not actualized for many landfill based category of informal collectors who are more prone to competitions with men and are unable to have as much. Also, due to other statutory challenges, they are not recognized as useful agents of environmental pollution control. Their agency is doubly diminished in that they are denied the basic essence of waste picking:

> "The only barrier is that we don't have the privilege to do what we want. There is no such privilege for women." (44 year-old woman landfill waste picker)

Intra-feminine inequality as observed in the case of formal and informal women is thus chiefly driven by these two structural factors: their role performance and sectoral structures.

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Contradicting Culture and Legislation: Shona Women's Battles over Inheritance Belongings in Southern Rhodesia, 1880-1896

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The Southern Rhodesian period (1880-1896) was marked by social, economic and political changes that affected women. The introduction of European legalities disrupted inheritance practices that marginalised women's rights. In Shona culture, inheritance was governed by customary law, which emphasised the importance of family and community. Spiritual agency was significant in inheritance customs, influencing how property rights were communally understood. Property inheritance and estate management were cardinal attributes of African social landscapes in pre-colonial Zimbabwe. They (re)shaped, and (re) defined cultural practices and vice versa. This article dissects the Shona ethos in managing the deceased's estate, especially the roles and values circumscribed by kinship (*ukama*), property ownership and the deceased's agency in familial cords, showing the collisions of Shona tradition and colonial law in Southern Rhodesia.

Grounded in Africana Womanism and *Ukama* philosophy, this article debunks Eurocentric claims that Shona women had concealed inheritance rights in deceased's estates. It reshapes the narrative by recovering Shona women's experiences and uncovers histories of Shona women's inheritance in the pre-colonial period, exploring how they traverse intersections of indigenous customs, colonial laws and economic change. By examining the material and symbolic meanings of inheritance, it illuminates how women's livelihoods were shaped by colonial modernity and cultural change. Cultural and historical evidence debunks the claim that women were inherently deprived. It builds on Chinweizu, who refutes the view that women are powerless and men are their natural oppressors.[1] He contends that this view is illusionary because most men are controlled by women. Contrary to Eurocentric feminism, where motherhood is considered as unpaid work, Africana Womanism conceptualizes it as responsibility.[2] Adopting Africana Womanism enables relational understanding of femininity and motherhood in conceptualizing African marriage and inheritance systems.

This article demonstrates that the marginalisation of women was not an inherent feature of Shona culture, but a complication of European colonisation which industrialised the colony on the basis of male labour, discriminating against women and dividing the landscape between rural and urban. Rural areas were reserved for women whilst urban spaces became masculine. This is observable within the infrastructure that was established in the colonial period, with bachelor's quarters in Mbare, Highfield and other towns.[3] The legislative framework restricted women's movement to towns. Colonialism thus villagized women and urbanized men.

Methods and Materials

This article adopted a qualitative research design which relied on the archives of missionaries such as the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian Churches, deceased-estate files, minutes and reports by government officials, Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA) records, court records, reports and correspondences by District Commissioners, and 15 oral interviews. This evidence together provided rich insight into conflicts that arose over deceased's estates and policy interventions. Missionaries often overlooked or misinterpreted local practices. Africanist have devised methods of reading for and against the grain to uncover misrepresentations in skewed records. Few deceased estate disputes were settled in civil courts. Cases involving rural Africans went unrecorded. [4] To counter these gaps, oral interviews were used. Interlocutors included men and women conversant with inheritance cases from previous generations, including former and current chiefs, headmen and spiritual leaders. Proverbs were

valuable in analysing how women's belongings were understood in Shona philosophy.

Contradictions of Culture and Legislation

A collision of Shona norms and Rhodesian legislation was rooted in ontological, epistemological and power-based tensions that shaped the experiences of women. Cosmologies of Shona social organisation was grounded in holistic communal understanding of the world where identity and property relations were inextricably linked to kinship, ancestral lineages, and spiritual beliefs. Contrastingly, the BSAC's legalities foregrounded Eurocentric individualism that celebrated private property rights. These divergent worldviews created tensions, as the codification of 'native law' and the appropriation of land by colonial authorities disrupted women's rights.

Clashes between culture and legislation manifested in orally transmitted forms of knowledge and the written, codified systems of legal reasoning imported by colonial administrators. While women's inheritance rights and burial practices were deeply embedded within communal understandings of cultural contexts, the colonial legal system imposed a universal, rationalist framework that transverse Shona customs. This epistemological divide exacerbated contradictions, as women's voices were marginalised. Underlying these ontological and epistemological tensions were unequal colonial power dynamics. Imposed foreign legislation represented the coercive assertion of European dominance over Shona populations, undermining their political and economic autonomy. For women, the erosion of self-determination was particularly acute, as the colonial legal order redefined their inheritance rights and economic determination.

Contradictions between culture and legislation manifested in experiences of Shona women, with profound ramifications on belonging, personhood and cultural continuity. Emphasising individual property rights and demarcation of land, colonial law severed the collective connections between women, their ancestral lineages, and communal structures. Coupled with the imposition of ahistorical, linear temporalities, this displacement worsened contradictions, as women struggled to reconcile their culturally grounded sense of self with the alien, depersonalising tendencies of capitalism. Contradictions revealed the profound philosophical and ontological challenges faced by marginalised women. This clash of worldviews not only disrupted the societal fabric, but exposed the enduring tensions on the self-determination of indigenous communities and the coercive imposition of foreign laws.

Pre-colonial Zimbabwe exhibited oral ethical guidelines inherited from Maat constitutional principle of goodness.[5] African philosophers coined Ubuntu as the model of humanness derived from a worldview based on togetherness. Shuttleworth views Ubuntu as an ethical concept which expresses the vision of what is valuable and worthwhile.[6] Rooted in the history of Africa, Ubuntu reflects Africans' understanding of diversity, solidarity, compassion, respect, dignity, spirituality and belief in universal participation and connectedness. Existing ceremonial male-leadership had no conscious attempt to otherise or discriminate women because gender stereotyping had no place in humanness. Both males and females discharged complementary duties.[7] This concept suggests that men and women have different, yet complementary, responsibilities. It values the strengths and contributions of each gender without forcing them into a uniform standard of equality. In that arrangement, no sex was weaker. Relations were progressive and complementary as both sexes worked together for procreation and production, promoting collective ownership of belongings through ukama (bloodline relations). Equality inadvertently fosters competition between men and women, overshadowing the potential for complementary strengths that enhance collaboration and mutual understanding. Contrary to individualistic systems of social organisation, Shona culture was deeply rooted in collective ownership. Colonial individualism transformed male ceremonial leadership into discriminatory patriarchy. It revolutionarised male leadership by creating seductive connections with capitalism anchored on private property rights. Relations previously based on complementarity of males

and females were abandoned by adopting sexism. Collectivism was replaced by brutal capitalist competition which promoted private property. This is how inheritance conflicts based on deculturisation of Shona guidelines emerged.

Shona Ethos on Death and Belongings

The term 'belongings' (*upfumi*), is used in place of 'property' to differentiate it from the colonial legislation on ownership of assets. 'Belongings' refer to personal items left by the deceased, including rights over children which were common causes of inheritance disputes. Herein, 'belongings' are assets left by the deceased. Early anthropological researches provide glimpses into the importance of spirits in Shona communities' administeration, supervision, and distribution of the deceased's belongings. In the pre-colonisation period, belongings included usufruct land rights, outstanding bride wealth payments, belongings and rights over children and widows.

Families settled inheritance matters. During conflicts, they consulted *samusha* (family head), *sadunhu* (sub-chief), or *mambo* (chief). The latter would consult the *svikiro*, (regional medium) connected with chiefly ancestors, to adjudicate. Spirit mediums provided advice. When a woman died, her belongings were shared among her paternal relatives in a practice called *kuparadzwa* (distribution).[8] Maldistribution of these belongings caused misfortunes from avenging spirits (*ngozi*). Holleman observed that sometimes husbands handed over more belongings than were due to ensure they escaped retribution.[9] Children were not major beneficiaries of their mother's estate. They belonged to their father's lineage, hence the Shona saying *amai haisi hama yako* (Your mother is not your relative).[10] For women, there was a strong link between their belongings and ancestral spirits.

Shona metaphysics never conceived death in terms of extinction, but as a rite of passage to supernatural existence.[11] Africans consider death as separation of *munhu* from the body to celestial existence. Death is not the final destination, but graduation to superior existence. When one dies, the Shona say, "*atisiya*", meaning leaving the material to metaphysical realm. Shona metaphysical reality considers humans as spirits (*munhu mweya*). Shona culture perceives the dead as active agents in estate distribution, a view emphasized by oral interviews. Chief Bushu said, "it's only the body that dies but the soul continues to live".[12] Other interviews concurred that the 'dead are not dead' as they continue to influence on inheritance management. Howman noted the tremendous influence of spirits and how 'no one could quarrel with them' under Chief Hwata, a former lorry driver for a bakery in Salisbury.[13] He observed that Shona society was composed of visible and invisible members. One could transcend into the spiritual world and retrieve Nehanda; the original spirit that existed before Hwata's people moved in.[14] Most women gave oral evidence that if women were aggrieved because their belongings were not distributed fairly to their rightful bloodline relatives, avenging spirits intervened.[15] Chief Bushu argued that churches played a detrimental role in exacerbating cultural erosion.

Shona people did not believe in natural death. All deaths had hidden causes which could be ascertained by spiritual consultation.[16] Several ceremonies were conducted to honour the deceased and distribute his/her property. Sudden death caused suspicions of witchcraft.[17] Therefore, consultation of traditional healers (*kuenda kugata*) was done to determine the cause through spiritual mediums (*vadzimu)*. For Africans, divination had psycho-spiritual significance in restoring justice. This provokes questions on the role of spirits in seeking justice and truth. Colonial settlers despised this practice, describing it as 'heresy' and promulgating laws to suppress and criminalize it. Christians criticised *kurova guva* as a form of idol worship because it glorifies the dead, not *Mwari Musikavanhu* (Creator). They showed conviction that the worship of spirit mediums was blasphemous, reaffirming colonial settlers' mindset which disregarded indigenous beliefs as 'mere superstitions' and passed legislations to suppress it.

Before *kurova guva* (ritual to bring home the deceased's wandering spirit) was concluded, most Shona people distributed the deceased's belongings (*nhaka*), with only a few cases done immediately after the funeral. Most African families waited

till the *kurova guva* ceremony.[18] Beer was brewed and cultural dances were performed throughout the night to appease the spirits of the dead,[19] a process called 'libation' by Ani.[20] It derived from the belief that when a person died, the invisible spirit returned to live among descendants. Women and men sang and clapped hands as the latter whistled during night vigils.[21] Mhike's article describes this phenomenon as an expression of fluid cultural identities and evidence of youths' contesting powers with the 'civilising' influence of education and Christianity.[22] When women died, their belongings were not 'inherited' but 'destroyed' (literally *kuparadzwa*) which meant distribution to paternal relatives. Children were considered to be of different lineage to their mother, so they barely benefited.[23] 'Relatives' of deceased women claimed their sister's belongings to prevent misfortunes caused by avenging spirits (n*gozi*).

In this order, women had property rights, notwithstanding settler misconceptions. In pre-colonial settings, all kitchen utensils belonged to women.[24] Their personal belongings were believed to have spiritual consequences and were inherited by their bloodlines. This was done to please her ancestors, who unleashed spiritual wrath if the protocol was disrespected. The settler misunderstanding of these practices can be seen in this narrative about a chief's daughter in the Native Affairs Department Annual from an ethnographer Agnes Sloan:

> It was without all equipment but a square dais mud, raised a few inches from the level of the floor, on which was spread a clean reed mat. The ever-smouldering embers of the fire lay in the depression which served as a fireplace. At my suggestion that she was cold without a blanket she laughed. There was fire and a well fitted door. She shut the door to show me and told me she had a sister to sleep with. They would take their limbo and cover their faces and bodies right to their toes. If the air grew, they woke up and add some more wood.[25]

This foregrounds 'false narratives' about Shona women because it did not entirely mean that they lacked blankets. When husbands died first, their belongings; including wives, clothes and cattle were inherited by eldest sons as first priority, and those of his paternal home. Society did not associate men's belongings with spiritual consequences, unlike women's.

Contrary to Eurocentric views, women were not at the periphery of the economy. For example, Gombe noted that cattle handed over to the widow and the eldest son were controlled by the widow:

The wealth left behind by the deceased would be under the jurisdiction of the son who would be assisted by his mother. Even though the wealth would not have been left directly in her hands, women (that is the mother) had great authority in making sure it was being used for the good of the family. In fact, the woman held the keys to the wealth, working behind her son.[26]

Women controlled family wealth, even if inheritance customs bequeathed them new husbands. They determined how inheritance was used, in stark contrast to the misperception that women hardly owned property.

Howman buttresses allegations that the political arena was 'traditionally' masculine.[27] This is discredited on the basis of written and oral evidence of head women who controlled political domains.[28] Although women typically did not have direct political influence, they controlled socio-political and family affairs. Despite being the prerogative of male heads to speak, mature women had the 'ultimate' say in family decisions. When asked about indigenous customs, elders say women subjected themselves to their fathers and husbands, but there is little evidence that anyone 'really' caused them to be submissive. Women were in fact, justifiably allowed to oppose their menfolk. They played an influential role in decision making, and could override men's decisions. They were neither treated like children nor classified as 'perpetual minors' as exaggerated by Eurocentric scholars.

The Impingement of Colonial Legislation

When the BSAC annexed Southern Rhodesia, they misunderstood and distrusted the prevailing laws. They introduced new ways of maintaining law and order, dealing with crime, and settling

disputes.[29] The 1896 Deceased Estate Ordinance Act introduced a new concept of property which conflicted with Shona practices of inheritance. What was considered 'property' by settlers was different from what Shona communities called 'belongings.' They defined such items and 'rights' in relation to legal frameworks, not in the context of social ties.[30] Colonial authorities neither acknowledged the power of paternal aunts as "female fathers," in distributing property[31] nor appreciated the spiritual significance of women's belongings such as *mombe yehumai*.[32] Finally, colonial rulers had no conception of agency beyond death, but focused on will writing and quasi-traditional inheritance rules, such as "from brother to brother."[33]

The Estate Ordinance Act of 1896 and the Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1899 undermined Indigenous beliefs. They distorted both traditional inheritance laws and the powers of chiefs and mediums. The role of chiefs was not only important within their communities, inasmuch as they were undermined by colonial law. Nonetheless, the importance of chiefs was exaggerated in 'colonial' archival records because they were the ones to whom the state turned to in consulting about 'customary law'. Prior to colonialism, African people did not have a written 'customary law'. In 1939, Spicer admitted that "there was no fixed code of 'Native' law and that foreign culture is rapidly modifying the old indigenous ideas, especially among the more intelligent members of the tribes".[34] Colonial administration invented and dictated rules; informed by African chiefs who manipulated customs to suit themselves; neglecting opinions of commoners and creating gender tensions. As Ranger argued, 'customary law' was never formalised in Southern Rhodesia.[35] It lacked the originality practised at grassroots level. Ironically, chiefs and spirit mediums' roles were undermined by white's statutes like the Witchcraft Suppression Act. Their significance was overstated as a ploy for justifying European dominance. Court records over inheritance disputes indicate that inasmuch as chiefs were important, they had shortcomings. Their disparities prompted Indigenous Africans to prefer the Native Commissioners (NC) courts over the chief's courts (*dare*).[36]

Colonial law presented African women with new dilemmas and opportunities that altered the distribution of power.[37] Founded on European Civil Law, colonial law was overlaid on but did not eradicate existing legal traditions.[38] Scholars argue that metropolitan legal frameworks were less important to Africans as they were subject to "customary law," manipulated by colonial powers to "subcontract the administration of justice" and "shift the burden…onto African shoulders."[39] While customary law was unwritten and based on local tradition, it evolved on social transaction and "resisted abstraction and codification."[40] Subsequently, it was a complex amalgam of precolonial African legal frameworks, mission rules, and colonial metropolitan legal traditions shaped by early administrators and African elites in their efforts to adapt it to changing political and economic contexts.[41] Southern Rhodesia presented a complex case as the colony did not have a system of indirect rule. There was no official "customary law," but a collection of statutes governing marriage and inheritance. The law was not solely subcontracted to chiefs and headmen, but jointly administered by Native Commissioners and local authorities. Nevertheless, Africans "continued to use their own systems of justice" and were often reluctant to settle disputes via white officials.[42]

Spear highlights the limitations that Africans imposed on customary law. Chiefs and ordinary Africans shaped customary law and legal practice.[43] Karekwaivanane's seminal research on colonial and postcolonial Zimbabwean legal issues emphasized African agency within the colonial legal space, highlighting the law's fluidity.[44] Building on such research, this article centers agency further, by focusing on women and their spiritual beliefs on inheritance.

Colonial officials and scholars misjudged women's position in property management and inheritance. Michael Bourdillon said:

> Under pure African law… a woman was under perpetual tutelage […] [B]ecause of her status, a woman… was a perpetual minor who could not enter any contract on her own… nor could she inherit any property or own property beyond limited circumstances.[45]

This article offers more nuanced assessment of women's standing in society during colonialism.[46] Schmidt drew attention to changing times, showing how women had more opportunities to assert themselves in the early colonial encounters until colonial officials and missionaries aligned themselves closely with rural patriarchs in consolidating power.[47] Jeater posits that until the BSAC was replaced by responsible government in 1923 and the emergence of reserves, neither white administrators nor missionaries wanted African senior men to have power over women.[48] Makaudze's recent anthropological assessment argued that contemporary Shona women's options to "generate and accumulate wealth" are significantly underestimated.[49] Women used courts in their struggles for inheritance, as witnessed in recent cases that have stirred debate, in Zimbabwe and international human rights activists.[50] The article explores such questions historically by investigating colonial inheritance cases, allowing scholars to explore layered examples of female agency. It is important to differentiate between women in general or in relational terms. While some were powerful as *vatete* (aunt), they were simultaneously limited as wives. Only the latter situation has been rendered visible in the existing policy-oriented deliberations.

Conclusion

This article concludes that complementarity is a more fitting approach than equality in African male-female relations. This perspective respects cultural identities and aims for a balance that recognises the distinct contributions of both genders, promoting a more harmonious society. Departing from historiographical orthodoxy, the article challenged the falsity that women had little or no property and inheritance rights in (pre) colonial period. Such misinterpretation of Shona regulations about property ownership, inheritance and deceased estates management needed correction. The article did not overemphasise the prelapsarian nature of Shona kinship structures before the advent of European colonialism. Rather, it argued that even though women had fewer formally written rights, Shona culture entitled them to own property and were active agents in the broader inheritance system, particularly with regards to the distribution of items in the estate of deceased persons. Women owned both movable and immovable property as well as spiritually inherited entitlements.

Endnotes

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11 See, Mbiti, J. S. (1990). African religions & philosophy. Heinemann.

12 Interview with Chief Bushu, Chief, Male, Buhera, 2023.

13 Howman, R. (1966) "Chieftainship" Native Affairs Department Annual, (hereafter referred to as NADA), Vol. 20, p. 11.

14 Ibid.

15 An argument put forward by 95% of the women who were interviewed in this study.

16 See (Eds) Muhwati, I. Mguni, Z. Magosvongwe, R. and Munashe Furusa, M. Gwekwerere, T. (2012) Rediscoursing African Womanhood In the Search for Sustainable Renaissance: Africana Womanism In Multidisciplinary Approach, Harare: College press, p. 93.

[17] See further, C. Bullock, The Mashona. (1927), J.F., Holleman, "Disparities and Uncertainties in African Law and Judicial Authority: A Rhodesian Case Study," African Law Studies, 17 (1979): 1-35, J.F., Hollemann, "An anthropological Approach to Bantu law, with special reference to Shona Law", Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 10, 1950, 51-64. 'Indigenous administration of justice', NADA, 32: 41-8. 1979. 'Disparities and uncertainties in African law and judicial authority: a Rhodesian case study', African Law Studies, 1.

[18] Bourdillon, Shona Peoples, 211.

[19] Gelfand, 54.

[20] Arni, M. R. (2004) Let the Circle Be Unbroken: The Implications Of African Spirituality In Diaspora. Nkonimfo Publications, p.29.

[21] Sloan, A. (1923) Native Affairs Department Annual, (hereafter referred to as NADA), Vol. 15, p. 64.

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[30] Suvorova and Romanov, What is property? Moscow: Progress Publishers, p.8.

[31] See Makaudze, G. (2014). Women, wealth generation and property ownership in traditional Shona culture in Zimbabwe. Latin American Report, 30(2), p. 18.

[32] According to Makaudze, Mombe yamai is the cow of motherhood given by the son-in-law as part of the bride price. Mombe yehumai protocols and rituals can help sustain or destroy families; thus, despite rapid social changes, this sacred cow should remain (ibid.).

[33] See National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) ED6/5/1-9 (Box) Shona Ethnographic Files by Edward Wiri; NAZ N1/2/3 Responses to Circulars of Succession to Property; NAZ S1069 Native Disputes in Southern Rhodesia. See also Mudenge, S. I. (1974). The role of foreign trade in the Rozvi empire: A reappraisal. The Journal of African History, 15(3), 373-391. Coldham, S. (1998). Succession Law Reform in Zimbabwe. Journal of African Law, 42(1), 129-134. See Beach, D. N. (1983). The Rozvi in search of their past. History in Africa, 10, 13-34. Aschwanden, H. (1987). Symbols of death: An analysis of the consciousness of the Karanga, p.41.

[34] Spicer, A. B.D. (1923) Native Customs in Nyasaland in Native Affairs Department Annual, (hereafter referred to as NADA), Vol. 16, p. 37.

[35] Ranger, T., & Hobsbawm, E. (1984). The invention of tradition. Cambridge University Press, p. 21.

[36] Dare is a Shona vernacular term used to describe the African traditional court system

[37] Moore, S. F. (1986). Social facts and fabrications:" Customary" law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980. Cambridge University Press, p. 23. See Ocran, M. (2006). The clash of legal cultures: The treatment of indigenous law in colonial and post-colonial Africa. Akron L. Rev., 39, p. 465. Waller, R. (2018). Legal history and historiography in colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History, p. 48.

[38] Jeater, D. (2006). Law, Language, and Science: The Invention of the Native Mind in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1930. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, p. 195. Waller, R. (2018). Legal history and historiography in colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History, p. 10. The British South Africa Company (BSAC) imported from the Cape Colony the Roman-Dutch Law to Southern Rhodesia. The emerging Rhodesian common law was based on Roman-Dutch Law but also strongly influenced by British legal concepts and forms of justice.

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[48] Jeater, D. (1994). Gender Comes in Two Sexes: A Critical Re-Evaluation of the Historiography on Zimbabwean Women. p. 13.

[49] Makaudze, G. (2014). Women, wealth generation and property ownership in traditional Shona culture in Zimbabwe. Latin American Report, 30(2), p. 19.

[50] Shumba discusses the popular Magaya v. Magaya case, in which a daughter claimed the inheritance left by her late father. See Shumba, 'Women and land,' 237.

Exploring the Socio-Economic Impact of Phosphate Extraction on Marginalized Communities: A Case Study of the Youssoufia Province

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Phosphate extraction in Morocco holds significant global importance due to the country's vast reserves of this essential mineral (Bamiki et al., 2021). While phosphate mining has historically been a cornerstone of Morocco's economy, contributing substantially to the GDP and export earnings (Geissler et al., 2018), it has also introduced considerable socio-economic and environmental challenges. These challenges are particularly pronounced in rural communities near extraction sites, where environmental degradation, social inequality, and health risks have become prevalent (Rousselin, 2018). The complexity and severity of these impacts necessitate a comprehensive examination of both the benefits and detriments associated with phosphate mining in Morocco. What are the socio-economic impacts of phosphate extraction on rural communities in the Youssoufia province?

The existing literature largely focuses on the economic benefits of phosphate mining at the national level, often overlooking the localized socio-economic and environmental consequences faced by marginalized communities. This study contributes to the literature by providing an in-depth analysis of these consequences, drawing on political ecology and sustainable development frameworks. It also adds empirical evidence through a case study of the Youssoufia province, emphasizing the lived experiences of those directly affected by mining activities.

This research adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative data from in-depth interviews with local residents and activists with an analysis of relevant socio-economic indicators. This approach allows for a comprehensive understanding of the socio-economic and environmental impacts of phosphate extraction on marginalized communities in the Youssoufia province.

Preliminary findings from the fieldwork and literature review suggest that phosphate extraction has significantly exacerbated socio-economic inequalities in the studied communities. Environmental degradation, including soil contamination and water pollution, has compromised agricultural productivity and public health, further entrenching poverty and social discontent. Additionally, water scarcity, driven by the depletion and contamination of local water sources due to mining operations, has limited access to clean water for both household and agricultural use. The limited economic opportunities available to the local population have proven insufficient to mitigate these adverse impacts, resulting in a cycle of dependence and vulnerability.

The paper is structured as follows:

- Part 1 provides a theoretical overview of the political and socio-economic implications of resource extraction on marginalized communities, incorporating perspectives from political ecology and sustainable development.
- Part 2 presents a case study of the Youssoufia province, detailing the lived experiences of those directly impacted by phosphate mining. This section includes qualitative data analysis from interviews and an examination of socio-economic indicators.
- Part 3 discusses the findings, emphasizing the socio-economic inequalities and environmental challenges identified in the Youssoufia province, and offers recommendations for policy interventions aimed at mitigating these issues.

Literature review

The foundational discourse on extractivism and its socio-economic impacts on marginalized communities has been extensively debated. Phosphate extraction, particularly as a key component of the agricultural industry, has long been recognized as a significant driver of economic growth in African nations. Classic works by Bocoum & Labys (1993) highlight the essential role of phosphate extraction in providing raw materials crucial for fertilizer production, which in turn enhances crop yields and food security. However, despite these recognized benefits, the literature also emphasizes the detrimental effects on marginalized communities, with Gamu et al. (2015) providing a critical examination of how extractive industries often exacerbate social inequalities, disrupt traditional livelihoods, and contribute to environmental degradation.

Recent studies have continued to explore the complex dynamics of extractivism, particularly in the context of developing nations like Morocco. Raji & Nadir (2023) provide a nuanced analysis of the challenges in translating the economic benefits of phosphate extraction into inclusive and sustainable development. They argue that mismanagement, corruption, and environmental degradation often undermine the potential positive contributions of the extractive industries. Lèbre et al. (2020) further examine the environmental consequences of phosphate mining, documenting the significant impacts on local ecosystems, including soil contamination, water pollution, and biodiversity loss.

Water resource management has emerged as a critical issue in recent literature, with studies like Lee et al. (2020) exploring the trade-offs between energy efficiency and water consumption in phosphate processing. The environmental impacts extend to air and noise pollution, with Cherai et al. (2022) highlighting the health risks posed to local communities. Furthermore, Cheggour et al. (1999) discuss the risks of metal contamination from phosphate discharges, underscoring the broader ecological consequences.

The socio-economic implications have also been a focal point of recent research. Lara-Rodríguez (2021) and Malone et al. (2021) address the disproportionate impact of extractivism on marginalized communities, noting how these communities often bear the brunt of the environmental and social costs while receiving limited benefits from the industry. In the Moroccan case, Kiogora (2016) and Bamiki et al. (2021) document the inequitable distribution of benefits from phosphate extraction, leaving rural and impoverished communities with minimal economic opportunities and social development.

The literature on phosphate extraction thus presents a complex picture of economic development, environmental degradation, and social inequality. Classic studies such as those by Bocoum & Labys (1993) laid the groundwork by recognizing the economic potential of phosphate extraction for agricultural productivity and food security. However, these early discussions have been critically expanded by more recent literature, which highlights the persistent challenges of translating economic growth into sustainable and equitable development. For example, Gamu et al. (2015) and Lèbre et al. (2020) connect the environmental and social impacts of extractivism, emphasizing how environmental degradation often leads to social discontent and increased vulnerability in marginalized communities. The exploration of water resource management by Lee et al. (2020) and the health implications discussed by Cherai et al. (2022) further enrich the discourse by showing how the environmental costs of phosphate extraction are intricately linked to the well-being of local populations.

In the Moroccan context, studies like those of Raji & Nadir (2023) and Bamiki et al. (2021) provide a critical lens on the governance and distributional issues surrounding phosphate extraction. These studies argue that the benefits of the industry are often concentrated in the hands of a few, while the costs are disproportionately borne by the most vulnerable. The recent literature thus not only builds on the classic understandings of extractivism but also challenges and complicates them by revealing the multifaceted and often

contradictory impacts of phosphate extraction on local economies, ecosystems, and communities.

Methodology

This paper employed a qualitative methodology to gain in-depth insights into the lived experiences of those directly impacted by phosphate extraction in Youssoufia. A case study approach was used to focus on the Youssoufia province, a key area in central Morocco known for its extensive phosphate reserves and a focal point of mining activities since its establishment in 1960. The province, spanning approximately 4,200 square kilometers, is situated within the Marrakech-Safi region and features a semi-arid climate, characterized by limited rainfall and high temperatures. These environmental factors further complicate the socio-economic landscape, particularly for agriculture and water resource management.

With a population of 251,943 (as of the 2014 census), Youssoufia is predominantly rural, with 151,060 residents in rural areas compared to 100,883 in urban settings. The economy heavily relies on phosphate mining, managed by the Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP), along with agriculture and livestock breeding. However, despite these activities, the province faces significant socio-economic challenges, including a high unemployment rate of 32.2%, which far exceeds the national average, and a poverty rate of 18.8%, particularly pronounced in rural areas.
The primary method for data collection involved conducting semi-structured interviews A snowball sampling technique was employed to identify and engage key stakeholders, including community leaders, farmers, environmental activists, and local residents across the city of Youssoufia and two rural communes. Snowball sampling, as highlighted by Noy (2008), is particularly useful in reaching hard-to-reach populations by building trust and gaining access to key informants through referrals.

This qualitative approach is well-established in the literature for its effectiveness in capturing nuanced perspectives, particularly in areas where formal data collection is challenging. The use of semi-structured interviews allowed for flexibility in exploring complex issues while ensuring that key topics were consistently addressed. Although the study faced limitations due to the inability to secure interviews with OCP personnel, this constraint shifted the analysis to focus more on the perspectives of the local population. This grassroots view provided critical insights into the socio-economic and environmental impacts of phosphate extraction, often underrepresented in broader industry discussions.

Results and Discussion

Phosphate extraction in Youssoufia has led to significant environmental and socio-economic challenges. This section explores the severe air and water pollution caused by mining activities, as well as the resulting health risks and deepened socio-economic inequalities among local communities. The findings emphasize the urgent need for better environmental management and more inclusive decision-making processes to mitigate these impacts.

1) Environmental Degradation and Air Quality

One of the most significant findings of this study is the severe environmental degradation in Youssoufia, particularly the drastic decline in air quality due to phosphate extraction. The city suffers from intense dust pollution, primarily caused by emissions from phosphate calcining and drying plants. Residents report severe dust emissions, especially at night, which blanket the city in a thick, fog-like layer. This is largely attributed to the frequent malfunctions of electronic dust filters, forcing the plants to operate without adequate filtration. This finding aligns with broader literature on industrial pollution, where similar issues have been documented in other regions with heavy industrial activities, such as in studies by Smith et al. (2010) on dust pollution in mining areas.

This issue is particularly severe in neighborhoods close to the plants, such as Al Ayoun, Saguia Al Hamra, Al Amal, and Al Dakhla, where buildings are visibly coated with phosphate dust. Mohamed Z., a resident of Al Dakhla, described the situation:

> "Our lives have become a nightmare because of the dust from the phosphate plants. The dust invades our homes, settles in our clothes, and even penetrates our skin. We are forced to keep our windows closed constantly, especially when the wind blows in our direction."

This persistent dust infiltration causes daily discomfort and poses serious health risks, affecting the respiratory health of the community and reducing overall quality of life.

The contribution of uncovered and deteriorating rubber belts, many dating back to the colonial era, to the dust pollution issue is particularly noteworthy. These belts leak substantial amounts of dust, and unprotected trucks transporting phosphate over long distances further exacerbate the situation. The presence of large waste dust mounds near processing plants, which are unstable and easily dispersed by the wind, also significantly contributes to pollution, especially in neighborhoods close to the plants. This phenomenon has been observed in other mining regions, where inadequate waste management practices have led to similar environmental and health crises (Jones & Love, 2012).

2) Water Contamination and Health Risks

Another critical finding is the significant concern over drinking water quality in Youssoufia. Residents have protested the brownish, foul-smelling water, suspected to be contaminated by phosphate mining activities. Tests revealed that fluoride levels in the groundwater far exceed World Health Organization (WHO) standards, reaching up to 1.8 mg/L. This contamination has led to numerous health issues, including gastrointestinal problems and chronic diseases, as supported by studies like those of Jemjami et al. (2003), which confirm the dangers of prolonged exposure to high fluoride levels. This finding is consistent with global research that links industrial activities with groundwater contamination and subsequent public health crises (Liu et al., 2013).

In one alarming incident, a local family discovered that their son, Mehdi, aged 13, had developed severe dental fluorosis characterized by yellowing and brittle teeth. "Mehdi was born here and has been drinking this water all his life," his father explained. "His teeth are now so damaged that we can hardly afford the dental treatments he needs." This case mirrors findings in other regions where industrial contamination has caused similar health problems, further emphasizing the need for stringent environmental regulations and better resource management (Rango et al., 2012).
Socio-Economic Impacts and Inequalities
Phosphate extraction has exacerbated socio-economic inequalities in Youssoufia, as the environmental degradation has led to reduced agricultural productivity, increased food insecurity, and heightened economic vulnerability. Health issues stemming from pollution have reduced workforce productivity and increased healthcare costs, straining local economies. This mirrors the findings of scholars like Gamu et al. (2015), who argue that extractive industries often deepen socio-economic disparities in resource-dependent communities.

Residents feel marginalized and excluded from decision-making processes related to phosphate extraction and environmental management. This exclusion perpetuates their vulnerability and inability to advocate for better conditions. This finding aligns with the literature on environmental justice, which highlights how marginalized communities often lack the power to influence decisions that directly affect their well-being (Martinez-Alier, 2014).

The local economy, heavily dependent on agriculture, has suffered due to the pollution. Contaminated soil and water have led to lower crop yields, reducing farmers' incomes and increasing food insecurity. Many farmers have been forced to abandon their land due to the uninhabitable conditions created by the pollution. One affected farmer shared, "We used to grow enough food to feed our families and sell the surplus in the market. Now, the soil is so contaminated that nothing grows, and we are struggling to make ends meet."

The strained relationship between the local population and the OCP, characterized by a

significant power imbalance, has led to a deep sense of mistrust and frustration among residents. Despite the OCP's sustainability initiatives, these efforts are often perceived as superficial and inadequate, further fueling local discontent.

Residents feel marginalized and excluded from decision-making processes related to phosphate extraction and environmental management. This exclusion perpetuates their vulnerability and inability to advocate for better conditions. As one community activist pointed out, "We are not included in the decisions that affect our lives. The OCP makes promises, but we see little improvement in our daily lives."

3) Health and Livelihood Impacts

The environmental degradation from phosphate mining has resulted in widespread health issues among Youssoufia's residents, including chronic fatigue, respiratory problems, and various allergies. Severe conditions such as asthma, bronchitis, and cardiovascular diseases are also common, with health professionals confirming a correlation between high levels of environmental pollutants and these health issues. This finding is consistent with existing research that documents the health impacts of industrial pollution on local populations (Brunekreef & Holgate, 2002).

The impact on local agriculture is also profound, with farmers reporting livestock born with twisted legs and deformed teeth, directly linked to high levels of fluoride in the water and air. This not only affects animal health but also has severe economic repercussions for farmers, further compounding the socio-economic challenges in the region. In addition, farmers report that their animals are born with twisted legs and deformed teeth, impacting local agriculture and the economy. One farmer lamented, "Our animals are born with twisted legs and deformed teeth. This pollution is destroying our livelihoods." Local veterinarian Dr. Ahmed Z. noted, "We are seeing an increasing number of livestock with dental deformities and skeletal issues, which are directly linked to the high levels of fluoride in the water and air. This not only affects the health of the animals but also has severe economic repercussions for the farmers."

Such findings are in line with global studies on the adverse effects of industrial pollution on agriculture and livestock (Galloway et al., 2008).

Conclusion

The findings of this study underscore the urgent need for more inclusive and sustainable phosphate extraction practices in Youssoufia. Effective strategies must prioritize community engagement, environmental stewardship, and equitable resource distribution. These findings align with global research that highlights the importance of balancing economic development with environmental and social well-being (Heinberg & Lerch, 2010). A comparative analysis with other phosphate-producing regions could provide valuable insights into common challenges and successful mitigation strategies.

Achieving sustainable phosphate extraction in Youssoufia requires a concerted effort from all stakeholders, including the OCP and the affected communities. Only through collaborative and inclusive approaches can the adverse impacts of phosphate extraction be mitigated, ensuring the well-being of Youssoufia's residents and the long-term sustainability of the region.

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The Absence of Representation of History and Heritage of Malawian Indian Community in Museums of Malawi.

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Introduction

This study considers the absence if not the exclusion of the history and culture of the Malawian Indian Community in the national museums of Malawi as a form of a statement of inequality of citizenship recognition and representation in a space that is meant to reconstruct the complete history and heritage of the nation.[1] Museums and other spaces of public history and culture are instruments through which societies and nations use to imagine the identity of the people and affirm their citizenship and belonging. The museums of Malawi conceived in the colonial era which continue to exist in the post-colonial era have constructed the narrative and image of its people with the absence of history and heritage of the Malawian Indian community who are one of the minority groups in the country.

This study locates itself within the discourses of political inequality of minority groups in spaces of public culture and history in the framework of cultural representation and recognition and belonging to the nation. This dimension of political inequality presented as cultural inclusivity should be understood as form of unsettling hegemonic spaces of public culture. Moreover, this study is also situated within the debates of negotiation of identity and heritage among the minority groups in a supposedly pluralistic society. The study asks a series of questions: What is the history of the Indian community in Malawi? What role has the Indian community played in shaping the social, cultural and economic aspects of Malawi? Why is the Indian community absent in spaces of public culture for example the national museum in Malawi? What implications does this have to the question of national identity, citizenship and belonging? What should be done to include the historical and cultural narratives of Malawian Indian communities in the Museums of Malawi?

Background to the History of Indians in Malawi

Doston and Doston's 1968 book presented what is regarded as a classic and comprehensive history of the Indian communities in British Central Africa which in present day includes such countries as Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Their work highlights the migration of the Indian community to these African territories, their social, political and economic roles in shaping the history and future of these countries as well as their experiences and how they adapted themselves in these British colonies in Africa.[2]

Unlike in South Africa, where the Indians immigrated largely as the result of indentured labour, in Malawi the migration of Indians was as the result of motivation of commerce and trade. Doston and Doston noted that the first Indian trader, a Muslim by the name of Osman, arrived in 1885, according to his family's reckoning. The migrant Indians were the economic middle men in the British colony that was British Central Africa and later Nyasaland. Statistics show that in 1956 in Nyasaland (as Malawi was then known) 67% of the Indian community were intensely engaged in commercial activities that largely involved retail trade and other associated businesses.[3] The relations between the local natives and Indians in comparison were much more comfortable than with white European settlers where they faced repulsive racial discriminatory treatment. The British colonial authorities had envisaged the Nyasaland colony to be the home of the immigrant Indians as way of assisting in improving the condition and status of the local people in the

imperial framework of governance.[4] The colonial government used mostly Indians in some of the colonial projects and missions in the colony; for example, the laying of the railways in the country was done by the Indian labour. Sir Harry Johnston, the governor, relied on the Sikh Indians in his regiment in the consolidation of the British power in the colony. Thus, the Indian community in various ways played a significant role in shaping the history of modern Malawi.

Although as a subject race in Nyasaland colony the Indians received favourable treatment, they faced the discriminatory policies of the British colonial authorities in various ways. They did not enjoy equal treatment with white settlers, who were perceived as superior in the imperial framework of power relations. During the anti-colonial struggles the Indian community joined the native nationalists' forces in agitating against the British colonial rule. Indians formed their own party, the Indian National Congress, which worked hand in hand with Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) which was the main nationalist movement against colonial rule. Mufuzi, writing about Indians in colonial Livingstone in Zambia, argued that the Indians only participated in agitating against British colonialism in order to protect their interests and not that of natives.[5] While this might also be true for colonial Malawi, Indians were still united with the local natives in forming a common frontier against the British. It was therefore no surprise that Sattar Sacranie, a very well-known barrister, became Kamuzu Banda's lawyer during the anti-colonial struggles.

The above history suggests that the immigrant Indian community in the colony of Nyasaland played a significant role in shaping the history, society and future of Malawi from colonial times up to independence time. While most scholarly writing on Malawian Indians focused on their experiences in colonial Malawi and their political inequality with Europeans in the colonial setting there is little scholarly analysis on contemporary political inequality in the framework of cultural representation in spaces of public culture such as museums. The analysis in this paper relied on exhibition analysis of various branches of Museums of Malawi and secondary literature. While time constraints prevented systematic oral interviews, the paper demonstrates an existence of political inequality in terms of cultural representation of the history, culture and heritage of this minority group in spaces of public culture for example museums in Malawi despite this group's significant contribution to Malawi's history.

On the left His Worship Late Sattar Sacranie Sc welcoming Emperor Hailee Selassie and Late Ngwazi Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Blantyre on 2nd August 1965.

The Indian Community in Post Colonial Malawi

What would be then the future and fate of the minority Indian community in the post-colonial dispensation in Malawi? Kamuzu Banda's politics of post-colonial Malawi which worked towards unifying the nation in a nationalist mode was marred with his tribalism and segregation. Banda's promotion of Chewa culture and heritage at the exclusion of other ethnic communities is well documented by Malawian scholars of various disciplines in social sciences, humanities and politics.[6] Banda continued with the colonial policies of differential treatment among the races in post-colonial Malawi. The treatment which Banda meted out on the minority Indian community, such as the expulsion of the Indians from rural areas as way of promoting indigenous trade and participation in the emerging economy of the post-colony, was to some extent motivated by his identity politics by the earlier colonial discriminatory policies. The Indian community found themselves between a rock and hard place to negotiate their identity and belonging as the

result of Banda's politics. Most often Banda at political rallies demanded that the Indians leave the country if they felt that they didn't belong to Malawi or adhere to his policies. The question of integrating minor races in the imagination of the newly independent African states was a critical issue as has been observed in Uganda's Idi Amin and Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe. For example, James Muzondidya's analysis on coloured people in Zimbabwe showed that land reforms designed to undo the legacy of white settler monopoly on land left the Indians and coloured as "subject minorities" ineligible to make land claims.[7] To access that land, one had to belong to an ethnic or tribal authority, and coloureds and Indians had no ethnic identity to claim. Under colonialism, to have a racial identity was an identity of privilege whilst having an ethnic identity condemned one to severe marginalization as a rural subject. As Suren Pillay argued 'after colonialism, in the name of justice, states tended to reverse the order in the name of Africanization and redistributive justice'[8] Thus ethnic subjects were now the most eligible for redress, and racial subjects would be last in the line. This was the fate of Malawian Indians in Banda's Malawi.

Spaces of negotiation, reconstruction and representation of nation's identity such as museums under Banda's regime never represented the history and culture of the Indian community and their role in shaping the country. The minority Indian community were not recognised as part of the larger history and heritage of the country. It was no wonder then that most Indian communities largely became involved in the movements that agitated against dictatorship and autocracy of Kamuzu Banda. When Malawi became a democracy in 1994 the first democratic government recognised the role of Indian community as evidenced on the appointments of some of the members into various portfolios of the cabinet. And in fact, some became members of parliament. How then is the role of Malawian Indians in shaping the country's history represented and recognised in the democratic Malawi in its national museum?

Democratic era and representation of Malawian Indians' history and culture in museums

Museums and related institutions have been used for representing cultures, creation of national identities and fostering a sense of belonging. Museums and such heritage institutions have played a central role in forming and fostering cultural identities, creation of civil citizens, nation building, democracy, human rights and imagination of the nation among others. If certain cultural communities and categories are not represented in these cultural institutions, they feel excluded in the larger discourse of nation belonging and recognition. A critical analysis of the exhibitions in the national museum of Malawi and its branches reveals the total absence of the cultural representation of the Malawian Indians and total absence of their role in shaping the history and society of Malawi.[9] This works to exclude their history and sense of belonging to the broader imagination of who is Malawian and what constitutes Malawianess. In other words, despite the significant role that the Malawian Indians played in shaping the history and society of modern Malawi their absence and misrecognition in the national museum that is meant to celebrate and recognise the different histories and cultures of various communities in Malawi constitutes a form of political inequality of representation which has implications on questions of belonging. Recently, the newly established Department of National Unity has for the first time in Malawi's history invited the Malawian Indian community to participate in the national cultural festival that is meant to showcase and recognise various cultures and histories in Malawi. Nonetheless, in their present form the various museums and cultural centres are yet to respond to democratic ideals and call of inclusivity and recognition of minority groups.

Malawian Indians are not a homogeneous community, of course. They have their internal differences in terms of culture, language and religion, as some are Muslims and Hindus and others speak Gujarat and Bengali. It would therefore be imperative to ask them how they would prefer to be presented in the national

museums with regard to these diversity among them. Also, while the Indians are not the only secluded minority groups in Malawi there is a general understanding that the ethnic groups in Malawi share commonalities in terms of certain aspects of culture and it is therefore very easy for these ethnic groups to see themselves in the national museums even though they are not directly represented. This is unlike the Indians who are racially and culturally different from the rest of other minority groups.

The recent debates over and subsequent halting of the erection of a statue of Ghandhi in Malawi should also be situated within the politics of identity and misrecognition of the heritage of Malawian Indians community in Malawi. In 2019 the government of India together with the Malawi government planned to erect a statue of Mahatma Ghandhi in Malawi's commercial city of Blantyre, one of the cities with a largest number of Malawian Indians. This was part of cultural diplomacy between the two nations as way of rebuilding and enhancing their relations. The Indian government had promised assistance to the Malawi government in building some state-of-the-art infrastructure. However, some sectors of civil society protested against these plans with arguments that Ghandhi was a racist against Africans and he does not deserve such honour as a statue in Malawi.[10] Such sentiments were similar to what happened in other African countries such as Ghana, where a Ghandi statue was defaced and pulled down by students at University of Ghana because of Ghandhi's perceived racial comments on Africans during his stay in South Africa. However, in Malawi Ghandhi was an inspirational figure among the nationalists in their struggle against British colonial rule; for example, the challenging of unjust colonial laws and policies by Mikeka Mkandawire and others was inspired by Ghandhi.[11] Those acts inspired by Ghandhi motivated the Indian community in Malawi to support materially the nationalist movement in Malawi. This seems to suggest that the legacy of Ghandhi had influence in Malawi beyond claims of racism as espoused by those resisting his statue and that the motivations for that resistance were just a statement of broader picture of identity politics that Malawian Indians face in Malawi.

As Suren Pillay argued in his work on the fate of South African Indians in post-apartheid South African, the greater social and political challenges lie in reshaping how we come to think about each other and ourselves, the extent to which colonial constructions have come to be embodied and lived in our dispositions towards each other, and our discourses about others. These are amplified by the extent to which market-based inequalities breathe new life into racial and ethnic stereotypes and prejudices.[12] The comparison to South Africa shows the need to find a difference that allows for the embrace of the multiple historical routes through which all find themselves in Malawi. Furthermore, there is need to embrace a pan-African concept of difference that remains open to inviting new migrants to becoming citizens. While the constitution of Malawi recognises the rights of all people who are its citizens it seems there is much to be done in the spaces of public culture for example national museums of Malawi in recognising and representing the history of minority race of Malawian Indians in the broader history and imagination of the nation.

Conclusion

Even though the Malawian Indians are in minority they have a cultural right to be recognised by state institutions of public culture. Furthermore, their role in shaping Malawi's history and society be acknowledged by state's cultural institutions such as museums which play a role in fostering the imagination and sense of belonging to the nation. As it stands at present the absence and conspicuous obscurity of the history and cultural representation of this minority group in the national museums of Malawi only serves to misrecognise and exclude this cultural group from the imagination of Malawi and their sense of belonging to the nation. Efforts should therefore be made towards cultural and historical research that can inform the representation of their history and culture in Malawian museums as part of inclusive imagination of the nation particularly in a democratic dispensation that claims inclusivity, cultural rights and recognition as tenets of building a plural society.

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Endnotes

[1] While in legal documents the common terms used to identify this category of community is 'Asian community' it normally refers to those people of Indian and Pakistan descent and origin. In the context of this paper both the Indian and Pakistanis are grouped together as Indians as is common in the everyday reference by Malawians on these people .

[2] F. Dotson and L. Dotson, The Indian minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi (New Haven and London, 1968).

[3] See F. Dotson and L . Dotson, The Indian minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi (New Haven and London, 1968) : J. Power. ' Building Relevance: The Blantyre Congress, 1953 to 1956.' *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28:1 (2002) 45-65, DOI: 10.1080/03057070120116971.

[4] ibid

[5] F. Mufuzi. ' Indian Political Activism in Colonial Zambia: The Case of Livingstone's Indian Traders.' In Jan Bart Gewald etal ,eds. Living the End of Empire: Politics and Society in Late Colonia Zambia (Leidem.Boston: Brill 2011).p.235.

[6] See L.Vail and L. White, 'Tribalism in the Political History of Malawi" in Leroy Vail (ed) The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa (Berkley, CA: University of California Press,1989) ; C. Gaby, 'The Radical and Reactionary Politics of Malawi's Hastings Banda: Roots, Fruits and Legacy', Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 6, (2017); B.Mkandawire 'Ethnicity, Language and Cultural Violence', The Society of Malawi Journal, Vol.63, No.1(2010): D. Kaspin, ;Tribes, Regions and Nationalism in Democratic Malawi.' Ethnicity and Group Rights Vol.39 (1997),

[7] J. Muzondidya.'Sitting on the fence of or Walking a Tight Rope? A Political History of the Coloured Community in Zimbabwe.' Doctoral Thesis, University of Cape Town 2001.

[8] S. Pillay. 'Being Coloured and Indian in South Africa After Apartheid.' https://africasacountry.com/2018/06/being-coloured-and-indian-in-south-africa-after-apartheid

[9] For the critical analysis of the exhibition in the Museums of Malawi and its branches see M. Lusaka. 'Curating the nation: Collections, ethnographic representations and heritage production at Museum of Malawi. *Cogent Arts & Humanities*, 10:1,(2003) 2160577, DOI: 1080/23311983.2022.2160577

[10] Malawi Court halts work on Ghandhi Statue after critics brand him racist. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46051184.

[11] J. Power. ' Building Relevance p.51.

[12] S. Pillay. ' Being Coloured and Indian in South Africa After Apartheid.' https://africasacountry.com/2018/06/being-coloured-and-indian-in-south-africa-after-apartheid

Violent Conflict Exacerbates Social Inequality: Livelihood Experiences of Women Survivors of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

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Sexual violence is one of the damaging and disruptive effects of violent conflict. This paper focuses on the experiences of women survivors of sexual violence in the DRC as a marginalised social group. Building upon the existing pool of knowledge on the health and socio-economic impact of sexual violence, I adopt the political economy approach[1] and use the sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) to demonstrate how violent conflict[2] and the attendant sexual violence can exacerbate social inequality in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

For this article, social inequality is bi-dimensional: inequality of condition (unequal distribution of income, wealth, and material goods) and inequality of opportunities (unequal distribution of life chances across individuals) (Crossman, 2018). Violent conflict inherently damages and disrupts the normal course of economic activities by destroying productive forces (e.g., labour), thus altering the structural determinants of inequality. While "the poor and the unskilled seem to face the greatest economic hardship", a small minority of "war profiteers" emerges (Bircan et al., 2017, p. 127)[3]. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the issue of war profiteers.

The abundant literature on the subject in the DRC context mainly focused on topics such as the risk of sexual violence (Zihindula & Maharaj, 2015), its patterns and instrumentalisation as a weapon of war (Bartels et al., 2010; Mukwege & Nangini, 2009), gendered attitudes towards sexual violence (Kelly et al., 2012), its social and health impact (Kohli et al., 2014), and interventions to mitigate the impact (Glass & Perrin, 2013; Glass et al., 2014; Glass et al., 2013). These studies address how sexual violence results in adverse health and socio-economic consequences as women survivors further experience social victimisation and rejection (Kohli et al., 2013). This is because being sexually violated is customarily not only considered taboo but is also feared as a risk for HIV and unwelcome pregnancy (Ibid). Social isolation renders women survivors of sexual violence more vulnerable to poverty, which in turn intensifies their traumatic experiences (Glass et al., 2013). Social isolation entails the loss of access to vital resources, which in turn complicates survivors' efforts to restore and improve their living conditions.

Based on these findings, development actors, specifically non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have implemented some mediation and livelihood interventions (e.g., livestock asset and cash transfers), aimed at buffering the impact of sexual violence, rebuilding the lives of survivors, and promoting their social reintegration (Kohli et al., 2017; Glass et al., 2014; Kohli et al., 2013; Glass et al., 2013). Studies evaluating such programmes show that livelihood support initiatives can reduce the negative health impacts of sexual violence (chronic stress, stigma, and trauma) and enable some beneficiaries to regain their worth and become productive members of society (Kohli et al., 2017; Glass et al., 2014; Glass & Perrin, 2013). Despite implementing such interventions, the evaluation found that survivors still needed financial assistance to meet basic needs (e.g., food, shelter, clothing, and education for children) and support their livelihood activities such as farming and informal trading. This underscores the limitation of non-livelihood support mechanisms in promoting the healing and social reintegration of women victims of sexual violence.

Two questions arise: 1) to what extent have such programmes resulted in sustainable livelihoods to ensure the sustainable social reintegration of women survivors of sexual violence? 2) given the limitation of current livelihood support pilot programmes, what alternative livelihood or coping strategies are available for women survivors

of sexual violence who have not succeeded or benefited from such programmes? This article aims to further stimulate the debate by analysing the livelihood situation of women survivors of sexual violence, some of whom were beneficiaries of similar support, considering 1) their vulnerability context, 2) the impact of sexual violence on their livelihood assets, 3) the transforming structures and coping strategies, and 4) the attendant livelihood outcomes.

1. Methodology

1.1. Research Design, Sampling, and Data Collection

This paper is based on qualitative data collected from the city of Goma in North Kivu, a province with one of the highest incidences of sexual violence in the DRC. Survivors of sexual violence in the countryside in North Kivu and neighbouring provinces have sought refuge in the city[4]. Most of the participants were migrants from the eastern DRC provinces of Maniema and North Kivu. Fourteen (14) adult women survivors of sexual violence, aged between 34 and 56 years, participated in the study. Most (9/14) of them were living with HIV and only two did not have children, while others reported two to three children each. The qualitative design of the study entails the focus was on the quality and depth, rather than quantity of responses, to provide a deeper insight into the experiences of women survivors of sexual violence. While the seemingly small sample was determined by the availability and willingness of the participants to share their lived experiences, the in-depth interview approach generated sufficient data to answer the research question. The ability to obtain new information (saturation) was reached. As Cleary, Horsfall, and Hayter (2014:473) state, "Who and how many participants will depend on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what's at stake, and what will be useful."

Three criteria informed the selection of participants: 1) an adult woman, 2) a survived sexual violence, and 3) availability and willingness to participate voluntarily. The focus on women is supported by the above literature, showing that sexual violence is predominantly perpetrated against women, although men may also be victims.
A semi-structured interview guide (administered in Swahili) was used for data collection. This facilitated data collection on participants' experiences with sexual violence and their living conditions. The duration was between 45 minutes to 90 minutes per interview. The interviewer used a probing technique to elicit more in-depth responses while scribing the responses on a notepad since voice recording was ruled out to ensure a more conducive interaction, considering the sensitivity of the topic.

1.2. Research Ethics

Ethical clearance was provided by the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Protocol Reference No.: HSS/0434/09M). TUMAINI, a registered faith-based, non-profit organisation that provides psychosocial support to women survivors of sexual violence in the city of Goma, facilitated access to participants. Briefing sessions were held with potential participants to explain the objectives of the study and seek consent for their involvement. They were informed that their participation was free and voluntary and that they could withdraw at any stage of the interview. Participants were further made to understand that anonymity and confidentiality would be upheld to protect their identity. A psychosocial and spiritual caregiver employed by TUMAINI was present to ensure immediate professional assistance in the event of an emotional breakdown during the interviews. However, none of the participants experienced this as they appeared comfortable sharing their experiences.

1.3. Data Analysis

NVivo was used to perform a thematic analysis based on key variables in the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) developed by the Department for International Development (DFID). This framework is helpful in studying human living conditions considering access to sustainable livelihoods. As depicted below, the



Source: Makanishe (2013)

SLF considers access to social, human, natural, financial, and physical capital as the sine qua non of achieving sustainable livelihoods (Makanishe, 2013). Sustainable livelihoods entail the ability of individuals or households to access means of living that enable them to meet their present needs to cope with and recover from stress and shock while maintaining and enhancing their livelihood capabilities and assets for future generations.

The SLF is further used to analyse the vulnerability context of livelihoods, considering shocks (e.g., violent conflict), transforming structures (e.g., institutional intervention), and livelihood outcomes.

2. Results

Through the lens of SLF, this article shows how violent conflict can exacerbate social inequality for women survivors of sexual violence, considering their livelihood vulnerability context, asset status, transforming structures and coping strategies, and livelihood outcomes.

2.1. The Vulnerability Context

The vulnerability context of women survivors is defined by the health and socio-economic impacts of sexual violence that increased the livelihood vulnerability of participants as evidenced by the traumatic experiences they recounted.

> *"I was raped at home by a gang of six men. I bled a lot, and I did not have a qualified person to stitch my wound. When stitched, my wound swelled, and now I have a big scar. They stitched my wound six times to stop my private part from coming out"* (Interview, Goma).

Participants further indicated that they experienced victimisation, social discrimination, and rejection as close family and community members often blamed them for their misfortune (of being raped and acquiring HIV).

> *"I was unable to leave the house because people began to discriminate against me ... People did not even want me to use their toilets … Even my children rejected me" (Interview, Goma).*

The evidence corroborates previous studies associating the traumatic experiences of women survivors of sexual violence because of its modus operandi[5] (Zihindula & Maharaj, 2015; Bartels, et al., 2010; Mukwege & Nangini, 2009).

The vulnerability of women survivors of sexual violence is further aggravated by their social status

as internally displaced persons to urban settings hoping to escape victimisation and social isolation in their rural bases. However, life in urban areas comes with different challenges associated with the cash economy. Access to basic needs is contingent on finances. At the same time, the income-earning ability of women survivors is constrained by the country's general unemployment levels and the lack of sufficient start-up capital and/or skills for self-employment. These vulnerability contexts render their realisation of sustainable livelihoods nearly impossible.

2.2. Impact of Sexual Violence on Livelihood Assets

The health and socio-economic effects of sexual violence affect access to key livelihood assets (human, social, natural, physical, and financial capital) among participants. The SLF considers that the capacity to generate livelihoods depends on the human ability to be economically functional or productive. This ability is a function of having good health (physical and mental) and intellectual status (knowledge and skills) (Makanishe, 2013). Participants described how sexual violence affects the physical component of their human capital.

> *"I was raped at home by a gang of six men. I bled a lot, and I did not have a qualified person to stitch my wound. When stitched, my wound swelled, and now I have a big scar. They stitched my wound six times to stop my private part from coming out"* (Interview, Goma).

In the aftermath of being sexually abused by armed rebel gangs, most of the participants (9/14) in this study indicated that they tested positive for HIV/AIDS.

From a social capital perspective, the potential to generate livelihoods also hinges on social support from different actors, including family, community members, the state and NGOs. Evidence in this study shows that sexual violence jeopardised the social capital of women survivors of sexual violence as they were generally victimised, experienced social rejection, and, in some cases, lost male breadwinners as husbands, fathers, or older children were killed.

Most (12/14) participants described how their families rejected them for being sexual violence victims and/or testing positive for HIV as a result.

> *"My husband's family snatched all the children from me. They blamed me that I have a curse that caused my husband to be killed. My husband's family took everything from me" (Interview, Goma).*

Such experiences of victimisation and rejection forced participants to seek refuge in the city of Goma away from their families and communities, thus depriving them of family and community support. Family and community support constitute critical social capital for women to generate livelihoods, particularly in a patriarchal society where they often depend on natural assets (e.g., land for subsistence farming, crops, and water resources) and physical assets (e.g., housing, furniture, and farming equipment) controlled by men for livelihood production.

The data shows that participants further experienced the loss of financial assets as a ripple effect of compromised human, social, natural, and physical capital, which constrained their ability to maintain economic productivity and earn an income. This occurred in three ways: 1) some women were not only sexually abused but also had their monies, trading goods, and properties confiscated by the armed rebels; 2) the brutality of sexual violence and the attendant damage to the survivor's physical and mental health rendered them quasi-dysfunctional, thus needing a long time to heal and regain economic activity; 3) social exclusion resulted in the loss of income opportunities as they lost access to key assets (e.g., farming land owned by the family, trading space controlled by the community).

> "*When I was rejected, I had to start life anew because everything I had was left in Bunia*" *(Interview, Goma).*

This social isolation entails internal migration becoming the only viable option. The question is whether this alternative necessarily provides opportunities for sustainable livelihoods. Well,

this may depend on the presence of adequate transforming structure and coping mechanisms.

2.3. Transforming Structures and Coping Strategies

The SLF considers the availability of transforming structures, including state and non-state interventions, to support alternative livelihoods or coping mechanisms. The findings point to a glaring absence of government intervention and limited humanitarian assistance (mainly psychosocial support) from NGOs. Participants generally relied on sporadic and insufficient support from NGOs and faith-based organisations like Tumaini. They indicated that such assistance resulted in minimal relief as it was generally limited to psychosocial intervention, short-term (six-month) microloans of US$50 to US$100, and petty cash to procure medication, such as ARVs. Although the purpose of microloans was to invest in profit-generating activities, participants indicated that the project generally failed because the amount was insufficient to do this and simultaneously meet their basic needs (e.g., food, rent, education, etc.).

2.4. Livelihood Outcomes

The SLF further analyses the livelihood outcome of a stressful event considering the vulnerability context, asset status, transforming structures, and coping strategies. The findings demonstrate that in the absence of government support and limited humanitarian assistance, participants experienced dire livelihood conditions. They felt the need to venture into the labour market in the host city where they require a different set of skills from their original rural and farming activities. Although those who are fortunate can secure low-paying jobs such as cleaning, washing, and babysitting, others resort to what participants called 'dirty jobs, such as street begging, serving alcohol in clubs, and prostitution.

> *"I live on donations. If someone has a job, I do it. However, there is a problem because there are times when people offer me the dirty job of selling alcohol, which exposes me to sliding back into sin [prostitution]"* (Interview, Goma).

Such job opportunities are perceived as dirty because they can expose women survivors of sexual violence to abuse further and health hazards, including the risk of HIV (re)infection and spreading. In this context, nearly all participants indicated that they were struggling to meet their basic needs because sexual violence compromised their ability to sustain themselves. This is a dramatic shift from the past when they used to support themselves before they were abused.

> *"The money I was making before I was raped was enabling me to pay for my children's education, to buy clothing, and travel. I was living a happy life, and my health was good because I ate healthy" (Interview, Goma).*

Against this backdrop, the participants wished to return to their villages, but numerous challenges, including the lack of transport and the violent ongoing conflict, also complicate this option.

3. Discussion and Conclusion

The findings show how sexual violence associated with violent conflict complicates access to sustainable livelihoods, which can exacerbate social inequality (considering both the living conditions and opportunities). From a political economy perspective, both violent conflict and the attendant sexual violence are an outcome of power relations located in the political, economic and social structures affecting women as a less powerful and marginalised social group in the DRC. As Navarro (2020: 2) maintains, social inequality is an outcome of "how power is realised through our economic, political, and social institutions". The findings show that sexual violence exacerbates the already marginal position of women survivors by compromising their access to assets (human, social, natural, physical and financial capital), which the SLF considers the building blocks of sustainable livelihoods. Experiences of physical and mental trauma[6] suggest that sexual violence compromised the human capital of women survivors. They became economically inactive and unable to support themselves because of their health conditions.

Sexual violence further erodes other livelihood assets as participants experience victimisation and rejection, forcing them to seek refuge in urban settings. This social isolation entails the loss of social capital (family and community support), natural capital (access to male-controlled land), and physical capital (loss of access to male-controlled housing and equipment). This form of gender-based marginalisation corroborates the theoretical postulation that power relations drive social inequality (Crossman, 2018). This mainly occurs in a patriarchal society where the ability of marginalised women to generate livelihoods largely depends on assets controlled by men, which is the case in the eastern DRC.

The ripple effect is systematic loss of income and destitution, with sustainable alternative livelihoods being nearly non-existent due to state inaction and limited non-state intervention and market opportunities. This situation axiomatically exacerbates inequality along gender lines[7] and livelihoods lines.[8] The finding aligns with previous research showing that violent conflicts increase the levels of inequality during conflict and post-conflict periods (Bircan, Brück, Vothknecht, 2017).

In conclusion, the evidence in this paper shows that sexual violence in the context of violent conflict can exacerbate social inequality as it worsens the living conditions of women survivors and compromises their opportunity to generate alternative and sustainable livelihoods. This occurs as they become economically inactive, first for health reasons and subsequently due to loss of access to vital livelihood assets, as they experience victimisation and social isolation because of their status as survivors of sexual violence. The absence of adequate transforming structures (e.g., social security by the state and meaningful NGO intervention beyond psycho-social support), aggravates the dire living conditions. Furthermore, high unemployment in the country and the relevant skills to access opportunities in the highly competitive labour market increase the livelihood vulnerability context of women survivors of sexual violence. The evidence suggests that while psycho-social support is a critical first step toward the healing of women survivors of sexual violence, their full mental recovery, social reintegration, and independence may depend on their ability to generate sustainable livelihoods.

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1 The political economy of violent conflict "focuses on how economic issues and [political] interests shape conflict dynamics or on how violent conflict starts, endures, escalates, or ends" (Wennmann, 2019:2).

2 Political and economic motives, including the quest for power, unanswered grievances, and the greed for natural and economic resources underly violent conflict in the eastern DRC where various armed groups commit violent crimes, including sexual abuses, against residents (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008).

3 Analysing the effect of violent conflict on inequality between 1960 and 2014, using cross-country data (161 countries), Bircan et al. (2017) found that the war period was characterised by rising levels of inequality.

4 A study by Solhjell (2009) estimated that sexual violence in the province of North Kivu reached a monthly count of 400 based on reported cases.

5 The literature shows that the nature of the violence (e.g., insertion of sharp objects into the private parts, rape in the presence of family members at gunpoint, and acquisition of HIV) often resulted in both physical trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Zihindula & Maharaj, 2015; Bartels, et al., 2010; Mukwege & Nangini, 2009)

6 The evidence in this study corroborates previous research findings by Kohli et al. (2013), Glass et al. (2012); Klot & DeLargy (2007) showing that women survivors of sexual violence often experienced physical health (e.g., injuries, fistula, sterility, HIV, STIs, pain), mental health (e.g., headaches, shame, fear, crying) and other issues such as unwanted pregnancy and malnutrition.

7 Inequality between men and women

8 Inequality between women victims and non-victims of sexual violence

The Role of Social Protection Programs in Addressing Poverty and Inequality in Rural Zimbabwe: The Case of Murehwa District; 2000-2023

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This paper examines the effectiveness of social protection programs in Zimbabwe and their impact on poverty alleviation and the reduction of inequalities. Social protection initiatives are crucial in addressing poverty and inequalities in developing countries like Zimbabwe. Since the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) launched in the year 2000 in Zimbabwe, the country has been fraught with challenges including economic instability, political unrest, and limited access to basic services, which exacerbated poverty and inequality, especially among rural communities. The government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have made efforts to address these challenges through various social protection projects targeting vulnerable populations through cash transfers, food aid, subsidised health services, and education support. These programs aim to improve the well-being of marginalized groups in the country. This paper uses the case study of the Murehwa district to evaluate the effectiveness of one selected social protection scheme in alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities in rural Zimbabwe. It uses qualitative research methods including interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries of the various social protection programs to get their lived experience and their view in terms of whether or not the programs were effective in alleviating poverty and improving their access to basic amenities like health and education. By revealing empirical evidence of the effectiveness of social protection programs in dealing with inequality, this study contributes to our understanding of the nature, manifestation, and evolution of inequalities over space and time.

Background

Inequality is cited as the major challenge to poverty alleviation in the world, especially in developing countries. Globally, it is recognised that wealth is growing but it is in the hands of a few individuals.[1] Consequently, power is concentrated in the hands of a few, and policies and laws are biased in the interest of elites, undermining democratic governance, development, poverty reduction, environment, social cohesion, and wellbeing.[2] The inequalities manifest in diverse forms, such as between rich and poor, men and women, rural and urban populations, migrants and citizens, and divisions related to ethnicity, caste, religion, sexuality, and disability. Put together, these inequalities create high barriers to human rights and sustainable development. Social protection has been cited as one of the remedies to address challenges relating to inequalities in the developing world. This study examines the economic crisis in Zimbabwe since 2000 to analyse the impact of social protection in addressing rural poverty using the case of the implementation of the food assistance program in Murehwa District to remedy food poverty in rural Zimbabwe. Murehwa District is in Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe 90km away from the capital, Harare with 90% of its population living in rural areas.

Inequalities in Zimbabwe can be traced from the colonial era when indigenous Africans were alienated economically, socially, and politically in favour of the colonial state. The colonial state was skewed in a way that reduced Indigenous people to mere labourers who were restricted to the rural areas and subordinate to the economic interests of the privileged urban white settler community.[3] The urban areas were designed for white settlers while the Blacks had to maintain their rural homes in the 'native' communal areas. Mseba notes that under colonialism settler powers took over the land an important source of economic well-being, and designated the indigenous people to poor, diseased, semi-arid, and wretched places known as native reserves.[4] These areas were dry and overpopulated

which impoverished many Africans who could not join wage labour in farms, mines, and towns. In these areas, crops could hardly grow, leaving the majority of Black Africans in rural areas poor while land and the means to economic prosperity were in the hands of the small white population.

At independence in 1980, President Mugabe pledged the government's commitment to redressing the inequalities through so-called socialist policies. This was through the creation of a welfarist state where the government introduced policies like free education and health for all, minimum wages for urban workers, and the conception and operationalization of village development programs and District Development Fund (DDF) in rural areas.[5] These measures were aimed at reducing the economic, social, and developmental inequalities that were created by colonialism.

However, these measures did not succeed in addressing inequalities in Zimbabwe. Instead, the socialist era created a balance of payments challenge which led to the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), which entailed cuts in government spending on social programs. ESAP resulted in massive job losses, a rise in inflation, and a rise in poverty such that by 1998 60% of the population earned less than US$1 a day and 80 per cent of these lived in rural areas (UNDP 1999).[6] In 1999, Zimbabwe was ranked 130th out of 170 on the Human Development Index.[7] There was little investment in rural development in terms of the provision of good quality education, access to better medical facilities, good roads, and rural electrification among other basic amenities. Therefore, the first two decades of independence in Zimbabwe exacerbated economic, social, and developmental inequality.

In 2000 the government initiated the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP) which seized the estates of white landowners and transferred them to landless indigenous farmers, which had catastrophic results in the agricultural sector and the economy. The FTLRP destroyed commercial agriculture, the economy's backbone, causing a major decline in food production and provision, job losses and economic sanctions against the country. This paper seeks to examine the challenges brought by the 2000 FTLRP and how social protection schemes in the form of food assistance managed to remedy the challenges brought by the land reform program.

Methodology

This study is an empirical qualitative research study which relies on oral interviews as primary sources of information. The research was conducted in Murehwa District Ward 13 and Ward 14 with 30 randomly selected participants, 10 of which were men and 15 women and 5 leaders in the community and NGO workers. Primary data gathered from the interviews has been triangulated with existing secondary data from newspapers and journal articles to make inferences and come up with conclusions in the paper. The food assistance program was selected as a case study to get a detailed and meaningful analysis of the implementation and outcomes of the social protection schemes in Zimbabwe.

The Fast Track Land Reform Program and Beyond

The government launched the FTLRP in 2000 aimed at fast-tracking the land distribution process to reduce the colonial legacy of inequality. However, the FTLRP was characterized by violence, massive destruction of commercial agriculture, and the displacement of experienced and capitalized white farmers. Land invasions and seizures by former freedom fighters and the general masses led to the displacement of White commercial farmers and their replacement them with inexperienced and undercapitalized black farmers. Food production plummeted, so that within four years (by 2004) food production had dropped by 30%.[8]

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) indicated that in 2001 at least 705,000 people in rural areas and 250,000 people in urban areas were experiencing food difficulties due to a sharp increase in food prices which resulted from the destruction of the country's agriculture followed by a drought season.[9] Commercial maize planting was

down to 45,000 hectares from 150,000 hectares in the 1990s.[10] The national herd of cattle dropped by nearly 20% and inflation topped 100% per annum by November 2000.[11] Food shortages were rampant, especially in the rural areas, which necessitated the intervention of the Government and non-governmental players to assist with food aid. In February 2002 the WFP began emergency food distribution in rural and urban Zimbabwe. Ngwenya et al's work highlights that soon after the FTLRP there was an increase in the number of players and investments working towards the implementation of food security initiatives in Zimbabwe.[12] Some of these players include the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), World Vision International, USAID and Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The initiatives by these players have been critical in remedying food poverty in rural, although there are limitations and flaws in the implementation of the programs which curtail their ability to address food access and food security problems in rural Zimbabwe.

Food Assistance Initiatives In Murehwa

The food assistance initiatives in Murehwa District include emergency food aid, social safety nets, school feeding programs and nutrition-specific interventions. Emergency food aid is implemented in years of crisis where people are given direct food handouts. The food assistance comes in the form of grains (maize, sorghum, wheat), beans, peas, cooking oil, and porridge amongst others. The kind of food given varies depending on the levels of vulnerability of the target population. Respondents highlighted that they are happy with the kind of food assistance they receive because they are not given foreign foods but their usual maize and beans which make the aid more acceptable and well appreciated by the community members. In 2008, they were given a certain cereal they named bulgar which they ate out of desperation but never really appreciated.

Food handouts have been cited as crucial in alleviating food poverty in the communities. One respondent had this to say;

> We receive maize every year but the aid does not come all year round. We are given in the dry months after we have finished our previous season's harvest from around August to December of each year. This is very important to us because nowadays we cannot produce maize sufficient for us to eat until the next harvest. However, my only worry is that they only give us maize or sorghum but we are not given relish which is also a challenge in most seasons. In the past, we used to do gardening to grow vegetables for relish but nowadays water is becoming scarce so by August it will be very difficult for us to continue gardening. We need support with relish.[13]

This view was shared by many respondents who believe food assistance is more meaningful when it can support a proper meal rather than just focusing on providing one part of the meal.

The interviewees expressed concerns over the selection criteria of the beneficiaries, citing many cases of corruption, nepotism and politicisation of aid in their communities. One respondent, Ms Msindo, indicated that ever since her children started working in Harare, she has been discriminated against from receiving food aid on the pretext that her children can support her when the children will be living their own lives in the city which makes her struggle to feed herself. Ms Msindo feels food aid is a weapon of segregation rather than a way of assisting those in need. In her own words "If aid is meant for everyone it should be given to everyone regardless of their social status, the government is for all."[14] She also indicated that despite herself, some members of the community are left out of the programs and are even more vulnerable than some people who are given food. Therefore, food aid is a sensitive issue for many people in the villages, with most of the interviewees expressing their disgruntlement over the selection criteria of who should and who should not receive support. Instead of remedying food poverty food assistance creates hatred among villagers. On the other hand, food assistance also creates entitlement and dependency among the communities which affect their productivity and ability to fully utilise their capacity. According to one NGO worker,

"Food distribution is frustrating especially when the available food is not enough for everyone. There are a lot of complaints and fighting amongst community members, people are very dependent on the maize that we give them."[15]

School feeding programs are also a common food assistance program in Murehwa District. Participants highlighted that social welfare supports school feeding programs every term for elementary school children and it spreads to the primary and secondary schools in times of crisis like the 2008 economic crisis or when there is a drought. According to the interviewed parents, the feeding program is key in supplementing the nutritional needs of the children which they cannot get at home.[16] According to a teacher at St Paul's primary school, school feeding programs not only benefit students nutritionally but encourage students to attend school, in years when students are given porridge or *sadza*[17] after school attendance rises compared to when there is no food at school.

However, in as much as the food assistance programs help alleviate food poverty in Murehwa, food security remains a big challenge, especially in the rural areas. Many households testified that they barely afford three meals a day. Of the twenty respondents only five indicated that they could afford three meals per day. Many others eat a combined breakfast and lunch then supper at night, during the day they survive on various fruits depending on the season. The fruits range from mangoes, wild berries, sugarcane, and avocadoes among other fruits. According to the World Bank people are food secure when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.[18] The interviews indicate that people still struggle a lot to access and afford their daily meals.

Conclusion

Food assistance has been prominent in Murehwa since 2002 assisting vulnerable populations to address food shortages. The direct handouts continue to be rolled out each year during dry seasons and when there is a crisis. This creates a cycle of dependency on handouts amongst community members who feel more should be given to them and not them coming up with ways to produce food sufficient for their households in a sustainable manner. Food assistance temporarily remedies food shortages there is a need for ways of helping communities produce more food so that they become self-sufficient rather than depending on aid. Moreover, food assistance initiatives should target improving food production rather than promoting direct handouts. They create dependency and worsen rural poverty which broadens inequalities in food access, especially amongst people in the rural areas.

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Interviews

Focus Group Discussion in Ward 13, Murehwa District, 6 July 2021.

Focus Group Discussion with parents at St Paul's Primary School, Murehwa District, 23 August 2024.
Interview with A. Mutemachani, Ward 13, Murehwa District, Zimbabwe, 5 July 2024.
Interview with Mr Mapara, Musami Township, 20 August 2024.

Interview with Ms Msindo, Chigombe Village, 23 August 2024.

Interview with Ruramai, Ward 13, Murwhwa District, Zimbabwe, 5 July, 2024.

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Stashed Abroad: Estimating the Impact of Capital Flight on Wealth Inequality in Africa

By Francisco Pérez, University of Utah, September 15, 2024

0 Introduction

The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists' (ICIJ) review of the Pandora Papers, a leak of millions of legal and financial documents, reveals how nearly 50 officials from 18 African countries owned offshore entities, often anonymously, in tax havens like the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Bahamas, Panama, Seychelles and Mauritius. Notably this group includes three long-serving African presidents: Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo, Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya, and Ali Bongo of Gabon. Sassou-Nguesso and his family set up a shell company in the BVI in 1998 to hold their assets including the rights to diamond mining in the Congo. In March 2024, US authorities accused his daughter Claudia Lemboumba Sassou-Nguesso of embezzlement through inflating government contracts and then laundering funds through shell companies and the purchase of a New York City apartment worth over $7 million. His son Denis-Christel has been accused of embezzling over $50 million and US authorities tried to seize his luxury apartment in Miami in 2020 (Sadek 2024). The ICIJ's investigation found that Kenyatta and his family worked with a Swiss private bank to hide assets worth at least $30 million from public scrutiny. The Kenyatta family set up an anonymous foundation in Panama in 2003 to evade taxes as well as various shell companies in the BVI to hold an investment portfolio including high-end properties in London (Fitzgibbon 2021). The Bongo family which ruled Gabon from 1967 to 2023, is notoriously corrupt, with US and French authorities seizing high-end properties in Washington DC, Paris and Nice and freezing multiple bank accounts liked to them (Reddy 2023).

In 2021, the wealth of the top ten percent of sub-Saharan Africans was 351 times greater than that of the bottom half, a figure second only to Latin America among world regions (Chancel et al. 2022). Yet, these news stories about corruption and recent research on capital flight suggest that wealth inequality in Africa could be even higher than these estimates. Approximately $2.4 trillion[1] in assets (Ndikumana and Boyce 2021) is "stashed abroad," not included in official figures of national wealth. This raises a crucial question: To what extent is wealth inequality in Africa understated due to assets illicitly held abroad?

Accurately estimating wealth inequality is important. Wealth inequality is both a cause and effect of fundamental political, economic, and social structures. Without accurate data, it becomes impossible to analyze the factors driving inequality, devise policies to reduce it, or assess the potential trade-offs of such policies. While both capital flight and inequality in Africa have garnered increased research attention in recent years, few attempts have been made to study their intersection. This essay aims to improve wealth inequality estimates by incorporating undeclared assets held by wealthy Africans abroad into the stock of national wealth. Drawing on capital flight data from Ndikumana and Boyce (2021) for 30 African countries from 1970 to 2018, and national wealth and inequality data from the World Inequality Database (WID), this essay estimate "capital flight-adjusted" shares for the top ten percent and bottom half of the wealth distribution for 2018.

Assuming the entire capital flight stock belongs to the top ten percent, the bottom half's average share falls from 12.5 to 9.1 percent of national wealth, while the top ten's share rises from an average of 66.7 to 75.6 percent. This is an upper bound on the increase of wealth at the top since it is impossible to know with certainty what share of undeclared wealth abroad is owned by the top ten percent. Even if the top ten percent own only half of the estimated capital flight stock, this brief

analysis still implies that wealth inequality in much of Africa, already quite high by global standards, is substantially understated. These findings suggest that policies effectively stemming capital flight could also significantly reduce wealth inequality.

1 Data

Capital flight is difficult to measure because by definition these are financial flows that are purposefully obscured. This essay relies on Ndikumana and Boyce (2021) who estimate capital flight as the discrepancy between sources and uses of foreign exchange as recorded in the official Balance of Payments (BOP) plus trade misinvoicing (Henry 2012; Ajayi and Ndikumana 2017; Ndikumana and Boyce 2021). For most countries in this study, the relevant BOP and trade data are available starting in 1970, but for some—notably South Africa—the time series begins much later (see Ndikumana and Boyce 2021 for details). The study period ends in 2018. Total capital flight ranges from less than $5 billion in Burkina Faso and Botswana to more than $500 billion in Nigeria (Figure 3). This translates to 10 percent of 2018 GDP for Burkina Faso and over 700 percent for the Republic of Congo, with an average of 157 percent for the 30 countries in the study (Figure 4). Over this period, capital flight exceeded inflows like foreign aid and foreign direct investment to Africa. The capital flight stock surpasses the total value of Africa's external debt, making the continent a net creditor to the rest of the world, not a borrower. Moreover, much of this capital flight consists of external debt contracted by governments that is then quickly embezzled and stashed abroad by corrupt politicians and officials (Ndikumana and Boyce 2011).

Wealth inequality data for much of Africa is recent, part of a commendable effort by the World Inequality Lab (Chancel and Piketty 2021; Chancel et al. 2022)we mobilize newly available historical series from the World Inequality Database to construct world income distribution estimates from 1820 to 2020. We find that the level of global income inequality has always been very large, reflecting the persistence of a highly hierarchical world economic system. Global inequality increased between 1820 and 1910, in the context of the rise of Western dominance and colonial empires, and then stabilized at a very high level between 1910 and 2020. Between 1820 and 1910, both between-countries and within-countries inequality were increasing. In contrast, these two components of global inequality have moved separately between 1910 and 2020: Within-countries inequality dropped in 1910–1980 (while between-countries inequality kept increasing to create harmonized international data on wealth inequality despite significant challenges with availability and quality. Africa and Latin America are the only two major world regions where the share of wealth owned by the top ten percent exceeds that of the world as a whole (Figure 1). Among Africa's major regions, South Africa is the most unequal, with the top ten percent owning more than 60 percent of national wealth. Central Africa also surpasses the 60 percent threshold, while North and West Africa are the least unequal by this measure, with the top ten percent share less than half of national wealth (Figure 2). At the national level in 2018, the top ten percent share varied from 0.58 in Mauritania, Algeria, and Tunisia to 0.87 in South Africa, with an average of 0.668.

2 Results

For the majority of African countries in the study, the estimates of capital flight stock would add significantly to the top ten percent's share (Figure 5). For the wealthiest African countries—South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt—the stock of capital flight is relatively small compared to the top ten percent's share of reported national wealth. For the Seychelles, the capital flight stock of $5 billion far outstrips national wealth of $1.5 billion. As a small island nation with 120,000 residents, it is unlikely that these foreign assets are owned by its residents; instead, they likely belong to people from other countries. The case of the Seychelles demonstrates the difficulty in tracing capital flight as money travels through a convoluted chain of shell companies based in an archipelago of tax havens operated by a sophisticated network of Western banks and law firms (Zucman 2015; UNCTAD 2020; Ndikumana and Boyce 2023; Reddy 2023; Fitzgibbon 2021; Sadek 2024).[2]

Assuming that the capital flight stock belongs to the top ten percent, adding it to estimates of national wealth increases their share of wealth by about 9 percentage points (pp) for the average country in the study, or a 14 percent increase from a high base (Figure 6). Given the uncertainty surrounding the extent of capital flight, the value of wealth abroad, and its ownership distribution, these figures should be treated as an upper bound of the capital flight-adjusted top ten percent share. Adding the capital flight stock to national wealth has the smallest effect (less than 4 pp) in the wealthiest countries—South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt—and countries where the capital flight stock is smallest—Botswana and Burkina Faso. The biggest effect (over 13 pp) is observed in commodity exporters with relatively low levels of reported wealth and a recent history of political instability and authoritarianism—Sudan, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, and Gabon.

The impact of adding capital flight stock is substantial, even given the already high levels of wealth inequality. The average 9 pp increase for the top ten percent's share is larger than one standard deviation, 8 pp. Even if the top ten percent own only half of the capital flight stock, these preliminary results suggest that wealth levels at the top of the distribution in Africa are underestimated.

It is safer to assume that only a negligible amount of the undeclared assets held by Africans abroad is owned by those in the bottom half of the wealth distribution. Adding the capital flight stock to national wealth estimates decreases the bottom half's share significantly in the 30 countries studied (Figure 7). The average decrease is 3.6pp, from 12.5 to 8.9 percent, nearly 29 percent. The decrease ranges from less than 1 pp in Botswana, Burkina Faso, and South Africa to nearly 8 pp in Gabon and 7 pp in the Republic of Congo. This drop is larger than the standard deviation of 3 pp for the bottom half's share. Accounting for capital flight substantially increases wealth inequality in most countries studied, possibly increasing the top ten's share by more than a standard deviation and lowering the bottom half's share by a similar relative magnitude.

3 Conclusion

This essay examines the extent to which wealth inequality in Africa is underestimated due to capital flight. Accurate measures of inequality are necessary for researchers to better understand its drivers and for policymakers to address it effectively. Approximately $2.4 trillion in undeclared foreign assets is held by Africans from 30 countries as of 2018. Adding this stock of foreign assets to estimates of national wealth significantly alters our understanding of wealth distribution in Africa, decreasing the bottom half's average share from 12.5 percent of national wealth to 9.1 percent. Adding all of the capital flight stock to the top ten percent's share would increase it from an average of 66.7 percent to 75.6 percent. Even if the top ten percent own only half of the capital flight stock, this preliminary analysis still suggests that wealth inequality in much of Africa, already quite high by global standards, is substantially understated.

Given the significant impact of capital flight on wealth inequality, in addition to its other important effects on growth, investment, and poverty (Nkurunziza 2014; Ndikumana 2014), African governments should prioritize action to curtail it. As part of Sustainable Development Goal 16.4, governments worldwide have committed to "significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime" by 2030.

To stem capital flight, African governments should consider good governance reforms, global taxation initiatives and capital controls. Governments could devote more resources to the effective prosecution of embezzlement, graft, and money laundering (UNCTAD 2020). To reduce trade misinvoicing, governments could improve the collection and sharing of trade data. To slow down the "revolving door" between external debt and capital flight, governments could enhance fiscal transparency, including conducting regular audits of external debt (Ndikumana 2017). To combat tax evasion, African governments can lead global efforts for global asset registry, automatic exchange of financial information, beneficial ownership of assets, and a unitary tax on corporations.[3] Carefully designed

capital controls were effective in stemming capital flight from Chile, Brazil, and Mexico in the 1990s and could work in Africa today (Ndikumana and Boyce 2014).

The potential gains of repatriation are large. If only 25 percent of the capital flight stock were repatriated and invested, it could boost the investment-to-GDP ratio by 10 pp (Fofack and Ndikumana 2010). Accordingly, African governments should also intensify international legal efforts to repatriate illegally acquired funds stashed abroad. For funds that were legally acquired but illegally transferred abroad, governments can incentivize repatriation through the same policies that promote domestic investment. However, just as the current system of tax havens is enabled by Western governments and banks, curtailing capital flight and repatriating the wealth abroad will also require their cooperation (Fofack and Ndikumana 2010).

As this brief analysis confirms, accounting for wealth stashed abroad means wealth inequality within Africa is underestimated. The presence of a large stock of unrecorded foreign assets owned by Africans also implies that wealth inequality between Africa and the rest of the world is overestimated. "The global dialogue on development financing must," therefore, "move from increasing aid to Africa to preventing the illicit export of African capital. A more productive model of global partnership with Africa is one that helps the continent raise more domestic resources and keep its capital onshore" (Ndikumana 2017, 1). Instead of begging or borrowing more from governments, investors, and philanthropies in the Global North, African governments could finance many necessary public investments with the money its top leaders and their friends have stashed abroad.

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5 Figures

Figure 1 Source: World Inequality Database (WID)



Figure 2 Source: WID



Figure 3 Source: Ndikumana and Boyce (2021)



Figure 4 Source: Ndikumana and Boyce (2021)



Figure 5 Sources: WID, Ndikumana & Boyce (2021)



Figure 6 Source: Author's calculations



Figure 7 Source: Author's calculations



Endnotes

1 $ = constant 2018 US dollars

2 A clear outlier, I drop Seychelles from the analysis on capital flight-adjusted wealth inequality and it is excluded from Figures 6 and 7.

3 Transfer pricing, where corporations manipulate prices of goods traded internationally among subsidiaries to book profits in the lowest tax jurisdiction is another form of illicit financial flows. It not captured by the method of estimating capital flight adopted in this study since it the invoice has the same on both sides of the shipment.

From Empire to Aid: Analysing the persistence of colonial legacies in foreign aid to Africa

By Swetha Ramachandran, PhD Candidate, The Graduate Institute, Geneva (IHEID)

"We want... to show France that we no longer need her"
"The French army needs to get out"
"No to France's accomplices"

These chants echoed through the streets during the protests following the coups in the Sahel region in 2023. The rapid succession of coups in former French African colonies led to speculations on whether it signalled the end of the 'Françafrique' era. While much of the focus has been on the declining military influence of France, the events underscored broader issues relating to colonial legacies and enduring inequalities across the continent.

Colonial legacies are not confined to military matters; they also permeate the economic and political landscape, particularly through channels of foreign aid. Foreign aid has often served as a continuation of colonial dynamics across Africa, reinforcing dependency and perpetuating power imbalances and inequality. Against this backdrop, I pose two questions: "Are colonial legacies in aid to Africa increasing or declining over time?" and "Do these legacies evolve differently depending on the identity of the former colonizer"?

By analysing aid funding flows between 1971 and 2021 from OECD donors to Africa, I find an interesting trend: colonial legacies in aid, if measured through the concept of donor concentration, declines over time across countries. I also show that the rate of decline in concentration varies depending on the identity of the former colonizer. Notably, aid assistance within former French colonies appears more concentrated relative to former British colonies. This change in concentration does not imply that aid itself is somehow less colonial. However, it does show that the former-colonizer-turned-donors, across the board, no longer maintain complete monopoly as aid donors within their former colonies.

Background

The question of colonial legacies in aid stretches back to the era of decolonization. Following Second World War, it became evident that colonial empires were coming to an end. Consequently, the former colonizers' relationship with their colonies drastically evolved, as did their centralized institutions guiding overseas engagement and aid assistance. In the case of France, which was one of the biggest colonial empires in Africa, the Ministère des colonies (Ministry of Colonies) gave way to interim institutions such as the Ministère pour les départements non métropolitains (Ministry for Departments outside Metropolitan France). What is today the modern-day Ministère des affaires étrangères (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ministère de l'outre-mer (Overseas Ministry), and Ministère de la coopération (Ministry of Cooperation) were established around 1960. Notably, the Ministry of Cooperation inherited many elements from the Ministry of Colonies, including its building, from which it continued to operate out of until 2009 (Pacquement 2010). However, the evolution of French assistance to Africa was not a linear process and was actively shaped by the political developments within France. In the aftermath of 'Free France' in 1941, the Caisse centrale de la france libre (CCFL; Central Fund of Independent France) was set up to manage revenues and currency circulation in Africa and other regions. In 1944, CCFL transitioned to the Caisse centrale de la france d'outre-mer (CCFOM; Central Finance Corporation for Overseas France) and its mandate was also extended to the domain of development. Eventually, CCFOM morphed into the Caisse française de développement (CFD; French Development Fund) in 1992 and was renamed Agence française de développement (AFD; French Development Agency) in 1998 (Pacquement 2010). Today, AFD is seen as the country's main public institution that contributes to the implementation

of 'France's policy in the areas of development and international solidarity' (AFD 2024).

Britain, the other major empire, also had a complex evolution of aid institutions following decolonization. The Colonial Office that existed until 1966 merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to create the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). As this happened, the pre-existing Department of Technical Cooperation started to fade away (Pacquement 2010). Additionally, in 1964, the Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) was set up by the Labour Party in the immediate aftermath of its election win (Dimier and Stockwell 2023). The ODM aimed to 'rationalize and optimize' British aid, and in doing so, distinguished itself from its preceding colonial institutions. While the Foreign Office continued to stress the links between Britain's overseas political interest and aid, the ODM masked these considerations with more objective-sounding technical framings of modernization theories (Krozewski 2015). In 1997, the Department for International Development (or DFID) was created as a fully independent government ministry responsible for international development policy and implementation. Subsequently, in a move marking a clear primacy of geopolitical interests, DFID was merged with FCO in 2020 to create the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Dissanayake and Calleja 2024).

While the overarching trajectories of French and British development assistance may seem comparable in that former colonial institutions eventually evolved into modern-day aid agencies, some distinctions persist. Notably, the Françafrique policy set France on a different trajectory relative to Britain's emphasis on strengthening 'British influence' through bilateral and multilateral fora, as the findings demonstrate.

Theorizing Donor Concentration

The role of colonial history in guiding foreign aid has long been established in the academic literature. Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that political factors such as colonial history and UN voting patterns, rather than the recipient country's political institutions or economic policies, explain how donors choose to distribute aid. Similarly, Andrzejczak and Kliber (2015) found that French development assistance followed the same pattern and is largely driven by colonial history and oil/gas reserves in aid recipient countries. However, these studies have a common pitfall: they study colonial history within a laundry list of potential factors that influence foreign aid, and rarely as a phenomenon by itself.

One way to examine the persistence of colonial legacies is by looking at the notion of 'donor concentration', which is what I use in this paper. Donor concentration refers to the distribution of foreign aid sources within a given aid recipient country. When aid is predominantly provided by one or a few donors, it indicates high donor concentration. Conversely, when many donors contribute aid, it reflects low donor concentration. I theorize that high donor concentration signals a stronger persistence of colonial legacies, as the former colonizer—often the largest donor by aid volume—continues to exert significant influence in aid funding. Similarly, lower concentration suggests a waning influence. However, this influence is primarily financial, and the concept does not capture other crucial forms of influence and control, such as setting aid priorities, shaping national agendas, or interfering in military or political affairs. Therefore, any claims around changes in donor concentration should be interpreted with caution.

A limited number of scholars in the past have used the concept of donor concentration to investigate dynamics of foreign aid. White (2002) analyses concentration, from the perspective of the donor, between 1911 and 1996 and found that aid is more diffused than ever. However, the restrictive timeframe and lack of comparison in levels of concentration between donors makes it hard to ascertain any meaningful variation. Other studies have also used this concept, but either conceptualized it differently or used it to answer different research questions. Steinwand (2015) uses donor concentration, as quantified through the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI), to measure 'lead donorship' and extent of donor fragmentation. Steinwand (2015) finds that lead donorship is

in long-term decline and that uncoordinated/competitive behaviors among donors are on the rise. Similarly, using HHI, Oh and Kim (2015) find that donors tend to proliferate aid as their budget increases, and this leads to recipient fragmentation.

While the concept of donor concentration has been explored in the literature, its application to the study of colonial legacies remains relatively scarce. Although it may not be a perfect measure, donor concentration provides a valuable perspective by enabling empirical analysis of colonial legacies, a dimension largely missing from existing debates.

Methods

I measure donor concentration through the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (or HHI), a commonly used measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each donor and then summing the resulting numbers. The index approaches zero when a market is occupied by many donors of relatively equal size and a maximum of 10,000 when the market is controlled by a single large donor.

The OECD DAC Credit Reporting System (CRS) serves as the data source. The CRS provides official, standard, and comparable statistics of ODA aid flows at the project/activity level since 1973. Additionally, the Colonial Dataset (or COLDAT) which maps the most recent/last European colonizer for every country and the US military assistance database are used. The resulting panel dataset consists of 1,847 observations, with each row indicating a recipient country–year combination. Given the panel structure, the following fixed effects regression (with country and year effects) for the time period 1971-2021 is estimated:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Former\_colonizer}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Years\_since\_independence}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Total\_aid\_volume}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{US\_military\_assistance}_{it} + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

where;

Y_{it}: HHI for country i at time t

$\text{Former\_colonizer}_{it}$: Categorical variable that indicates the former colonizer for an aid recipient country i at time t

$\text{Years\_since\_independence}_{it}$: Calculates the number of years that the aid recipient country i has been independent at time t

$\text{Total\_aid\_volume}_{it}$: Represents the total volume of aid (in dollar value) received by country i at time t

$\text{US\_military\_assistance}_{it}$: Represents the dollar value of military assistance provided by the United States to country i at time t

α_t: The year-specific fixed effects capturing time-specific unobserved factors

α_i: The country-specific fixed effects

ϵ_{it}: The error term

Results

I begin by presenting some distributions of the HHI. Figure 1 shows a declining concentration in almost every aid recipient country over time, especially since the 1990s. The trend is clearer starting 1990 owing to enhanced data quality from donor reporting systems.

Figure 1: HHI distributions with HHI disaggregated by aid recipient country, former colonizer and time



Source: author's computation based on the OECD CRS dataset

Additionally, the pace of decline appears to vary depending on the identity of the former colonizer (see Figure 2). Once again, the trends are clearer from 1990 owing to better data quality. Running country-specific trends further validate this trend.

Figure 2: HHI disaggregated by former colonizer and time



Source: author's visualization based on the OECD CRS dataset.

A simple regression (Annex - Table 1, Model 1) confirms the declining donor concentration. On average, the HHI decreases by 208 points for each additional year. The declining HHI is primarily linked to more donors and implementers getting involved in development programs within countries that were once the aid strongholds of former colonial powers. As Fengler and Kharas (2010: 22) note *"in the past, a developing country government could convene the top ten donors and cover more than 90 percent of the aid flows. Today (published in 2010), the top ten donors typically cover less than 60 percent of total aid, and this proportion is likely to decline further as new aid players expand their activities."*

Models 2 and 3 check for varying concentration levels across former colonizers. Notably, French colonies appear more concentrated relative to former British colonies. While the regression analysis cannot point to mechanisms driving this, presumably it is influenced by donor-specific engagement strategies. Studies have previously found that Anglophone and Francophone Africa show significant differences in economic growth (Ricart-Huguet 2022), with the Anglophone countries potentially growing faster due to an erosion of the persistence of colonial investments (Kohnert 2022). This points to France playing a more influential role in its former colonies, as substantiated by its Françafrique strategy (Listre 2022).

Models 4 and 5 test whether one observes varying rates of de-concentration across donors. Results show that this is indeed the case with donor concentration in former French colonies falling by 73 units for every subsequent year following independence compared with former British colonies. For non-European/regional colonizers, the concentration increases by 95 units relative to former British colonies. These interaction effects are not statistically significant for former Belgian and Portuguese colonies, however. Combining this finding with those from the previous models, the following insights emerge: (i) donor concentration has generally reduced over time, (ii) former French colonies are generally more concentrated relative to former British colonies, and (iii) for every subsequent year following independence in former French colonies, donor concentration falls. But how can insights (ii) and (iii) be simultaneously true? This is where historical path-dependencies come into play. Britain's colonial method of 'indirect rule' that used existing political structures to project its power (Becker, 2020; Gerring et al. 2011) versus France's direct rule driven by centralization and close ties between the metropolitan and colonial governments (Lee and Schultz 2011) meant that the extent of embeddedness of each former colonial power within their colony greatly varied. This legacy of direct rule coupled with France's explicit aim to maintain strong control over former colonies through the Françafrique strategy can help explain the outcomes, atleast partially.

Conclusion

This paper set out to answer two overarching questions relating to colonial legacies in foreign aid to Africa. (i) Are the colonial legacies increasing or declining over time? (ii) Does this increase/decline vary depending on the identity of the former colonizer? I find support for the general decline in donor concentration over time and across countries. However, variations across donors exist with increased concentration in former French colonies relative to former British colonies. Notably, the declining concentration does not imply that the overall influence of former colonizers has reduced in African countries. However, what I find is that the tendency to maintain a complete 'monopoly' over foreign aid by the former colonizer is reducing. The main limitation of this research is that it does not account for Chinese aid owing to data availability issues. Additionally, the analysis was restricted to Western, Eastern and Southern African countries, which makes it harder to extrapolate to Northern Africa.

Despite these limitations, the findings contribute to scholarship and policy debates on neocolonialism, dependency, and foreign aid. Given that modern-day inequality is often a continuation of historical structures and path-dependencies, this research maps how historical patterns of aid evolved and will continue to influence development across Africa.

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Annex

Table 1: Regression results with fixed effects

	Dependent variable: HHI		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**
Year	−208.259***		
	(3.071)		
Former_colonizer_Belgium		−80.917	−483.287***
		(127.708)	(154.167)
Former_colonizer_France		248.125***	200.791**
		(68.922)	(80.476)
Former_colonizer_Non-European		497.840***	369.601**
		(129.881)	(153.295)
Former_colonizer_Portugal		8.849	22.606
		(120.921)	(128.832)
Market_size			−0.079
			(0.050)
US_military_aid_log			−110.648***
			(23.090)
Years_since_independence			1.269
			(1.960)
Observations	1,847	1,847	1,115
R^2	0.719	0.015	0.061
Adjusted R^2	0.712	−0.013	0.028
F-statistic	4,599.291*** (df=1; 1,801)	6.660*** (df=4; 1,795)	9.915*** (df=7; 1,077)

Note: df, degrees of freedom. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: results based on the author's analysis of the OECD CRS dataset

Table 2: Regression results with interaction effects

Dependent variable	**HHI**	**Log_diff_HHI**
	Model 4	**Model 5**
Years_since_independence	−122.612***	0.005*
	(8.409)	(0.003)
Market_size	0.344***	0.0001*
	(0.089)	(0.00003)
US_military_aid_log	−47.381	−0.009
	(47.393)	(0.016)
Years_since_independence: Former_colonizer_Belgium	−3.817	0.004
	(21.639)	(0.007)
Years_since_independence: Former_colonizer_France	−72.803***	−0.006
	(12.677)	(0.004)
Years_since_independence: Former_colonizer_Non-European	95.144***	−0.011
	(29.374)	(0.010)
Years_since_independence: Former_colonizer_Portugal	−34.122*	−0.018***
	(18.272)	(0.006)
Former_colonizer_Belgium: Market_size	−0.105	0.0001
	(0.224)	(0.0001)
Former_colonizer_France: Market_size	0.664***	0.0001***
	(0.212)	(0.0001)
Former_colonizer_Non-European: Market_size	0.558	0.0004**
	(0.541)	(0.0002)
Former_colonizer_Portugal: Market_size	0.322	0.0003***
	(0.315)	(0.0001)
Former_colonizer_Belgium: US_military_aid_log	−8.909	−0.044
	(112.236)	(0.037)
Former_colonizer_France: US_military_aid_log	149.720**	0.005
	(63.898)	(0.021)
Former_colonizer_Non-European: US_military_aid_log	144.271	−0.047
	(177.877)	(0.058)
Former_colonizer_Portugal: US_military_aid_log	668.263***	0.025
	(135.802)	(0.045)
Observations	1,115	1,115
R^2	0.522	0.057
Adjusted R^2	0.495	0.004
F-statistic (df=15; 1,055)	76.668***	4.222***

Note: standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.
Source: results based on the author's analysis of the OECD CRS dataset.

Margins of the Marginalized: The Occupationally Casted Women Potters of Horn of Africa.

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This article explores the concept of double marginalization experienced by women, arising from societal and economic constraints that threaten their professional and cultural identity. Specifically, it focuses on pottery-making's cultural and economic significance for women in the Horn of Africa. Using social inclusivity and identity theory, the article analyzes the interconnected social and economic roles pottery provided to women for generations even while it is an occupation that is considered the activity of the lower cast groups even within the marginalized women. The research used a qualitative approach, employing the case study method and involving potters from Ethiopia and Somaliland. These potters were identified using snowball methods due to the absence of a publicly accessible community. Data was gathered through oral history methods with structured questions. The study uncovered social labeling, discrimination, and stigmatization associated with the practice and its practitioners. Additionally, it highlighted the critical endangerment of this tradition, with only a few families still practicing it. Drawing insights from other communities in the region, the article suggests that revitalizing and commercializing pottery production could bring various benefits, including income generation for potters, rebranding opportunities, and preserving cultural heritage.

Rukia Abdillahi Hussein, an elderly woman in her 70s, is one of the last remaining potters in Hargeysa, Somaliland. Despite facing visual impediments, she continues to practice pottery to make income and preserve her identity and culture. Having learned the craft from her mother, Rukia feels a strong responsibility to uphold her family's legacy, fearing that the practice may cease with her. She expresses her belief that even in the past, when there were more potters, her community has been marginalized, emphasizing the disconnect between the appreciation for their products and the disdain towards the practitioners themselves. In her words, "they like our products but they detest us."

Rukia emphasizes the stereotypical stories associated with her community, labeling them as the lower caste or minority group and attaching derogatory meanings to their profession as craftswomen. In most communities of the Horn of Africa, the occupation of pottery making is considered to be that of the "untouchables," marginalizing them by carrying implications of mostly spiritual impurity. Rukia and her sister produce cultural items such as the traditional incense furnace, Idiin, and the traditional stove, Girigire, which still hold functional value in certain areas among Somali communities. However, these items are now primarily viewed as aesthetic relics of the past, contributing to a sense of loss encompassing the objects, the practitioners, and their collective identity. The Hargeysa Cultural Center based in Somaliland observed in its community engagement that clay materials are not at the market being replaced by imported materials, and also the production is no more in place at a community level. Surveys conducted by the Center indicated that very few community members engage in the practice at a personal consumption level. This paper explores the intersectionality of marginalization, encompassing aspects of gender, clan, and occupation within the context of women potters of the Horn of Africa. The research delves into the historical background of pottery, the status of practitioners in the Horn of Africa, and potential pathways toward dignified preservation and advancing the socioeconomic needs of women potters within their respective communities.

Pottery and potters' historical background

Pottery is one of the early productions humans engaged in during the evolution of civilization. Clay products have been an instrumental source

of information about earlier communities, as explained in archeological excavation-related data. They usually make the majority of the items collected from such sites as a reference to trade relations between communities or as an element of cultural identity from early production. Early-day researchers have stipulated that ethnic groups' identities are marked in their pottery cultures, though this archaeological lens today is considered shallow as it did not bring in the social environment. More recent anthropological research has gone beyond that and looked at the production from a wider scope by including culture (Dietler & Herbrich: 1993).

Frequently produced items in Ethiopia include 'Jebana' (coffee-making pot), 'Diist' (cooking pot), 'Insera' (water fetching and container pot), and 'Etanmacheshia' (the incense furnace). In Somaliland, similar items are produced, named locally 'Jalxad' or 'Mardabaan' (a water jar), 'Dabqaad' or 'Idin' (the furnace used to burn incense for frankincense used by the women), 'Dheri' (cooking pot), and 'Girgire Xamari' (traditional cooker used with charcoal). More recently, flowerpots and other household use materials have been introduced, especially in Ethiopia and Kenya, which have become more of home decorative tools than serving their original day-to-day functions.

As it is for many historical productions, where and how pottery making started is not something that has a definite answer. The literature suggests it came during a transition from a 'hunter-gatherers' way of life to planting and cooking which accentuated the need for an item that fits these services (Barnet, 1999). Consistently mentioned communities as an early society engaged in its production and use are communities in the Middle East, Africa, China, and Japan.

The pottery history of the Horn of Africa has often focused on the sociology of potters which for most involves a story of discrimination across most communities (Arthur, 2006, 2014; Bazar Author & L Mallowan, 1947; Lyons et al., 2018). This line of research focused on the community, with the practice of pottery making predominantly being a skill transferred on a kinship basis. Archeological research in the Horn, as elsewhere, has used pots as a central instrument and they have made also a large reference to the items being part of the trade relation the early East African communities had with the other side of the world (Mire, 2005; Fernández, Ruibal and Torre, 2022). The route of the Red Sea coast and the Indian Ocean brought several gift items that have been found in the graveyards of the prominent figures of the region (David and Kramer, 2001; Bahn etal, 1996; Fernández, Ruibal and Torres, 2022).

In the case of Ethiopia, pottery production is practiced among many communities in different parts of the country, such as in Gamo (Dorze ethnic groups) of southwestern Ethiopia, Amhara (among Falasha communities), and Oromo of Wollega at Dongoro district, as well as Tigray National regional state (Bula, 2011; Arthur, 2002, 2003; Gedef, 2011; Tilahun, 2016). There is also a relation between the practice in Ethiopia and Sudan as Kabangi (2013) presents it as a result of Mid-Holocene climatic desiccation, as "Pre-Nilotic" Eastern Sudanic-speaking populations migrated from Sudan into the highlands of Ethiopia, bringing with them their domesticated plants, animals and agricultural knowledge. Following that migration, the Eastern Sudanic populations began to adopt pottery to transport and store their food. Pankhurst (1992) has stated that pottery technology in Ethiopia was exclusively handmade. Barnet (1999) further explains that ceramic materials in Ethiopia are distinct morphologically compared with early ceramics of the surrounding region.

In Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa, especially in the locality called Kechene where the potters live and work together, exists a mix of contemporary and traditional pot-making practices. Their products are among the traditional items placed in traditional artifact shops even though the social discrimination against the auctioneers is as negative as it always has been. The nationally celebrated coffee culture around the Jebana (clay pot) can be taken as a symbol of resistance and survival for potters in Ethiopia.

While there is a difference in type and decorative patterns, pottery practice in Kenya also shares

some similar patterns to the others in the region. The oldest clay pots found in Kenya are said to be around 8000 years old, with a fragment of one of them recently 'rediscovered' deep inside the National Museum of Kenya's collection by Freda Nkirote M'Mbogori. That fragment can today be seen in a fascinating, wide-ranging exhibition at the National Museum's Creativity Gallery entitled "Pots and Identities." The exhibited pots from all over Kenya had historically been used to identify which pre-historic Kenyan peoples were living where and when, as well as with whom they interacted. The reading also states that in the majority of Kenyan communities (apart from some Cushitic peoples), it is women who are the pot-makers. Nonetheless, her research work illustrates the techniques of pot-making as well as the decorative designs found on practically every piece of pottery, which are passed down from mothers to daughters and fathers to sons over centuries. Currently, contemporary Kenyan potters who are now known as ceramicists and artists dominate the production, challenging the traditional women potters' status whose pottery had a more functional role in the past (M'Mbogori.F. N. and et al., 2020).

The practice has been affected in recent years by the increased importation of clay and ceramic products mainly from China which have dominated the market. There is still local production taking place at a very small scale, but the growing domination of imported pottery worries the practitioners as it both pushes them more to the margin in economic benefits and also fades their generations-long preserved cultural identity.

The pottery-making practice and history of Somali communities are hard to find as there seems to be a huge gap in the literature. Even though the practice existed as some families still have items made of clay, showing clearly that it has been and still is part of the material cultures of the community currently there is no active production. Archeological excavations have provided clay items that are used in the description of the community profile (Mire 2005, 2007, 2015; Curle 1934). González-Ruibal et al. (2022) in their fieldwork at Xiss Somaliland have extensively described and presented the routes of the trade lines with the pots and other items collected from the site. The clay in Somaliland was used to produce products such as Jalxad, Mardabaan, Dabqaad, Idin, and Dheri; more recently flowerpot and other household use materials have been introduced, like Girgire Xamari (produced in Somalia and imported which is traditional cooker used with charcoal).

The women, their social status, and marginalization
In 2006, Tara Belkin, in collaboration with Steven Brandt, produced *The Buur Heybe Potters* ("The Hill of the Potter's Sand"), the sole existing documentary and anthropological account of pottery making in the Somali community. An interesting aspect of this community is that the pots were made only by men while the women helped in collecting the clay and making the preparations for the production. Nevertheless, my interviews and observation have illustrated a different case as it was only women who were engaged in it in the case of Somaliland and also most in the Ethiopian cases. Accounts about the practice in Kenya also demarcate it as a practice by women with a special meaning to the Luo community where it is considered a marker of womanhood.

In many societies across Africa and the Americas, pottery was a woman-dominated craft, reflecting its role in daily domestic life and cultural practices. According to anthropologist Joan M. Gero, "In numerous cultures, pottery was primarily a female activity, with women not only producing essential household items but also imbuing their creations with cultural and symbolic meanings" (Gero, 1991:164). This perspective highlights how pottery has often been seen as a profession closely aligned with women's roles and responsibilities within these societies. In addition to the practice of being women-dominated, it also has a social casting practice of the groups considered minority in almost all of the countries in the Horn of Africa.

In the case of Somaliland, there are very few families still engaged in the making of the pots in a way of the pre-ordered system. This has left the practicing women challenged with livelihood income as well as the uncertainty of the continuation of the cultural heritage and practice. The occupational minorities in Somaliland

consist of the Gabooye (Madhibaan together with Muse Diriye). They also live, in smaller numbers, in Ethiopia, Puntland and southern Somalia. Traditionally, Madhibaan and Muse Diriye were hunters, shoemakers, tanners, potters, well diggers, and water carriers for their hosts. Muse Diriye also traditionally worked as basket makers. Members of the Gabooye enjoy limited protection throughout Somalia (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022).

As far back as the early 1900s, occupational minorities were considered outcasts by other clans, resulting in their segregation, even though their language, physical appearance, and customs were largely the same. This stigmatization is also partly rooted in a groundless myth that associates these groups with the consumption of unclean food like dead animals, inflicting harm from a visual power and labeling them as evil-eyed. Many women in this community worked on reproductive health as traditional birth attendants and also as FGM (Female Genital Mutilation) practitioners.

The sociocultural and religious landscape for Somali women presents a myriad of challenges, necessitating adept navigation of restrictive customs and norms. Somali women continue to strive for equitable and inclusive representation within a predominantly clan-based traditional system that purports to uphold a "democratic" governance structure, yet falls short of providing parity. This struggle is further compounded by the marginalized status of minority groups, such as those engaged in pottery-making, whose male counterparts also encounter barriers to inclusion within the overarching social framework dominated by "noble" clans. The resulting landscape is one characterized by intricate obstacles impeding access, economic opportunities, and inclusivity.

The case in Ethiopia is a bit better but not as far from the discriminatory and derogatory status for handcraft women. The particular group is called "Shekla Seri" which translates directly as "Clay Makers" and is sometimes used as a derogatory term. The group is marginalized in ways similar to the minority groups in Somaliland claiming they have an "evil eye" which is another element that has played in the group-specific ownership for production and also limited the engagement of the assumed Noble class in the production. "They like our products but they detest us" is an expression frequently used across occupational groups even though there is still a hierarchy within the group.

The scholarly lens of intersectionality theory offers a framework deeply rooted in the premise that an individual's lived experiences are shaped by the confluence of multiple social identities, such as race and gender. This theory posits that an adequate understanding of these experiences cannot be achieved by examining social identities in isolation. While intersectionality theory has been widely embraced in qualitative research, its incorporation into quantitative studies has only emerged more recently. This theoretical framework serves as a valuable tool for elucidating the complex interplay of various forms of inequality and disadvantage, often resulting in compounded barriers to full societal participation and advancement in ways that often are not understood among conventional ways of thinking.

It is members of these occupational groups who are engaged in pottery making in Somaliland currently living at two specific places in Daami and Sh. Madar. Through this research, two families were found practicing the production at a preordering system. The families got the skill as inherited practice coming down on a female member line of generation unlike that of the Buur Heybe. Hence, the Somaliland pottery production also has a gender element. The research participants clearly stated that they learned the practice from their grandmother and mother in their early days who used it as a means of income generation and cultural occupation.

By interviewing the community members who are still engaged in the production, the research has been able to learn that the family has now only three members who produce pot only on a request basis. Rukia Abdilahi is an elderly woman in her late 70s who is visually challenged and has the longest experience with the practice. She has stated that she has learned the production from her elder sister who herself learned it from their

grandmother. The second person engaged in the practice is Safia Hussein who is also in her late 60s. The third one is Nasri Caydiid, the son of Rukia who joined the production as a way to help his mother. Unlike the Buur Heybe community where the males are the only pottery makers culturally, the history of Rukia's family indicates that they inherited from the female line of their family and even describes the practice as the activity of women's responsibility.

Rukia working on her pot at an event organized for an exhibition at Hargeysa Cultural Centre in 2022. (Photo credit @Hargeysa Cultural Centre 2022).

The interview with Rukia Abdillahi Hussein indicated pottery-making was not something practiced by the majority of the community. It was practiced by the communities closer to the settlers that had access to the clay and water points. This, she stated, makes it a very group-specific practice for her community within the predominantly pastoral community. In addition to this, she has stated that pottery making initially was not market-oriented but grew out of household needs and later it became a source of income generation for her family. She is concerned with the future of the pottery-making culture as families have not transmitted as was the case for her family. She emphasized the need to make the transmission of knowledge a key priority in future efforts to revitalize pottery-making. She states that young women are not interested in acquiring the practice as they see it work of marginalized groups and have no space in their future lives leaving very few objects saved but the practice fading. As Sada Mire (2007) wrote, factors such as the method of production, function, meaning, context, and significance are important to consider to preserve traditional knowledge and not objects.

Safia Hussein discussed how the social view of pottery making has changed over time mainly due to the importation of ceramic products. Accordingly, people saw the pots as less important and discouraged her and her daughter from carrying pots around the city to sell them. She insisted that pottery-making is part of the Hiddihii iyo Dhaqankii (cultural identity) as "the essence of our culture" and wished to carry on the legacy despite the challenges even with all the social discrimination she says their community face.

Nasri Caydiid, who is the only male potter in the family line, stated that he has practiced and learned pot-making as a way to support his mother and understands that the tradition is fully considered a women's activity. He states if it wasn't for the demand of not having alternative family income generation, he would not have learned the practice. In his words; "I saw my mother struggling to make a living from the profession and working hard to preserve her culture. I wanted to get her rest from this hard work that I learned the practice."

While the social isolation and denigratory name-calling for the potters is still in place, especially in the rural areas of Ethiopia, the urban potters seem to be in a better position with the rise of back-to-the-roots initiatives with valuing items considered indigenous becoming aesthetical presentations. There is an initiative that is teaching children traditional handcrafting practices with storytelling that readjusts the discriminatory and marginalizing identification of the practice and practitioners. Mama Pottery is a social enterprise in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that is working towards revitalizing the practice and structuring it as an alternative livelihood for woman victims of Gender Based violence. Along this novel mission, the founder Brikti Twolde set a mission to change the wrong assumptions towards the practicing women and the practice. The stereotypical perception still exists, though. When I went for my research conversation with the potters and had a one-day pottery-making training some of my friends considered it bravery sub-texting that I could have been a victim of the evil eye.

Emama Pottery (Emama Shekla) sessions P1 children training sessions with Story telling while the second one is the Auter having a one-day training on pottery making with Brikti Emmama Shekla. (Photo Credit @Emama Pootery social media 2023)

These are the lived realities of women potters across the region now with the modernization and limited capital access for marginalized women their cultural identity and their livelihood are threatened more than before. With the emergence of spaces like the Mama Pottery, the Kenyan ceramic and artesian groups, and even the wider change in the reimagining of culture as a decolonization process, there is an opportunity to revitalize the practice and adjust the double marginalization of the women potters.

Conclusion

Women potters are navigating through a complex and multi-layered margin. Discriminated due to ill-informed derogatory perceptions towards them from their profession, within the wider ethnic marginalization they face for being a minority compounded with the modernization push that is giving priority to imported items and modernized technology that they have challenges to access due to gender norms are aspects that have made the practitioners lose their livelihood and also the traditional pottery culture fade. Heritage, be it built, intangible, or material culture, is the instrument of identity, the path to trace back self-awareness, and the mode of livelihood. Without romanticizing it, preserving and adopting the cultural production of tools inherent to the identity and social development of these women is pertinent.

The case of the potter community of the Horn of Africa is very concerning as its fading out is taking the livelihood generation means for the community. It is also concerning because similar items are being imported with much more money spent benefiting other communities instead of capacitating the practitioners with advanced skills while preserving tradition. Caly production is an element the younger generation in the region especially in Somali communities hears about as a fictional story with almost out of their reach. Accordingly, it is important to give a critical observation and plan of action to revitalizing the practice before it completely dies out. Regional practices in neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya revitalization efforts both in terms of inclusivity and respect for the practitioners and income generation programs are getting attention. Somaliland should similarly use the very few practicing members of the profession so that it preserves the culture and revitalizes it among the younger generation as it can assist the community cohesion beyond social discrimination faced by the minority groups who are for now the sole owners of the dying practice.

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Steeped in Inequality: Uncovering the Hidden Stories of Mozambican Earn and Learn Students in Zimbabwe's Tea Estates, 1980-2013

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Introduction

In the late 20th century, debates on "child labour", inequality, and economic development gained global attention. Efforts by the United Nations and the International Labour Organization sought to address these issues, but exploitative labour practices persisted in Southern Africa. Zimbabwe's Tea Estates, particularly the Earn and Learn System (EALS), perpetuated inequality and "child labour" under the guise of education and vocational training. This study examines the experiences of Mozambican Earn and Learn students at Tanganda Tea Estates in Chipinge, south-eastern Zimbabwe, between 1980 and 2013, uncovering stories of exploitation and resilience. Their background reveals unique factors why they migrated as young children. Tanganda Tea Estates contracted children (defined as anyone under the age of 18)[1] from across Zimbabwe and Mozambique to work for them in return for educational support. Most of the children engaged through the EALS came from Mussourize communities surrounding the estates such as Muchemedzi, Mpingo, and Mapungwana. The children enrolled at Avontuur, Jersey, New Year's Gift, Ratelshoek and Zona schools. The paper argues that we need to reconsider and contextualize our understanding and conceptualization of the implications and interpretation of "child labour" in local situations. Ultimately, this study highlights the need to move beyond simplistic narratives of "child labour" and instead adopt a nuanced understanding that acknowledges the complex interplay of poverty, migration, and education in shaping the experiences of the marginalized youth. This study makes an important distinction between "child labour" and child work. The latter refers to a social instrument for child training, social integration, and preparation for adult life.[2] Child work encompasses several elements that can help the social and healthy development of the child and does not detract from essential activities such as education, playing and sleeping.[3] However, "child labour" is "labour performed by a child [that] risks the somatic, psychological, or just the well-being of a child."[4] "Child labour" involves the obnoxious exploitation of children; the child is restricted as a worker and there are no time restrictions. This study, therefore, adds to the understanding of this discourse by examining how parents and children conceptualised their local experiences as they interacted with the Tanganda Tea Company. By examining the motivation, experiences, and how they perceived their time in the system, this research aims to contribute to the historiography of childhood in Africa, promote children's well-being, and situate African childhood experiences in historical and modern contexts.

This study is informed by supply-side theorization and the concept of the "economy of affection" to analyse the factors influencing the occurrence of EALS and the reciprocal benefits for tea estate owners and students. The supply-side considerations influenced the socio-economic context in which the EALS occurred by determining what constitutes "child work" or "child labour". By exploring this case study, the paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics driving inequality and child labour in the global south. The study begins in 1980 because the year marked a critical juncture in Zimbabwe's history, as the country transitioned from colonial rule to independence. This period also saw significant changes in education policies, which had a profound impact on the EALS. The study ended in 2013, when the EALS system was abandoned.

Literature Review and Methodology

This work draws on the existing literature on Childhood Studies. While scholars like Grier, Bourdillon, and White have explored the role of African "child labour" in capital accumulation and commodification of childhood[5], their work disregards the agency and influence of children in shaping their experiences. In contrast, research by Chirwa, Agrawal; Kielland and Tovo emphasizes the importance of considering children's perspectives and the cultural context of "child labour."[6] Hungwe, Sachikonye, and Salani situate "child labour" within the broader context of poverty, necessity, and social obligation[7], but their frameworks overlook the autonomy and influence of children. All in all, this study builds on the work of these scholars to understand the nature of "child labour" as opposed to child work. However, many of the works overemphasize how the quest for economic efficiency pushes employers to contract child labourers.[8] This rules out other possible reasons such as Social Contract Responsibility and Philanthropy.[9] Likewise, a few other works also overemphasize poverty as the sole reason driving children to work on the plantations.[10] None of these viewpoints captures the full story because they fail to account for the persistence of the EALS over a period of 33 years. Hence, a socio-economic history approach over the entire run of the EALS will be able to encapsulate the saliences of "child labour" that other disciplinary approaches do not quite satisfy.

The study employed qualitative methods including archival research and auto-ethnographic approaches to gather data from diverse stakeholders. It focused on a case study of Tanganda Tea Estates and surrounding communities to revisit discourses around "child labour" vs. child work. A total of 32 informants were randomly selected for in-depth interviews, with 16 of them being females. The study adopted purposive sampling to target interviewees who experienced the EALS, focusing on middle-aged individuals with familial ties to the EALS. Data was collected through questionnaires and in-depth interviews. The snowball sampling technique was used to identify 14 former foreign students who went through the EALS and were interviewed. Archival research involved scrutinizing records from Tanganda Tea Estates and the National Archives of Zimbabwe, and the auto-ethnographic approach included gathering data from the researcher's own experience. Participants were fully informed about the research's purpose and provided informed consent.

Background: Origins of Tanganda Tea Company

Tanganda Tea Company started growing tea commercially in the Chipinge district, Zimbabwe, during the colonial period in the mid-1920s. The name 'Tanganda' derives from the river that runs through New Year's Gift, one of the company estates. To most Zimbabweans, however, it is synonymous with tea.[11] Jackson and Cheater note that the production of tea and coffee started with Tanganda Tea Company (formerly Ward and Phillips).[12] The company was started by two Indian planters, Arthur Ward and Grafton Phillips, and used seeds brought from Assam, India, by Mrs. Florence Phillips.[13] They initiated a small tea plantation on New Year's Gift Estate in Chipinge. To this date, tea is primarily grown in the Mutasa and Chipinge districts of Manicaland Province where the environmental factors are suitable for both large-scale and smallholder viable tea production.[14] Besides that, according to Rearden, tea production in Zimbabwe succeeded by establishing irrigated estates in the Eastern Highlands.[15]

In the 1920s, white farmers employed women and children from the reserves as casual or seasonal labour and sought to attract whole families to work on their farms as wage labourers.[16] The Native Juveniles Employment Act of 1926 allowed children to work alongside their parents on white-owned commercial farms.[17] Additionally, missionaries utilized juveniles as unpaid domestic workers in their own houses and on mission-owned commercial farms.[18] White employers and missionaries saw children as a cheap source of labour and allocated them numerous farm duties.[19] The use of juveniles was crucial to the earnings of white farmers, who benefited from the state both in accessing juvenile labour and in controlling and disciplining the children.[20]

Reflections on colonial African education

The introduction of colonial education and the rise of the mission and kraal school system in colonial Rhodesia cemented the space for the presence of a childhood distinctiveness.[21] Some African children were keen on the unique views of learning to read and write to augment their social status and economic opportunities.[22] According to Charton-Bigot the advance of colonial schools contributed to the rise of childhood as a social category and schools produced the circumstances for the presence of a new group of actors between childhood and adulthood.[23]

The new education scheme drew youths together as the missionaries eagerly participated in changing African societies within their spheres of influence. Frederick Lugard viewed African education as threatening to the system of indirect rule.[24] In Southern Rhodesia, African education had been left under religious missions.[25] In 1907 NC for Belingwe warned:

> To educate him, (the African) in book learning alone, without the wholesome discipline of labour, is fatal. A smattering of education suffices to give him imagination, very little of which the ordinary uncivilized native possesses. The first result of imagination is to breed ideas, and the ideas which come more readily on an idle man are his grievances or supposed grievances… The partially educated barbarian is the man who foments discontent leading, as it has done in Natal, to rebellion.[26]

In the 1920s, schools in African villages of Southern Rhodesia became important for social mobility and empowerment.[27] The colonial education systems aimed to produce a labour force for the colonial powers, but Africans realized that education could help them gain knowledge and skills to improve their employment opportunities and defend their rights.[28]

The Earn-And-Learn System in Tanganda Tea Estates

The farm schools – namely Avontuur, Jersey, New Year's Gift, Ratelshoek, and Zona – were established to keep juvenile labour on the plantations in the 1930s.[29] During this period, the schools provided primary education mainly to cater for the children of estate workers, mostly African labourers. These schools chiefly provided basic education that focused on agricultural skills and labour force training. Ratelshoek, for example, provided only up to Grade Two.[30] This fascinated children in rural areas. The sources of adult labour for Tanganda Tea Company were the neighbouring areas of Mozambique while school pupils worked in the morning and then went to school in the afternoon.[31] The Company employed more than 1600 children and adolescents who worked part-time on the farm for nominal wages and attended the company's schools part-time.[32] However, the schools provided poor-quality education. Also, they opened and closed according to the farm work schedule.

Tanganda Tea Estates faced challenges in attracting and retaining labour due to its remote location and harsh working conditions.[33] To reduce labour costs, the company employed children and young adults at lower wages through the EALS. The system provided control and discipline while claiming to offer vocational training and improve productivity. However, it perpetuated exploitation and paternalism influenced by colonial-era labour practices. Mozambican children, vulnerable due to poverty and economic instability, faced particular exploitation under the EALS.[34]

Experiences and Conditions in the Earn-And-Learn System

This section integrates the concept of the "economy of affection", which highlights mutual benefits, social relationships, trust, and loyalty nurtured within the system. It explores reciprocal advantages for both tea estate owners and students, including access to education, training, and employment. It also emphasizes the personal connections, trust, and loyalty cultivated among students, as well as the exchange of labour for education and training, which instilled a sense of responsibility and discipline. Furthermore, it delves into the significant role of kinship ties in labour recruitment and retention, where family relationships influenced access to the system and ultimately

impacted students' experiences and conditions within the system.

In the 1980s, changes in the EALS led to a shift towards free education for everyone.[35] This reduced the labour pool for EALS, and workers began to expect better wages and working conditions. Despite the availability of free education, it was not always accessible in rural areas due to shortages of schools, teachers, and resources. Orphaned or vulnerable children often had to work to support themselves or their families, making EALS still a necessity. Despite the challenges, an increased number of orphans and vulnerable children sought education within the EALS, using the wages they earned to buy uniforms, books, and other necessities.[36] For example, Johanna joined the EALS after being orphaned at a young age.[37]

Additionally, the size of families affected children's enrolment in Tanganda schools, as many fathers had multiple wives and struggled to support their children, leading to difficulties in paying school fees.[38] Consequently, many mothers chose to send their children to Tanganda for education because the fees were more manageable. The local community recognized that financial hardships at home were a significant factor in sending children to these schools, with many families struggling to provide enough food and other essentials.[39] There was a consensus that if the government provided free education for all, these children would not have had to attend these schools.[40]

The former students had the opportunity to gain an in-depth understanding of the tea industry, including aspects such as tea plantation management, processing, and marketing.[41] This extensive exposure opened up diverse career paths for the former students, equipping them with transferable skills applicable to other sectors within agriculture. Furthermore, the EALS emphasized the importance of industriousness and physical strength, with one informant describing it as a training centre for individuals to realize the value of standing up for themselves.[42] Outstanding students were awarded bursaries for their Advanced level education. The government of Zimbabwe supported the system[43], and there were notable success stories of former pupils finding careers in teaching and agriculture internationally.[44]

Moreover, Jersey and Ratelshoek Secondary Schools excelled in 'O'-level results between 1995 and 1997, surpassing the district average with 42% of students passing five or more 'O'-level subjects, compared to 25% in the Chipinge District.[45] An interviewee revealed that the schools' success was attributed to the admission selection process driven by competition for places, and the facilities and quality of teaching provided.[46] However, the primary-level results were disappointing. The estates pressured the schools to admit children with weaker academic backgrounds, prioritizing those with parents working on the estates or showing talent in plucking.[47]

As per the feedback received from one participant, students were required to work in the fields from 6:00 until 12:30 on Saturdays.[48] Following this, they were given the rest of the day off, wherein some form of entertainment was typically organized for the evening. On Sundays, children had the day off, except for a mandatory study period in the evening.[49] The winter timetable mandated 29 hours of work every week, which left the students with inadequate time to sleep.[50] Unfortunately, it seems that the need for sufficient sleep was not taken into consideration by anyone.[51] The estate management claimed its share of hours from the children, while the school also demanded its fair share of hours.[52]

In the past, there were reports of children being required to work during school holidays.[53] Student representatives met with management to address grievances, and strikes occurred due to poor remuneration and working conditions, such as long hours without breaks and the absence of protective clothing.[54] In 2011, students from Jersey Tea Estate used the internet to raise awareness about their severe working conditions.[55]

In addition, the company operated five clinics, one at each of the tea estates, ensuring the health and safety of learners.[56] Notably, sick children required a clinic certificate to excuse them from work.[57] However, certificates were sometimes issued for light work only or not issued at all. Nevertheless,

the management was generally sympathetic towards sick children. Interestingly, one manager, who had experienced the system first-hand, acknowledged the challenge of determining genuine illnesses and even shared some of the tactics he used to skip work during his school days.[58]

The task of pruning in the tea bushes was assigned to the older boys. They were given quotas that some could complete in just an hour and a half.[59] However, careless pruning could pose a danger to these boys, and unfortunately, several children were injured.[60] One such example was Chiko Chaza, who accidentally cut one of his legs just above the knee. He had to spend nearly three months in the clinic to recover.[61] Although many students had been hurt by pruning knives, "I am grateful for the first aid that was provided. The clinic was located nearby, and depending on the severity of the injury, some were referred to hospitals such as Mt Selinda and Chipinge."[62]

Due to adverse weather, some children experienced health issues. Nyambi Nyatesa sought traditional healing, while Chitsi Garara lost her eye in 2008 but received medical care, including a successful eye transplant.[63] The company covered the hospital bills and promised to support her until she completed her studies.[64] Unfortunately, she did not finish her education. Nevertheless, the company continued to look after its students, recognizing their importance to its workforce.

Furthermore, some respondents viewed the work at school as relatively manageable compared to their experiences at home.[65] Again, many children were accustomed to working at home and even found the school much better.[66] Additionally, they appreciated the opportunity to read at school, which they never had time for at home. However, another informant starkly contrasted this view, describing the school work as unbearable, particularly the physical labour of carrying heavy loads that left them with aching muscles and a weakened skeletal system.[67] Moreover, they felt a deep sense of fatigue that even affected their sleep. Interestingly, this informant highlighted the stark difference between the treatments received at school versus the care they received at home.[68]

Figure 1 below shows a photograph of students plucking tea in the field using shears with baskets on their backs in 2012.

Figure 1: The Photograph shows students plucking tea using shears with baskets on their backs in 2012. Source: C. Sigauke, "The Collapse and Socio-economic impact of the "Earn and Learn" Programme in Tanganda Tea Estates, Chipinge District", *Special Honours Dissertation*, University of Zimbabwe, May 2017, p.39.

Despite concerns about child labour, many former students spoke positively about their experiences at the school. Notably, many individuals who went through the system praised it and were reported to be happy during their time. Moreover, parents and others expressed concern that the company might stop the system due to external pressure.[69] The deputy headmaster, a product of the system himself, argued that critics did not understand the benefits, asking, "How can you say [the company] is bad? If this scheme was not here, where would I be?"[70] Interestingly, he noted that children who did not join the system struggled with harder lives as tea pluckers and farmers. Furthermore, efforts to eliminate "child labour" sometimes pushed children into worse situations, highlighting the need to consider the reasons behind child labour and the alternatives.[71]

Additionally, it's interesting to note that the youngsters were offered complimentary lodging in cosy dormitories and were provided meals in the communal dining area.[72] While certain students were grateful for the nutritious meals, others expressed dissatisfaction with the food, unhygienic environment, and repetitive menu.[73] Additionally, local vendors could sporadically sell meat, milk, fish, and vegetables in the evenings.[74] Teachers had to taste the food to ensure it was well-prepared. The

boarding master and matron provided a fixed meal schedule.[75]

Another informant narrated his experiences and how he joined the EALS during the colonial period. According to Machoba, he arrived at Jersey Tea Estate at the age of 19 seeking employment as a cattle herder.

> Born in Chikwekwete, Mossourize District, Mozambique, I was the firstborn of my mother, the ninth wife of my father, who had 14 wives. With no access to education in my area, I moved to Zimbabwe in search of work. For nearly four years, I herded cattle under an agreement where the owner would reward me with a heifer after one year, and additional heifers for each subsequent year. During a holiday in 1973, I met Tichaona Makuyana, a student at Ratelshoek who introduced me to the EALS. Inspired, I joined the system that same year. Through dedication and hard work, I completed my Ordinary level in 1983. Today I proudly serve as a Director at SMS South Africa. The EALS had a profound impact on my life and family. It instilled in me three essential values: hard work, discipline and responsibility. I cherish the admirable relationship we had with management, teachers, and parents. The teachers' dedication was remarkable, often conducting lessons on weekends. I attribute my success to the system's influence.[76]

Another informant came from Jokoniwa in Mossourize District in Mozambique:

> In 1982, at the age of 21, I joined the EALS, commencing my education in Grade One at Zona Tea Estate. Before this, I had spent time herding cattle in Zimbabwe's Chimana area, having been separated from my mother at a young age due to her untimely passing when I was just one-year-old. I was raised by my grandparents. Through the EALS, I was able to access education and subsequently pursue a career in law, culminating in my current position as a lawyer in Mutare. My success has enabled me to acquire property in all ten provinces of Zimbabwe. Notable, few individuals are aware of my foreign origins, as I have obtained all necessary documentation for myself and my family. Regrettably, when the EALS was discontinued in 2013, I was outside of Zimbabwe on official duty and unable to advocate for its continuation. Despite this, I remain grateful for the opportunities afforded to me by the system, which have enabled me to achieve my current status.[77]

Another informant who was enrolled on the EALS in 1997 at Jersey Tea Estate was driven by economic necessity and attracted by the system's boarding school structure. He explained that the provision of electricity for night-time study was a significant advantage, enabling him to excel academically:[78]

> Before joining the system, I commuted from Mpingo in Mozambique to Gwenzi Primary School from Grade One to Five in Zimbabwe, before transferring to the EALS at Grade Six. Through the system, I completed Form Four and secured a bursary from Tanganda, allowing me to pursue further education at Mt Selinda High School. Currently, I hold a position as a lecturer at Great Zimbabwe University. I attribute my academic success and professional achievements to the EALS, which provided me with a supportive environment and access to education. The system's impact on my life has been profound, and I appreciate the values and skills instilled in me during my time there.[79]

Garwi attended Mabee Primary School from Grade One to five where he had to navigate the challenges of walking barefoot, particularly during the harsh winter. The unsanitary conditions of the boys' toilets often marked by urine stains from the doorway to the facilities, made it difficult to enter without shoes:

> I had to resort to tip-toeing to reach the toilet hole. However, my life took a transformative turn when I heard about the EALS in 2000 from my uncle Tapiwa. I enrolled into the system at Jersey Tea Estate in the same year, commencing Grade Six. Through hard work and determination, I completed my Ordinary

> level in 2005 with an impressive academic record of 5A's and 3B's. The EALS proved to be my breakthrough, as it enabled me to secure a bursary from Tanganda Tea Company to pursue Advanced level studies at Mt Selinda High School. I excelled in the Science subjects, achieving 14 points. This academic foundation has served me well in my professional journey, and I am currently employed as an engineer in Bulawayo.[80]

In summary, the EALS presented a complex experience for the children involved, providing benefits for both tea estate owners and students, yet perpetuating inequality and exploitation due to power dynamics and structural factors. Its impact on students' lives was profound, with some attributing their success to the system's influence, while others faced challenges and hardships.

Demise of the Earn-And-Learn System

The Tanganda Tea Company was forced to cease operations due to various reasons, with "child labour" being the most prominent. Both the ILO and UNICEF accused the company of exploiting children.[81] A UNICEF report from 2010 revealed a high incidence of "child labour" in Zimbabwe, with 13% of children affected, violating the ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labour, which Zimbabwe had ratified in 2000.[82] This convention mandates immediate and effective action to prevent and eliminate the worst forms of "child labour"[83] and stipulates that primary education should be free and compulsory for all children.[84] Therefore, the Company was deemed to be a significant violator of the International Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.

The Company made a significant move towards sustainability in September 2011 by becoming a member of the Rainforest Alliance (RFA).[85] This non-profit organization is dedicated to preserving biodiversity and safeguarding the well-being and rights of workers, their families, and communities.[86] RFA sets standards for all products in the international market, similar to Fairtrade. As a result, the company had to discontinue the use of EALS in 2013 to ensure a fair price for their tea products and to attain certification by 2014.[87] Bourdillon argues that the primary concern about "child labour" should not be centred on a complete prohibition of it, as there may be valid reasons against such a measure.[88] Rather, the emphasis should be placed on enhancing the conditions for children who are compelled to work and guaranteeing that their labour is recognized as valid work, both in terms of tangible and intangible benefits, at all levels.[89]

Conclusion

The paper uncovers the complex dynamics surrounding the EALS in Tanganda Tea Estates, Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2013. It reveals varied perspectives among communities and children, with some viewing it as beneficial and others considering it exploitative. While the system provided important skills for students, it also perpetuated inequality. Students demonstrated agency through protests, leading to the system's abandonment in 2013 due to concerns over "child labour". The research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics driving inequality and "child labour" in the global south, highlighting the importance of contextualizing child labour and considering the nuanced perspectives of communities and children involved.

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Interview with C. Karidza, Headmaster at Jersey High School, 21 December 2016.

Interview with C. Marufiye, former student at Jersey, resident in Musirizwi, 8 January 2017.

Interview with C. Mbaringwe, a former student at Zona High School, 27 August 2023.

Interview with F. Chamunorwa, former Earn and Learn student at Jersey High School, 9 February 2024.

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Interview with G. Garwi, a former student at Jersey High School, 10 February 2023.

Interview with J. Pariduri a senior teacher at Ratelshoek Primary School, 19 December 2016.

Interview with J. Ziyakacha, Senior teacher at Jersey High School, 20 December 2016.

Interview with Johanna, a resident in Mutare and, former Student at Jersey High School, 21 December 2016.

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Endnotes

1 This study has adopted the simplified and legal definition of a child. A child is, therefore, any person under the age of 18 years. See Children's Protection and Adoption Amendment Act 23 of Zimbabwe's Constitution of 2013. In this context, childhood is how people control social experiences concerning the everyday engagement of children with society and negotiating their position and competence in society. The numerical age does not define this, but the activities they undergo in society.

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[35] Interview with Mr. S. Hlatshwayo, Jersey Tea Estate Manager, on 7 October 2023. He is a senior Manager. He joined the Tea Estates in 1960.

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[38] Interview with B. Simango, Headmaster at Ratelshoek High School, 17 December 2016.

[39] Ibid.

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[41] Interview with T. Sigauke, a former student at Jersey High School in 2007, on 1 October 2023.

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[44] Ibid.

[45] Interview with C. Karidza, Headmaster at Jersey High School, 21 December 2016.

[46] Interview with S. Muwandi, a teacher at Jersey High School, 23 December 2016.

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[48] Interview with F. Chamunorwa, former Earn and Learn student at Jersey High School and he is now teaching at Jersey Primary School, 9 February 2024.

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[50] Interview with Personnel Manager, Zona Tea Estate, 22 December 2016.
[51] Interview with T. Chivhovho, local resident at Mundanda and former student at Jersey High School, on 1 September 2023.
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[69] Ibid.
[70] Interview with Mr. L. Njeni, Deputy Headmaster at Jersey High School. He joined the system in 1970 and started teaching at Ratelshoek in 1993, 22 October 2022.
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[73] Interview with T. Gwenzi, former student at New Year's Gift Primary School, 17 December 2016.
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[76] Interview with R. Machoba, a former student at Jersey High School, 20 November 2022.
[77] Interview with C. Mbaringwe, a former student at Zona High School, 27 August 2023.
[78] Interview with S. Chimwenje, a former student at Jersey High School, 2 August 2023.
[79] Interview with S. Chimwenje, a former student at Jersey High School, 2 August 2023.
[80] Interview with G. Garwi, a former student at Jersey High School, 10 February 2023.
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[82] Ibid.
[83] M. Bourdillon, "Working children in Zimbabwe" in H. D. Hindman, (ed), The world of child labour: An historical and religional survey, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 2009, p.293.
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[85] Ibid, p.1848.
[86] Interview with B. Kuboya, senior teacher at Zona Secondary School, 22 December 2016.
[87] Interview with S. Hlatshwayo, Estate Manager at Jersey Tanganda Tea Estate, 21 December 2016; see also Tshuma et al., "An Evaluation of Rainforest Alliance (R.F.A) Towards The Sustainable Use and Management of the Environment at Ratelshoek Tea Estate in Chipinge District of Manicaland Province, Zimbabwe", International Journal of Innovative Research and Development, 2013, Vol. 2 Issue 5, p.1848.
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Confronting Inequality in Zimbabwe? From Growth with Equity to National Development Strategy (NDS1); 1980-2024

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Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has implemented several policies aimed at promoting equity-based socioeconomic growth and correcting historical inequalities. This study explores the economic policies crafted and implemented since 1980 to address inequality in Zimbabwe. It delves into the transition from a focus on Growth with Equity to the adoption of the National Development Strategy 1 to confront and mitigate development disparities within the country. Embedded within these policies were clear objectives to redistribute land and wealth, create employment opportunities for the masses and improve the standards of living for everyone. While historical research on policy formulation and implementation in Zimbabwe emphasises local interest groups and politics in influencing the outcomes of the policies, this paper also highlights the intrusive nature of global forces in interfering with policy objectives of reducing inequality. By exploring these broader dynamics, the study analyzes pauses and continuities in the forms, structure and degrees of inequality over the four and half decades of independent Zimbabwe. The paper highlights global forces like the Lancaster House Agreement, the Structural Adjustment Programmes and the USA's Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, and how these impacted on effectiveness of these policies on redistribution of wealth.

Inequality refers to the disparity in the distribution of resources and opportunities among individuals or groups in a given society. It can manifest in various forms, such as income inequality, wealth inequality, and inequality of opportunity.[1] Inequalities evident in Zimbabwe have largely been ascribed to the country's colonial history characterised by racial dominance of the white settlers in the colonial period (1890-1980). Colonial development policies shaped the distribution of resources (particularly land and mineral rights), access to economic opportunities and social services (education, health and housing) in a manner that favoured the white minority over the black majority. From a Marxist perspective, the skewed distribution of land in favour of the whites historically remained central to racial, income and gender inequality discourse in the country after independence.[2]

Since 1980, technocrats in Zimbabwe developed seemingly aggressive economic and social policies and programmes to determinedly fight inequalities. The inherited colonial economy was troubled with entrenched inequalities including rural-urban disparities, educational and occupational disparities, regional inequality, income inequalities, gender inequality, land ownership disparities and racial inequality to mention a few. Influenced by the socialist ideology, the policy-making processes accentuated the state-centric nature of post-colonial development centred on land redistribution, agricultural development, health and education service delivery and social welfare programmes.[3] The government became the central channel through which redistributive programmes were carried out. How did the international scene play out to influence policy formulation and implementation in Zimbabwe? To what extent did the conceived economic policies achieve their objectives of ending inequality?

This paper presents a chronological analysis of the socio-economic policies adopted by Zimbabwe in each of the four and half decades of independence.

The First Decade (1981-1990): *Growth with Equity*, *Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) and The First Five Year Development Plan (FFYDP)*

Independent Zimbabwe inherited a dual agrarian society and economy comprised of white

large-scale farms and a stagnant impoverished communal sector.[4] During the colonial period, the government pursued a separate development policy that favoured the white minority over the black majority. For instance, in terms of access to education in 1976-77, the state expenditure per African pupil was R$43.2 compared to R$475.2 per European pupil, while previously in 1972-73 it was R$28.8 per African pupil against R$377.8 per European pupil.[5] The infant mortality rate among whites was only 17 per 1,000 against 120 to 220 per 1,000 among blacks.[6] In terms of land ownership, about 6,000 white farmers owned over 15.5 million hectares of land, while more than 8,500 small-scale black farmers had just 1.4 million hectares.[7]

During the first decade of independence, the new government prioritised majority-focused socio-economic policies and adopted state-led development strategies to address these colonial inequalities. As a result, the government promulgated and adopted the Growth with Equity policy in 1981 as the first post-independence economic policy blueprint. It aimed to "achieve a sustained high rate of economic growth and speedy development in order to raise incomes and standards of living of all our people and expand productive employment of rural peasants and urban workers, especially the former."[8] Growth with Equity was characterised by high social welfarist rhetoric underpinned by a strong socialist ideology, although Zimbabwe never became a socialist country. The government aimed to enable the black majority to take control of the commanding heights of the economy and widen the masses' access to social services. From 1981, the government spearheaded land resettlement for the land-hungry blacks. Further, there was immense support in the form of subsidies for social services such as health and education.

The *Growth with Equity* policy made notable headway in improving the economic and social status of the black majority. As Zhou and Masunungure note, the policy's redistributive programmes significantly improved access to education and health and the allocation of productive factors to the previously marginalised black masses.[9] Free-for-all all health and education policies caused improvement in health indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy. There was enormous progress in school construction and a corresponding increase in school enrolment for both primary and secondary schools by 1990. State education up to universities was free. By 1990, Zimbabwe had successfully attained universal primary education for all its citizens.[10]

However, several structural challenges constrained the performance of the *Growth with Equity* policy in confronting inequality. The policy assumed that economic growth would be fast enough to create adequate revenue and resources to bankroll national 'socialist' projects. This projection was based on the euphoric economic prosperity between 1980 to 1982 owing to bumper harvests recorded, the removal of sanctions and a reduction in defence costs necessitating easy access to foreign aid and the doing of business. Yet, the growth in social sectors was not accompanied by similar growth in productive sectors. Zimbabwe faced trade deficits and negative balance of trade, shortages of foreign currency and a general decline in investment and capital formation which all contributed to sluggish economic growth.

To support the goals of the *Growth with Equity* policy, in 1982 the government promulgated the *Transitional National Development Plan* (TNDP) which ran until 1985. The plan aimed at achieving social justice and equity through the conception of state enterprises (SEs) "to roll out government programmes, worker participation and social cooperation."[11] However, throughout the TNDP, economic growth rates remained low and did not meet the target of 8%. This was primarily due to insufficient investment in productive sectors, a global recession, and severe droughts during the 1983 and 1984 agricultural seasons. The plan failed to address key issues such as equitable land redistribution, indigenization and empowerment. Although the TNDP had registered some headways in creating over 150,000 jobs and supporting small-scale communal land farmers, it overall failed at its goals.[12] During the TNDP period, the economy grew by 5% compared to the target of 8%. Inflation averaged 13%, worsened by rising budget deficits.

Due to the failure of the TNDP, the government promulgated the *First Five Year Development Plan* (FFYNDP) (1985-1990). The plan aimed to improve the living standards of the whole population, principally, the peasantry. Yet several factors again hamstrung government efforts and projections. The country once again suffered a severe drought in 1986/1987, adversely reducing agricultural output. The shacky performance of the economy, along with the allocation of significant resources to address social inequalities, led to budget deficits and a scarcity of funds for productive investment. As a result, public investment expenditure remained stagnant at less than 1% of GDP. Over 90% of total government expenditure was consumed by public service salaries and wages, interest on debt, and transfer payments. Thus, the economy was faced with internal and external imbalances.

Despite a few achievements registered in addressing inequality issues, the first decade was basically a false start. What are the broader global factors at play in influencing the capacity of the socio-economic policies of the first decade to achieve their stated goal of eliminating inequality? First, it should be noted that the new government's socialist slant scared away foreign investment, upsetting the development of the private sector. At the same time, the government partially relied on international aid (which was generally opposed to socialism) to roll out the programmes. Two important factors were critical in defining Zimbabwe's capacity to sustain its programmes in dealing with inequality: the Lancaster House Constitution, which protected the interests of white capitalists; and the reliance on donor aid from countries who were ordinarily opposed Zimbabwe's development as a socialist state.

The 1980s land reform exercise was couched within the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 which specified that all land be attained on a "willing-buyer willing-seller" basis and that payment for any land so acquired was to be designated in foreign currency. These tight conditions slowed down land reform and set targets were not met. While some land transfer occurred, it was below the official targets. Only one-fifth of the projected 162,000 families were resettled.[13] This poor performance was blamed on "incongruent forces that enter[ed] the system from outside [and] lack of imagination and commitment on the part of policymakers."[14] Support from the donor community for the programme was meagre. Consequently, land was expensive and only available mainly in marginal production areas owing to the "willing-buyer willing-seller" condition. Despite the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1985, which gave the government the first option to purchase land on offer, it did not address the problem of the lack of adequate land where planned resettlement was more feasible. As Mandaza puts it, the Lancaster House Agreement provided "imperialism with the opportunity to be an umpire in a match in which it had vested interests."[15]

The Second Decade (1991-2000): *Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)* and *the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST)*

By 1990, it was evident that the economy had failed to grow as projected in the previous decade. There was an expanding inverse proportion between employment and population growth, severely reducing incomes. The formal sector created only 18,000 jobs, only 10% of the required level. Given this realisation, on January 18, 1991, the government with advice from the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Fund and the World Bank) adopted the *Economic Structural Adjustment Programme* (ESAP) from 1991 to 1995. The programme was mute on the need to address inequality but focused on attempting to restructure the economy from high regulation to liberalisation. ESAP aimed to reduce the deficit from 10% of GDP to approximately 5% by 19945. It was expected to reform public enterprises to abolish subsidies which caused a huge budgetary burden, and to reduce the number of civil servants.[16] The goal was to reduce the wage bill. It also wanted to facilitate labour law reforms by amending the Labour Act to rationalise appointment and dismissal and ease retrenchment processes.

ESAP broadly failed to stimulate economic development in Zimbabwe and worsened inequality in the country. What was the role of international financial institutions and 'global forces' in perpetuating social and economic disparities in Zimbabwe? Crafted by the IMF and the World Bank (apostles of global capitalism), ESAP was perceived by the Zimbabwean public as a tool to reorient the economy from its socialist slant to a capitalistic one. By suspending subsidies on social services and cutting the wage bill through retrenchments, ESAP worsened inequality and became synonymous with poverty in Zimbabwe's shopfloor lingo. Suspicion over the intentions of the IMF and WB, given the competing ideological grounding of the Zimbabwean state and the international financial institutions, complicated the implementation of ESAP programmes. From the economic front, liberalisation exposed the local manufacturing sector to stiff import competition. At a local level, the programme was also affected by natural factors, particularly the prolonged 1991/2 drought. By 1995, the country's deficit had reached up to 13% of GDP. Inflation worsened, which eroded peoples' purchasing power.[17]

In reaction, the government launched the *Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation* (ZIMPREST) (1996-2000). Although it was meant to continue the unfinished business of ESAP, such as parastatal reforms, financial sector reform, and civil service reform, it also vowed to address worsening inequality by confronting the "constraints to economic growth, employment creation and poverty alleviation as well as facilitating public and private savings and investment."[18] ZIMPREST aimed to "provide a firm basis for sustainable growth, greater employment and equitable distribution of incomes… to prop up private sector role in production and distribution of goods and services with government to act as an enabler while the private sector was to lead in growing the economy and employment creation."[19]

Like preceding policies and programmes, ZIMPREST fared poorly. Owing to its waning political chances, the ruling party government ditched meaningful programmes to redistribute incomes and widen economic chances to the broader population. It decided to patronise key stakeholders in its political life, particularly liberation war veterans. In 1997 the government made an unbudgeted once-off payment of Z$50,000 (then worth $1,315) and long-term pensions to 60,000 liberation war veterans.[20] At about the same time the government participated in an expensive civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Those massive expenditures reduced the financial resources to roll out programmes to improve the standards of the people. The economic consequences of this had lasting repercussions. On November 14, 1997, the local currency lost 71.5% of its value against the United States dollar and the stock market crashed by 46%.[21]

The Third Decade (2001-2010): *The Fast-Track Land Reform Programme*

Zimbabwe's third decade of political independence was marked by social and economic turmoil that headlined globally. Within the context of challenges, the government developed several economic policies, most of which were never implemented, evaluated or even talked about. One key programme nonetheless dominates the discourse on Zimbabwe's third decade: the 2000 *Fast Track Land Reform Programme* (FTLRP). The FTLRP was an unparalleled countrywide occupation of farms and estates owned by white farmers by the supposedly landless blacks due to delayed land and agrarian reforms.[22] The FTLRP occurred in two main phases. The first phase was the 1998-2000 seizure of white-owned farms by war veterans. However, such occupations and the demand that 20% of the land be set for the war veterans were not recognised by the ZANU-PF led government.[23] The second phase was the formalisation of land acquisition and speedy redistribution of the land from July 2000.[24] While the programme was a reaction to the colonial processes of land dispossession among the black majority and slothful agrarian change during the post-colonial period, the political motivations of the FTLRP distorted its justification as a fight against inequality.

Whereas the major objective raised for the FTLTP was the need to amend the problem of

unequal distribution of land emanating from colonialism and to support agricultural production in communal areas, the FTLRP was perceptibly an issue of political survival. Among the many political pressures threatening the survival of the ZANU PF government included the failure of bilateral negotiations for funding the land reform with Britain in 1997, and the demand for land by the war veterans. These pressures were worsened by the rejection of the 2000 draft constitution in a referendum which meant political doom for ZANU-PF.[25] These and other political threats led the government to use farm invasions to revive its political fortunes. Owing to the political overtures, access to land was largely guaranteed by loyalty to the ruling party rather than any genuine reason to redistribute land.[26]

Importantly, the way the FTLRP was carried out provoked the USA to pass the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001. ZIDERA was meant to pressure the Zimbabwean government to respect human and property rights in response to the land appropriated from mostly white commercial farmers for redistribution to the majority land hungry black Zimbabweans. The Act had widespread implications to the Zimbabwean economy as it comprised of freezing of assets and imposing travel restrictions to some Zimbabwean officials, restrictions on USA investment and trade with Zimbabwe and prohibition of USA international financial institution loans to Zimbabwe. In 2002, the EU followed suit by imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe which included travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargo and restrictions on financial transitions and trade with Zimbabwe.[27] The impact of ZIDERA and EU sanctions on Zimbabwe's economy and society has been widely debated. However, what is notable is these two global forces made a significant impact in worsening poverty in Zimbabwe and further compromising Zimbabwe's fight against inequality. The policies that were developed in the following years were crafted within the context of sanctions and were significantly influenced thus.

The Fourth Decade (2011-2020): *Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation* (ZIMASSET)

Following the end of the Government of National Unity (GNU) (2009-2013)[28] the government launched the *Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation* (ZIMASSET). ZIMASSET's theme was "Towards an Empowered Society and a Growing Economy." ZIMASSET aimed to foster economic growth and be one of the strongest economies in Africa within the context of the USA and EU-imposed sanctions. ZIMASSET focused on four critical clusters: food security and nutrition, social service and poverty eradication, infrastructure and utilities and poverty eradication, and value-added beneficiaries.[29] ZIMASSET was essentially a populist socialist policy from which everyone in the country would benefit. The agricultural sector and infrastructural sectors largely focusing on transport; power generation; ICT; tourism and enhanced support for the SMEs and cooperative sectors, were deemed to be the key drivers of the economy to create employment.

However, like many of its predecessors, the implementation of ZIMASSET was fraught with many structural challenges which triggered its failure to reduce inequality and eradicate poverty in the country. Its major limitation was funding. Given its ambitious nature, ZIMASSET needed a huge amount of foreign currency through donor aid and foreign direct investments. However, Zimbabwe's socialist empowerment policies like the FTLRP and indigenisation policies scared away donors and foreign investment. Furthermore, the high unemployment rate in the country significantly narrowed the tax revenue base that the government targeted to use to supplement its ZIMASSET policy. Furthermore, the agricultural sector which is one of Zimbabwe's main sources of foreign currency was decimated during the FTLRP.

The Fifth Decade (2021-2025): *The National Development Strategy 1* (NDS 1)

After ditching the ZIMASSET policy, the government introduced NDS1 expected to run

until 2030. NDS1 is a framework designed to facilitate transformative economic growth while ensuring sustainability inclusivity. It is a medium-term guideline aimed at achieving the long-term desire of Zimbabwe to become a prosperous equal upper-middle-income society by 2030. The NDS1 incorporated almost all the objectives of Vision 2030.[30] The strategy, which emphasises the principle of common prosperity summed in the rhetoric "leaving no one and no place behind" was aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The NDS1 builds on four guiding principles; "bold and transformative measures," "domestic growth mobilisation," "leveraging competitive advantages" and "commitment to good governance."

Five years after its promulgation, NDS1 is yet to make any meaningful results as far as the desire to reduce inequality in Zimbabwe is concerned. For instance, the 2022 to 2024 national budgets, which were part of the implementation of NDS1, were criticised for widening inequalities between rich and poor Zimbabweans and not doing enough to eradicate poverty. The distribution of resources and economic opportunities remain skewed, pushing it further from achieving equality. The austerity measures introduced in the 2022 budget increased the tax burden on the poor who subsist on the informal economy. These measures constrained household incomes through skewed resource transfers which worsened poverty and inequality. Overall, despite efforts outlined in the NDS1 to promote inclusive growth and leverage Zimbabwe's competitive advantages, the current economic situation reflected in the 2022 -2024 budget does not seem to be effectively addressing inequality or poverty in any significant manner.

Conclusion

Zimbabwe's fight against inequality since 1980 has largely been piecemeal. Rather than reducing inequality, poverty and the gap between the rich and the poor have worsened. The country's economy remains fragile. This calls into political economy question, who benefitted from the succeeding economic policies, and what interests (local and global) were at stake in shaping the course of Zimbabwe's confrontation with equality. Locally, the politics of patronage remains a glaringly big factor in expanding the gap between the rich and the poor. The allocation of resources – land and mineral rights, for instance – is skewed in favour of the political elite with strong connections at the expense of the masses. This opens another impeccable lead to another factor – corruption. Together, these factors have created structural inefficiencies in the implementation of programmes to improve the lot of Zimbabwean masses.

Globally, Zimbabwe's socialist ideological orientation since independence has also contributed to the failure of projects designed to reduce inequality. International financial institutions, the donor community did not support Zimbabwe's socialist programmes and they fell outside capitalism and the principles of liberal democracy. The introduction of ESAP, which worsened inequality in Zimbabwe, was an effort to remove Zimbabwe from its socialist slant. ZIDERA and the EU sanctions were imposed largely to oppose Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform programme. Given the failures of the past four and half decades in addressing inequality in Zimbabwe owing to both local and global forces, the prospects for Vision 2030 seem grim.

Endnotes

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Legal Homophobia on Sexual Minorities: The Illegality of Common Law

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Malawi, like most democratic African countries, has struggled to develop progressive jurisprudence on sexual minorities in courts due to legalized homophobia. The co-existence of the penal code with the sodomy law on the one hand and the Constitution on the other is problematic as it allows unchecked illegality in courts. Common law has allowed the use of retrogressive jurisprudence to criminalise homosexuality through the penal code. It has equally allowed progressive jurisprudence which decriminalises it through the Constitution. Such co-existence is paradoxical, demonstrating that the law can have two facets of the truth. This paper argues that constitutional morality must shape the court and not social morality. Leveraging gaps identified in queer theory, this study advances the scholarship through the development of a research model that recommends scientific queer epistemology through anthropological and historical approaches to create scientific queer jurisprudence. It offers a paradigm shift in the discourse from courts operating illegally to the rule of law through the proposed regulation of common law.

Legal homophobia is created through the enactment of laws that criminalise same-sex relationships. It is defined as cultural prejudice towards sexual minorities manifested through repressive laws (Anderson 2024). About 69 countries in the world criminalise homosexuality. Of these, 33 are African countries (Reid 2022). Such criminalization is based on the predominant belief that homosexuality is un-African and a Western concept. There is an emerging counter-discourse that rejects such theorizing. Tamale (2013) argues that history and anthropology reveal that same-sex relationships existed during the pre-colonial era without criminalization. She contends that *legalized homophobia* and not homosexuality was exported to Africa from Europe "in the form of Western codified and religious laws" (36). The British who developed the law abandoned it following the Wolfenden report in 1957, noting "homosexual relationships between adults by mutual consent and privacy, are… not within the province of criminal law and should be removed from our statutes" (SHD1957, 10). A historical and anthropological analysis by Murray and Roscoe (1998) concurs with Tamale that homosexuality in Africa could be traced to around the 1900s. Ngwena contends that Africa is pluralistic in sexuality (2018, 10). He suggests having a *radical epistemology* that would disrupt the discourse on normalizing heterosexuality (heteronormativity). Ngwena (2018), Tamale (2013) and Murray and Roscoe (1998) all observe that anthropology had either ignored or dismissed the existence of homosexuality among Africans. Murray and Roscoe state that most of what is regarded as African tradition emanates from colonial writing that disrupted African culture (11).

It has been argued that in criminal law one must establish *mens rea* (criminal intent) that can establish harm (Herring 2022). Failure to do so, puts in dispute the legal rules for establishing criminality. Unfortunately, countries like Malawi still use this sodomy law. This has implications as it is in *ultra vires* (beyond jurisdiction) of the Constitution. The court that is supposed to be jurisgenerative (create law) on sexual minorities, has brought inconsistencies in instead. Against this background, the development of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) jurisprudence through common law poses a significant challenge in the courtroom.

The Historical Context of the Legal Framework on LGBT in Malawi

Malawi has a 1929 penal code adopted from the British (Bande 2020). It is modeled on the 1860 Indian penal code which was itself inherited from British colonial rule (HRW 2008). The anti-

homosexuality law under section 377 of the Indian penal code from which Malawi developed its own jurisprudence was decriminalized in 2018 between consenting adults (Johar v Union 2018). The law persists in the Malawi Penal Code. Section 153 refers to *unnatural offences* and 154, to *attempt to commit unnatural offences* and 156 on *indecent practices between males* ((DPP 2012). In 2011, the Malawi Law Commission added another section 137A which criminalized same-sex relationships among females (Kangaude 2019).

Malawi has a Constitution with a Bill of Rights which is a combination of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). These instruments have expounded non-discrimination grounds to sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI). The Constitution is not explicit on SOGI. However, the framers of the Bill of Rights have interpreted it to include SOGI as in the landmark case of *Toonen v. Australia* (1994). Citing the case, Mazel (2022) argues that international human rights law (IHRL) has the potential to transform domestic legislation. The country has also adopted the African Charter on Human and People's rights (ACHPR), and is thus a party to the 2014 African Commission's Resolution 275. The Resolution condemns "other forms of persecutions of persons on the basis of their imputed or real sexual orientation or gender identity" (2). Human Rights Watch argues that by having the anti-homosexuality law, the country is in breach of its human rights obligations on the ACHPR, ICCPR and the ICESCR. One key challenge to the country's adoption of IHRL in its legal framework in Malawian courts is poor interpretation of the Constitution. Kapindu (2015, 75) argues that in a dualist State like Malawi, IHRL ought to automatically become part of the legislation. Gloppen and Kanyongolo have also argued that lack of pro-poor jurisprudence in Malawian courts can be attributed to lack of justiciability of socio-economic rights and lack of jurisprudence on social rights exacerbated by lack of landmark judgments on the same (Gloppen and Kanyongolo 2007).

Methodological Approaches

This study was a desk research from the recent Malawi court case on homosexuality. It uses data from strategic litigation of *amici curiae* (friends of the court) in a case involving a 27-year-old transgender woman convicted of procuring sex under false identity and a 51-year-old Belgian man accused of raping several boys. It also uses case law from other jurisdictions and other primary legal sources such as the penal code, Constitution and IHRL. The study uses queer theory, introduced by Teresa De Lauretis in 1991 (Watson 2005). Queer African studies have emerged to interrogate queer theory of its Western foundational influences (Asante 2022). It is argued that postcolonial thinking is still entrenched in the colonial rhetoric that denies the existence of homosexuality, regarding it as un-African and a Western phenomenon (Hawley 2001). Queer theory provides decolonial methods. However, it is argued that decolonial methods alone are not "sufficient for epistemic justice" (Meer & Muller 2023, 21-22). It is also argued that queer theory has potential to achieve substantive equality (Kepros 2000). Within queer theory is also the concept of queer legal theory (QLT). It is considered 'outside jurisprudence' as it is not recognised in traditional law (Banovic 2023). QLT's goal is to bring queer consciousness into law and court. Kepros recommends that QLT develop literature to provide materials for courts to eliminate 'heterosexist fiction'. According to her, QLT offers an anti-discrimination doctrine that would be devoid of *ideological baggage* (296).

Findings and Discussion

The court case in the High Court of Malawi against the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) (*Akster and Another v. DPP and Another,* 2024) is the most recent one concerning sexual minorities. Skeleton arguments were presented before the court from the Attorney General (AG) which were anti-homosexuality and amici curiae that were anti-LGBT rights and those that were pro LGBT rights. The claimants were challenging the constitutionality of the anti-homosexuality law in the penal code sections 153, 154,156 and 137A

as a violation of their human rights on the key principles of human dignity, non-discrimination and right to privacy. The court quashed all arguments citing that the applicants failed to demonstrate how the sodomy law discriminated against sexual minorities and to either appeal to the Supreme Court or opt for law review with legislators.

Common Law Implications

The skeleton arguments presented in court by both the AG and the amici curiae included different interpretations of case law from other jurisdictions. It is interesting how the same case law can be interpreted mythically and scientifically depending on the judges. The implication of this is that both scientific epistemology and scientific jurisprudence as well as mythical epistemology and mythical jurisprudence are accepted, legitimised, and legalised. Case law from African countries cited in the Malawi court case included RSA and Kenya. However, other jurisdictions such as Botswana and Namibia. The ECtHR and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) had also been used to set legal precedent.

National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice

The AG referred to the South African case *(*1998) to argue that the principle of privacy did not forbid States from interfering if the acts were shameful. However, the AG ignored the broader ruling of the case. Drawing inspiration from ECtHR in (Dudgeon v. The United Kingdom 1981) and in (Norris v. Ireland 1988) the RSA court held that sodomy laws were in violation of privacy, contrary to the AG's claims. The AG had also made reference to the ECtHR in (Willis v. United Kingdom 2002) on the definition of discrimination without acknowledging progressive jurisprudence on LGBT in the UK. The RSA case found the views on the concept of marriage as dictated by heteronormativity as being possessed by "crude bigots" (39). Again, this contradicted the AG's religious pronunciations. The court condemned morality that was based on beliefs instead of the Constitution. The court held "The enforcement of the private moral views … which are based … on nothing more than prejudice, cannot qualify as such a legitimate purpose" (ibid., p.37). It was further noted, "the Bill of Rights is … founded on deep political morality" (ibid., p.132) based on "constitutional guarantees not with unwarranted assumptions" (ibid., p.133). Again 'unwarranted assumptions' reference the ideological baggage of the law which is interrogated by queer theory. The court demonstrated how sodomy laws had been invalidated in most of the mature democracies. It called for substantive equality against formal equality and pointed out that criminalization "reinforced systemic disadvantage" (ibid., 119).

Eric Gitari v. NGO Coordination Board and Others

The AG had also referred to a Kenyan case *Eric Gitari v NGO Coordination Board* (2023). In his argument, the AG insisted that the sodomy law is neither unclear nor ambiguous, agreeing with the case. This case was quite interesting as the judgment seemed to be conflicted. There were parts that were retrogressive and others that were not. Despite questionable interpretation in some parts, the difference in State arguments between this case law and the Malawian court case is that the former tried to balance arguments with some progressive case laws. For instance, there were reservations on the penal code. It was pointed out "Talking of Kenya's penal system…was transplanted and adapted to the exigencies of the British Colonial administration … The relevance of some of these laws remains controversial debate" (74). The court had also made reference to the case of *Johar v Union.* It noted that section 377 on sodomy law was found unconstitutional and "manifestly arbitrary". On morality, it also quoted the Wolfenden report on outlawing the law. It was further pointed out that constitutional morality included pluralism and inclusiveness. In *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972) it was also noted that religion did not give license to state to offer moral judgement to its citizens (Johar v Union 2018).

Motshidiemiang v AG of Botswana & Dausab v The Minister of Justice of Namibia

In *Motshidiemang v. Attorney General Botswana* (2019), the Botswana case displayed queer consciousness. The court held that the arguments made by the respondents were not based on science and that the public morality argument was not "buttressed by any factual, scientific and cogent evidence" (105). The High Court further held that the sodomy law was *ultra vires* to the Constitution. The court found the law unreasonable and unjustifiable. Referring to the Wolfenden Report, it also emphasised that "there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is not the law's business" (122). In the recent Namibia case, *Dausab v The Minister of Justice,* (2024) the court also held that sodomy laws were unconstitutional and struck down all statutes containing the law and declared them invalid. It also held that society's mere dictates of morals and values did not make certain actions criminal. The judge reasoned, "By whose moral values is the State guided?" (15). The judge also noted that public opinion could be characterised by prejudice.

Conclusion

This study set out to interrogate the epistemology used for LGBT law, which also has implications for the epistemology used in the courtroom for LGBT and the sort of jurisprudence that comes out of such an epistemology. This epistemology claims that homosexuality is a Western concept and therefore un-African and against African values. It reinforces heteronormativity with no legal backing apart from the belief that it is perverse and against social morality. Queer theory condemns this and advocates for a queer world in both scholarship and jurisprudence to reflect the social reality of queer society. Prior studies have revealed that the anti-rights epistemology is not based on empirical evidence. Such studies correlate with some historical and anthropological findings by scholars such as Murray and Roscoe that homosexuality existed even during the pre-colonial era. These studies therefore concur with queer theory's assertions that the world is queer and has always been queer. However, such studies fall short of disrupting the dominant mythical epistemology. The study interrogated this mythical epistemology and suggests having a scientific queer theory that would create a scientific queer epistemology of LGBT and also scientific queer jurisprudence. It therefore advances the current queer theory which has been criticized for failing to overtake the dominant universalistic epistemology. Above all, it calls attention to the fictitious nature of the law exacerbated by such a false rhetoric. This aspect can never be ignored as it undermines the law. Illegality should not be allowed into law and those that allow it must be held accountable. The country has the potential to piggy-back on emerging jurisprudence from Africa and other jurisdictions such as the ECtHR, however, it has failed to do so.

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